UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS STUDIES
IN THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES

Vol. XVI SEPTEMBER, 1928 No. 3

A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF BULGARIA 1870-1886

By
ARTHUR MAY HYDE
Professor of History
Union College

PRICE $1.25

PUBLISHED BY THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS
URBANA

[Entered as second-class matter, July 27, 1915, at the post office at Urbana, Illinois, under the Act of August 24, 1912. Acceptance for mailing at the special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized July 31, 1918.]

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PREFACE

Whenever, during the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there was any disturbance in the Balkan Peninsula, the Great Powers of Europe were pretty sure to give it their attention. The situation there was in unstable equilibrium, and a shift was always possible which might be to some one's disadvantage. For this reason a history of the creation of modern Bulgaria must be mainly diplomatic. When stirrings in the Near East indicated danger, the chancelleries of the Great Powers became active. For the same reason, also, we find the history of changes in the Near East written extensively in the languages of Western Europe. Great Britain has been especially generous in the publication of documents and the correspondence of her diplomatic and consular agents. Recently the documents of the German foreign office have been published. Prince Alexander of Battenberg was a German, and left much material which E. C. Corti has made available in his biography. Herr Koch was Alexander's chaplain, and has left his recollections of the Prince in his biography. Jiracek, who occupied an official position in Bulgaria for a number of months, has written an important history of Bulgaria before the days of the principality, and a book on the principality, both descriptive and historical. The journal of M. Quiellé has also been published, covering the time of his residence in Bulgaria as financial adviser together with a history of the early days of the principality. Other books by travellers or foreign residents and abundant material furnished by correspondents of the *London Times* are also available. Accordingly, the writer has felt that even without a knowledge of the Bulgarian language, a diplomatic history of Bulgaria during the period of its birth and infancy can be made worth while.

This book, prepared in partial fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History at the University of Illinois, owes much to several who have read the manuscript. The writer takes pleasure in recording his gratitude

to those who have taken that trouble and made suggestions for improvement: to Professor E. L. Bogart and Professor J. A. Fairlie; and especially to Professor A. H. Lybyer for detailed and kindly criticism; and to my sister, Miss Margaret Hyde, for carefully reading and helpfully suggesting many improvements in diction.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1870 Bulgaria was taking her first important step toward independence In that year she gained her liberty in ecclesiastical affairs by the establishment of the Bulgarian church. This event had been preparing for many years. Gradually the Bulgarians were coming to a realization of long-standing abuses and to a consciousness of their identity as a people. Their first great step toward independence was brought to pass largely by their own efforts, though not without some assistance from foreign powers.

When the Turks conquered the Byzantine Empire, the patriarch of the Greek Church was placed over all the Christians of the newly conquered territories. This was convenient for the Sultan, as such ecclesiastical centralization would take the place, to some extent, of political centralization. The patriarch was given his headquarters in Constantinople. He sat in the divan and served as representative of the people over whom he ruled ecclesiastically. The result was a religious tyranny, a religious tyranny added to political despotism. "The Constantinople Church," states Shasistis, "with its prelates and dignitaries who represented it in every community was virtually their supreme ruler in national affairs as well."[1] Like the Turkish officials and tax-gatherers, the church officials held their places for the exploitation of the people and not for their edification. The people had little or no ethical teaching from their clergy. The priests of ancient Greece were more helpful than these modern priests.[2] They called themselves Christians, but Christianity meant nothing to them but a place in a system for worldly gain and privilege. Bishoprics were bought from the patriarch and the people were compelled to pay the price and enough in addition to support the higher clergy in luxury. Priests were required to pay from $80 to $200 for their ordination and from $20 to $50 yearly. At a marriage or a death, fees were exacted from the

[1]D. Mishew, *The Bulgarians in the Past*, p. 215.
[2]Albert Dumont, in *Revue des deux mondes*, Oct. 1, 1871.

people, and in the case of a death, the corpse could not leave the house until the fee was paid. The amount paid by Christian subjects of the Sultan to their clergy was said to exceed the amount paid to the Ottoman government.[3]

For a long time the people of the Balkans submitted to this oppression. In former times and of late years the Bulgarians have shown sufficient spirit, but for some four centuries after the Turkish conquest they were unresisting subjects. They forgot they were Bulgarians, and no one called to mind certain periods in their history when the name Bulgaria meant glory and power. For many years Europe forgot them too. The Greek language was used in the Bulgarian church services, and, although Bulgarian was employed as their domestic language, the people attached no significance to its use. The submergence of the Bulgarians seems to have taken place during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, unconsciously, both on their part and on the part of the Greeks. During the latter half of the eighteenth century, however, the spirit of nationalism appeared in Europe. Of Turkish subjects, the Greeks were first aroused. It came to be their purpose to hellenize all the Balkan region, perhaps to restore the Byzantine Empire. At any rate it was their ambition to make European Turkey Greek in culture. The Greek patriarchate at Constantinople was to be the important agency in this process. In 1767 the Sultan, over whom the Patriarch had much influence, suppressed the Bulgarian archbishopric of Ochrida. The incumbent had kept the title of patriarch with privileges and with some freedom for his diocese. Memories of former days had been preserved there. But it stood as an obstacle to the hellenizing program; it was therefore removed.

But the spirit of nationality which inflamed the minds of the Greeks affected also the Bulgarians. In 1762, a monk, Paissi, published a history of Bulgaria. It was not a work of scientific merit, but it served to interest a few Bulgarians in their past. "Bulgarians," he said, "learn of your race and know your language. I am taking the trouble to write this history that all Bulgarians may see that our people were also glorious, were more glorious than all others, that they possessed great kings, patri-

[3]St. Marc Girardin, in *Revue des deux mondes*, Feb. 12, 1861. The article is an analysis of reports made by British consuls to their government.

archs, levied taxes on the mighty Byzantines and gave books and writings to other people."[4] The publishing of this book marked the beginning of the Bulgarian renaissance.

This revival progressed slowly. The Greeks did the best they could to check it by burning all they could find of Slavic books and manuscripts. Among the Bulgarians were only a few who were concerned to keep alive the memories of their race. A great many of them had become, to all intents and purposes, Greeks. For many years the schools of Bulgaria were Greek, conducted by Greeks or hellenized Bulgarians. Some of these Bulgarian teachers became intensely patriotic Greeks. Eugene Bulgaris, a Bulgarian who lived in the eighteenth century, was the greatest Greek scholar of his time. To him and to his disciples is due the beginning of the revival of the Greek language and literature.[5] Marco Bozzaris, the legendary hero of the Greek struggle for independence, was a Bulgarian, so it is claimed. Other Bulgarian heroes fought for Greek independence.[6]

However, Paissi's History had some influence, and an attempt was made to start Bulgarian schools; but no Bulgarian school of western standards came into existence before 1835. It is at this time that the movement for the revival of the Bulgarian nationality begins to assume considerable proportions.

In 1840 a translation of the Bible into modern Bulgarian was published. The work of translation was in the hands of a committee of Bulgarians ably assisted by the American missionary, Dr. Elias Riggs. Paissi's History was in a language which is described as a transition from the Slavic used in the Church to the Bulgarian language of today. This Bible was one of the first books in pure Bulgarian. As there were no printing presses allowed in the country, these early books were published abroad.[7]

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many Bulgarians went to the cities. About 1855 there were more than 30,000 in Constantinople.[8] There they became, to some degree, prosperous. They proved to be better artisans than the Greeks. City life was broadening and stimulating and had something to

[4]N. Staneff, *Geschichte der Bulgarien*, pp. 44-45.
[5]Mishew, *op. cit.*, p. 186.
[6]*Ibid.*, p. 195.
[7]Mishew, *op. cit.*, p. 125.
[8]Alois Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Turkenschaft*, p. 189.

do with the emergence of the Bulgarian nation. On the other hand, there were certain districts in the region of the Balkans so retired that they had never been hellenized and certain monasteries continued to use Slavic religious books. In mountainous regions there were organized groups of men called haidouks who helped, also, in keeping alive the memory of a free Bulgaria. They were hardly to be distinguished from bandits, but, like the patriots of the days of Queen Elizabeth, they plundered with discrimination, and a motive even stronger than greed was often revenge for wrongs done to their relatives by the Turks.

These haidouks helped to keep alive the spirit of resistance to oppression and were responsible for several insurrections against the Turks in the nineteenth century. They were rather frequent between 1830 and 1841. In 1834 Marmartchoff of Katel led a rising at Tirnovo. In 1835 advantage was taken of the revolt of Mehemet Ali against the Sultan. The insurrectionists were especially active along the Serbian border, since the Serbians led them to hope for help. In 1836 the monastery of Kapinovo was taken by the Turks and plundered, and Marmartchoff banished to Konia.[9] In 1841 a revolt of a more general character broke out. There were simultaneous insurrections in Nish on the Serbian border; in Kirk-Kilisse near Adrianople, and at Shimla west of Varna. Just before this the Hatti-sherif of 1839 had been issued promising reforms; but, although it was not without result, there was not enough improvement to prevent revolts. Great cruelty was shown by the Turks in putting these insurrections down. Unarmed Bulgarians were attacked, churches were plundered, and 225 villages burned. The Austrian consul at Nish reported atrocities in 2000 villages in the districts of Nish, Pirot, and Leskovas.[10]

The insurrection of 1841 attracted some attention among the Powers. They were appealed to by the Bulgarians, who expected substantial help, especially from France who claimed to be protector of Christians in Turkey. The Serbian cabinet alone made an official protest against the cruelties of the Turks, although European papers published reports of Turkish cruelties and public opinion against Turkish methods began to be aroused

[9]Mishew, *op. cit.*, pp. 345-46; Hajek, *op. cit.*, pp. 150-51.
[10]Hajek, *op. cit.*, pp. 155-56.

among the people of the West.[11] After a time revolutionary bands became well organized, both at home and abroad, and their example and exploits helped to intensify Bulgarian national feeling. The most famous of these insurrectionary leaders or voyoidas was Sava Rakovsky, editor, historian, and archaeologist—wielder of the pen as well as of the sword.[12]

During the years from 1850 to 1870 the efforts of Bulgarian leaders and the interest and participation of foreign governments in the Eastern question became more conspicuous. Attention was directed especially toward obtaining relief for the Christian subjects of Turkey; and the chief purpose of the Bulgarians and their friends came to be to obtain their independence from the Phanar, i.e., the Greek organization at Constantinople controlling Greek Orthodox communicants in a large part of Turkey. For many years the French and Russian governments, and at times the Austrian, had shown themselves sensitive to the violation by the Porte of the rights of Christians. Sometimes those making pilgrimages to the Holy Places were molested, or the privileges of the subjects of European Powers residing in the Ottoman Empire were interfered with, or perhaps Turkish subjects who were Roman Catholic or Greek Orthodox Christians were persecuted.

[11]In the forties Europe began to take some notice of the Bulgarians. The French minister, Guizot, sent a special representative into European Turkey to investigate conditions there, and he not only made his official report but also published a book, *Voyage in Bulgaria* (Paris, 1843). He visited Sofia, Philippopolis, and other places. He witnessed the outbreak of 1841 and its merciless suppression. Here are over 7 million Christians "such as we are," he says, who are treated like dogs by a government with whom all Christian States have representatives. In 1843 there was written by Alexander Stoilovitch, Exarch, a memorial to present to the five Powers of Europe the Bulgarian side of the situation in the Ottoman Empire. In 1846 he tried in vain to get help from European Courts. Palmerston and other representatives of the diplomatic service were interested but unwilling to do anything to weaken Turkey for reasons of high politics. Some Russian savants, too, during the first half of the 19th century, became interested in their brother Slavs in Turkey. Exarch Alexander also aroused the interest of Count Nesselrode, Russian foreign minister, who sent him to Tsar Nicholas I with his memorial, though with no important results. In the forties there were published articles by Cyprien Roberts in the *Revue des deux mondes*, on the people of European Turkey. Hajek, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-68.

[12]Mishew, *op. cit.*, p. 354.

The treaty of Carlowitz, made by Austria and other European states with Turkey in 1699, forbade the ill treatment of Christians residing in the dominion of the Porte, who had accepted Roman Catholicism. The capitulations with France in 1740 provided that the "bishops, subjects of France, and other religious persons who profess the Frankish religion of whatever nation or race they may be when they keep within the borders of their state shall not be molested in the exercise of their functions in the places of our empire where they have for a long time been."[13]

As Russia expanded toward the Black Sea her relations with Turkey became increasingly important. By the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji, made in 1774, "The Sublime Porte promised a continual protection to the Christian religion and to the Churches of that religion."[14] This, and other articles of the treaty, gave the Russian government the right to make representations, and these, the Porte promised to respect. It was, perhaps, partly for imperialistic reasons that these provisions were made and taken advantage of by Russia, but there were other very good reasons for these clauses. A Bulgarian writer says: "By wresting these documents from Turkey, Russia laid the foundation of international altruism until then unknown to history." We find here, at any rate, two of the elements of the Eastern question: first, the presence in Turkey of numerous Christians likely to be unjustly treated by the Turkish officials or people; and second, Russian interest in the situation. It was due to Russia and, in some degree, to England and France, that Greece won her freedom in 1829. England's action at that time, however, was not in accordance with her policy, definitely adopted later, of opposing the disintegration of Turkey.

In 1854 came the Crimean War which began ostensibly over the rights, claimed by France on the one hand and by Russia on the other, to protect Christians in the Ottoman Empire. The result to the Christian subjects in European Turkey was of some importance. It increased the prestige of Turkey, diminished that of Russia, and added to the interest Europe and

[13]A. Schopoff, *Les réformes et la protection des Chrétiens en Turquie*, 1673-1904, p. 8.

[14]*Ibid.*

America took in the East. It also awakened the subject peoples of European Turkey to a larger realization of their condition and aroused, perhaps, an expectation of European help at some future time. By the treaty of 1856 Turkey, being on the side of the victors, was favored by permission "to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe. . . . Their Majesties engage each on his part, to respect the Independence and the Territorial Integrity of the Ottoman Empire." It was because of the promises of reform contained in the firman of 1856, called the Hatti-Houmayoun, that the Powers felt justified in depriving France and Russia of the privilege of interfering in the interests of the Christian subjects of the Sultan, or, perhaps we had better say, in relieving them from that duty. This decree was formally recognized in article IX of the Treaty of Paris:

> His Imperial Majesty the Sultan having in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects, issued a Firman, which, while ameliorating their condition without distinction of Religion or of Race, records his generous intentions towards the Christian population of his Empire, and wishing to give further proof of his sentiments in that respect, has resolved to communicate to the Contracting Parties the said Firman, emanating spontaneously from his Sovereign will.
>
> The contracting parties recognize the high value of this communication. It is clearly understood that it cannot in any case give to the said powers the right to interfere either collectively or separately in the relations of His Majesty the Sultan with his subjects nor in the Internal Administration of his Empire.[15]

Since this notice of the Hatti-Houmayoun was incorporated in the treaty, it was to be expected that the Sultan would occasionally be reminded of his delinquency if he should fail to carry out any of the promises he made. Such was in fact the case. In 1860 came a massacre of Christians in Syria and in 1867 a revolt in Crete and in the Balkans. On both these occasions representatives of the Powers had extensive conversations and copious correspondence over the troubled situation. Prince Gortchakoff, minister of foreign affairs in Russia, took notice of the failure to carry out the promises made in 1856, and argued that in the interests of the peace of Europe something be done, "not pursuing any end exclusively of Russian interest,"

[15]Sir Augustus Oakes and R. B. Mowat, *The Great European Treaties of the Nineteenth Century.*

he said, "but desiring to save Europe from a general conflagration."[16]

Gorchakoff proposed that representatives of the Powers participating in the Treaty of 1856 send a note to the Porte to arouse it from its apathy and to hold conversations with that government in order to induce them to execute the principal provisions of the Hatti-Houmayoun.[17] Gortchakoff declared that the Russian policy was: to maintain the Ottoman Empire, but under reasonable conditions; that, if the hour of that Empire had come, "we desire no territorial aggrandizement, no exclusive advantage provided that the other Powers prove themselves equally disinterested."[18]

England objected to any interference with Turkish independence and no common action was taken in 1860. However, the British consular agents conducted an investigation into the condition of Christians in the Ottoman Empire, and the Sultan sent his grand vizier, Mehmet-Kiprishi Pasha, into the provinces of European Turkey to examine the situation. The Turkish investigation had no consequences except to exasperate the European Powers; but the consular reports to the British government gave some real insight into the hardships of the Christians in the Turkish Empire and induced the British government to consent to a meeting of representatives of the Powers in Constantinople. Once more the Porte successfully used its customary methods. The meeting was put off on the plea that there should be time to prepare for it and the Porte was never ready.

In 1867 the Powers were aroused again by the outbreak in Crete and unrest in Serbia. There was a demand by the Austrian[19] and the Russian[20] governments for a revision of the treaty of 1856. The Austrian government saw the desirability of quiet among the Slavs of the Ottoman Empire. The Russians were always interested in the Balkans and they wished also an annulment of the clause in the Treaty of Paris which forbade them to have warships upon the Black Sea. According to a common

[16]Baron I. DeTesta, *Recueil de Traites de la Porte Ottomane*, VII, 351.
[17]*Ibid.*, p. 356.
[18]*Ibid.*, p. 369.
[19]*Ibid.*, pp. 415 ff.
[20]*Ibid.*, p. 430 ff.

belief in England, the Russian government desired the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, a policy not at all acceptable to British diplomacy. Russian views seem to have been more in accord with true statesmanship. Gortchakoff wrote to the Russian ambassador in Great Britain:

> The fall of empires is in the hands of God. We do not object to the continued existence of the Ottoman Empire in Europe because we have no illusions as to the grave complications its disappearance would bring without a complete entente of the great powers. But we believe that the conservation of the authority of the Sultan is possible only if he rallies to his support his Christian subjects by bonds of confidence and a sense of security and well-being.[21]

The French foreign office saw hopes of improvement in provisions for the education of a class of men from whom judges and other officials of the Ottoman Empire might be drawn.[22] France stood also for an amalgamation of Turkish subjects; Russia, on the other hand, was in favor of decentralization. France thought the fusion of races possible and would make no distinctions among Ottoman subjects. Russia desired the application of the principle of nationality with special guarantees.[23]

The weakness of the French policy is pointed out by the Russian memorandum issued in March, 1867. "Eleven years of painful experience having shown that the Hatti-Houmayoun, which was represented perhaps with too much confidence to be of high value, has had no practical results." This document, more justly than the French proposals, recognizes the fundamental difficulty in the situation, namely, the doctrine of Mohamedan law which makes a marked distinction between Mussulmans and Christians.[24] As an illustration of this condition is cited the attempt of Midhat Pasha to suppress brigandage in Bulgarian territory. He threatened the execution of certain brigands but was not allowed to carry out his purpose because the brigands were Mussulmans. The cadi, the mollah, and all the Turkish authorities protested against their execution.[25] It is evident to one reading the documents of this period that the situation in Turkey was most carefully studied by the

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 430-31.

[22] *Ibid.*, p. 432.

[23] Engelhardt, *La Turquie et le Tanzimat, ou l'histoire des réformes dans l'Empire Ottoman depuis 1826 jusqu'à nos jours*, I, 215-22.

[24] De Testa, *op. cit.*, VII, 437.

[25] *Ibid.*, VII, 438.

Russian government and its recommendations consequently were best adapted to meet the very great difficulties of the Turkish Empire. The remedy it proposed was the autonomy of the Christian population.[26] It was pointed out that certain communities in the Ottoman Empire were governed autonomously with satisfactory results. The Porte, of course, objected to any limitation of its power, and contended that a very important and effectual step had been taken in the way of good government when certain excellent principles had been laid down in the Hatti Sherif of Gualhane of 1839 and the Hatti-Houmayoun of 1856. England was always inclined during this period to take the Turkish point of view, standing firmly for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, urging, however, as a means to that end, the putting into effect of genuine reforms. The Hatti-Houmayoun of 1856 was said to be very largely the results of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe's work. Many times British consuls had interfered and prevented injustice. It was a common thing, at least in the time of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, for a British consul to call the British ambassador's attention to instances of misgovernment and for the British ambassador to talk the matter over with the Turkish authorities and obtain a change of procedure.

In 1867 at the time of the Cretan insurrection, due, no doubt, to the pressure which foreign powers were bringing for the execution of reforms promised in 1856, the Law of the Vilayets was issued providing, among other things, for courts composed of Christians for the trial of cases involving Christians, and mixed courts for those involving Christians and Mussulmans.

The Russian contention that the reform decrees of 1839 and 1856 were dead letters is perhaps not quite borne out by the facts. Besides the Law of the Vilayets, other changes were made. It is true that the reforms were limited in scope and that those proclaimed were not well enforced, yet there was some change for the better. Englehardt points out that after the Hatti Sherif there was no more illegal confiscation of property and that it was no longer considered in accordance with good morals to put enemies out of the way clandestinely. Beside Midhat Pasha, who attempted to effect reforms in the vilayet

[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 446-55.

of the Danube in the latter part of the sixties and early seventies, there were in the Turkish ministry Fuad Pasha and Aali Pasha who were interested in reform. Then, as was true of the Declaration of Rights issued by the French in 1789, these Turkish decrees served as programs and principles to which one could appeal. Cyrus Hamlin, American missionary in Turkey for many years, says that people of the Ottoman Empire claimed freedom from serfdom after the Hatti-Houmayoun was issued and after a while got it. Then he adds: "Most of its provisions were never carried out. But it gave the people a knowledge of their rights. It was to them a political enunciation. It wrought a revolution in their ideas and that has led to a revolution in their condition."[27] A German historian says the execution of the Hatti-Houmayoun took place slowly, unequally, and incompletely, but that the document has remained only a scrap of paper is an assertion made partly through ill-will due to doctrinal considerations.[28]

[27]Cyrus Hamlin, *Among the Turks*, p. 268.
[28]Karl Ritter von Sax, *Geschichte des Machterfalls der Turkie*, p. 346.

CHAPTER II

FOUNDATION OF THE EXARCHATE

We have seen in the preceding chapter something of the tyranny of the Greek bishops over the Bulgarians who came under their care. We have seen also that one archbishop who had Ochrida for his seat had retained some degree of independence and was known as patriarch of the Bulgarians; and that in 1767 the Greek Church induced the Turkish government to suppress this Bulgarian Church. This period of religious independence the Bulgarian Christians recalled, and early in the nineteenth century began their struggle for its restoration. In these efforts to free themselves from the domination of the Phanariote Greeks the European Powers became interested. The demands at first were moderate. They asked only that, while the supremacy of the Greek patriarch should be acknowledged, they should, in certain places, have churches of their own where the services should be in Bulgarian. This request was refused, partly because of the fear that the granting of it would be a first step toward entire independence. At the time of the insurrections in 1841 and in 1851, among the demands of the people were requests for bishops and priests who understood their language. Due to the pressure the Bulgarians were able to exert, the Sultan in 1847 appointed three laymen who should act with the Greek patriarchate and, to a limited extent, should control it. Moreover, in 1848 permission was given for the erection of a Bulgarian Church in the Greek quarter of Constantinople.[1]

One phase of the movement for a separate Bulgarian Church was the project entertained by some Bulgarians for union with the Roman Catholic Church. Romanists were sent as missionaries. One whom Dr. Schauffler, missionary of the American Board, met, is described as a polished, educated man who made large promises of worldly advantages if the Bulgarians would give their allegiance to the Pope.[2] A paper called *Bulgaria* was

[1]Staneff, *Geschichte der Bulgarien*, pp. 56-57.
[2]*Missionary Herald*, March, 1857, pp. 78-79.

published in the interests of Romanism.[3] A considerable number of Bulgarians favored union with the Western Church. Some of the Western powers, including England, supported this step. Turkey, hoping to weaken possible enemies both at home and abroad, was willing to give her consent. So in 1861 the Uniate Bulgarian Church was organized, and recognized by a firman of the Sultan. Sokolski, abbot of the Gabrovo monastery, was ordained as its bishop and patriarch. But the new church did not go well. The support of the French and Austrian ambassadors which was counted upon was not forthcoming. Presents of sacred vases to the Bulgarian Uniate Church from the French Emperor and the existence in Paris of a committee of the most prominent citizens for aiding the Bulgarians had aroused false hopes.[4] The French did not care to offend Russia, and so gave the Bulgarian Roman Catholic Church no further encouragement. Prokesch, the Austrian ambassador, gave out that Austria could intervene in favor of the Bulgarian people only if they broke entirely with orthodoxy, and thereby, with the Russian Empire. The attitude of the British ambassador, Sir Henry Bulwer, at first thought seems hard to explain. He was a Protestant, representing a Protestant power, yet preferred that the Bulgarian Church should ally itself with Rome. The explanation of this attitude is clear if it is remembered that Britain's policy was to thwart Russia's plans for strengthening her influence in the Balkans. The British government continued to hold to the policy which prevailed at the Congress of Berlin and right through the last half of the nineteenth century. Naturally the Russian ambassador opposed the breaking away from the Orthodox Church.

The church was formed, a patriarch was consecrated by the Pope, a berat confirming him in his office was issued by the Porte, and he was allowed to have his headquarters at Constantinople. The movement, however, never developed any vigor as it was impossible to win the support of more than a few Bulgarians. They feared that Rome would prove as great a tyrant as the Greek Church. Moreover, hardly any Bulgarians were

[3]Mishew, *The Bulgarians in the Past*, p. 419.

[4]Simeon Radeff, *La Macedoine et la renaissance bulgare au XIX^e siècle*, p. 199; Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Turkenschaft*, p. 199.

willing to abandon the church of their fathers. What they wanted was a church organization of their own. Many of them helped in the effort to establish the Uniate church with no other purpose than to promote a Bulgarian church independent of Roman Pope and of Greek Patriarch.

St. Clair and Brophy, two British subjects who were in Bulgaria in the sixties and wrote a book on their observations, give a conversation with a Roman Catholic chief of the mission at Varna which presents another reason for the failure of the Roman-Bulgarian Church. The missionary says:

> Some time since several Bulgarian (not Greek though of the Greek Church) Papasses called on me with questions as to the possibility of union with the Holy See—but I can assure you, Signore, that such a thing is quite out of the question. . . . There is one insurmountable religious obstacle to admitting this clergy into union with our Church. . . . Just imagine, all those Papasses, without exception, are so totally ignorant of all that relates to even the first principles and simplest doctrines of Christianity and their ideas of morality, even of social morality, are so vague and loose that it would be utterly impossible to admit them into our church as priests, but I doubt whether, without previously preparing them by a course of study, I should be justified in accepting them as catechumens.[5]

This Catholic priest ignored the Roman Catholic Church established in 1861, it was so obscure and unimportant.

As a protest, the secession from the Orthodox Church had some effect. Influenced also by the Russian ambassador and some vigorous action by a Bulgarian mob, the Greek patriarch was willing to grant certain privileges. The concessions were sanctioned by an imperial firman. They were those the Bulgarians had been asking twenty or thirty years before, a clergy of their own race subject to the Greek patriarch. In 1861 the concessions were regarded as of no importance and were rejected.

After this, negotiations went on for several years between the Phanar and the Bulgarian leaders, with the Russian ambassador showing much interest. In 1866 a satisfactory agreement was arrived at by representatives of the Bulgarians and of the Greek Church, but the agreement was not ratified by the patriarch, Sophronius, nor by the assembly of theologians called for the purpose of considering it. Soon after this a new patriarch displaced Sophronius taking the name Gregory VI.

[5]St. Clair and Brophy, *Residence in Bulgaria*, pp. 102-3; also in *Eastern Question in Bulgaria*, pp. 75-76.

With the election of Gregory VI in February, 1867, the events leading immediately to the establishment of the Bulgarian exarchate may be said to have begun. Gregory VI was a man of ability and character, much respected in Orthodox Church circles. He was inclined to be conciliatory. However, he was a good deal hampered by his advisers. A change in the organization of the church dating from 1860 had lessened the power of the patriarch and increased the power of the lay element in the church. The constitution of the church was so framed that the lay element could make it very uncomfortable for a patriarch who attempted to carry out a policy not pleasing to it. At this time on the question of granting more independence to the churches among the Bulgarians, the laymen were inclined to be less conciliatory than the churchmen. Looking at the political aspects of the matter, they feared that more freedom to the Bulgarians would mean less chance for Greek expansion.

The Russian ambassador, Ignatieff, had used his influence to bring about Gregory's election and the two were prepared to work cordially together. Gregory expressed a desire for a closer cooperation with the Russian Church—not with the government, however. For, he said:

> When political agents are directed to treat of religious matters one is always ready to attribute to them a political purpose concealed under the mask of religion. It would not be any longer the same when the high Russian clergy inaugurated (in spiritual affairs) relations with the patriarchate which is direct and carried on independently of all governmental action.[6]

In dealing with the Bulgarian affair which Gregory took hold of with energy, he consulted confidentially with the Russian ambassador. When his plan was ready he took it to Ignatieff who said of it, "The project of the patriarch gives a body of concessions which effectively guarantee the Bulgarian aspirations. Monseigneur Gregory makes no mistake as to the importance of the plan he proposes."

"I am building a bridge," Gregory remarked, "to the political independence of the Bulgarians."

By Patriarch Gregory's plan the Bulgarians were to have their own church officials and were to be virtually independent

[6]Troubetzkoi, "La politique russe en Orient," in *Revue d'histoire diplomatique*, XXI (1907), 175; Radeff, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

of the Greek Patriarch. This was just what the Bulgarian leaders were working for, and the proposal would have been acceptable to them if it had not narrowed the territory of the Bulgarian church to that between the Danube and the Balkans and thus left out many of the Bulgarian people. Nevertheless, the project no doubt should have been accepted. Ignatieff thought so, and, if it had been, much hard feeling might have been avoided.

As it was, the attempt to effect an arrangement by mutual agreement in a spirit of good will failed. There was fault on both sides. Gregory, influenced by the lay element among his council and also by his own too ardent patriotism, became more and more unwilling to make concessions. The Bulgarian leaders, on their side, were uncompromising and demanded at once all Macedonia and Greece which was inhabited by Slavs. The territory comprised in the plan of Gregory was somewhat more than that included in the Bulgaria of the Congress of Berlin, since the valley of the Morava which was in 1878 given to Serbia and the Dobroudja which was then given to Rumania were granted to the Bulgarian church.[7]

The Greeks felt that their "Grand Idea" was in danger. A few years before this one of the Greek deputies had said:

> What is happening in Crete and in Macedonia puts in peril the future of the fatherland and places an unbreakable barrier to the progress and to the grandeur of Greek civilization. Certain peoples who deserve not that one should pay any attention to them, peoples, who a short time ago considered it an honor to have a share in Hellenism, make themselves now blind and conscienceless instruments of the two anti-Greek propagandas (those of Russia and the Roman Catholic Church) and are doing everything possible to efface every trace of Hellenism from among them. Two hours distance from Salonica, gentlemen, in Constantinople, in fact, the Greek Church and the Greek nationality have become an object of derision and misrepresentation.[8]

The revolt in Crete which came in 1867 and 1868 had its effect on Bulgarian aspirations, as Turkey just then was in need of friends. A deputation of Bulgarians went to the grand vizier Aali Pasha and he told them that the Porte was disposed to recognize the Bulgarians as a nationality, but did not wish to interfere in religious differences. Nevertheless, she overcame her scruples and was induced to interfere. She made the following proposals:

[7]Radeff, *op. cit.*, p. 220.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 207.

1. Free election of their clergy by the Bulgarians.

2. The churches which have been constructed at the expense of the Bulgarian population should be recognized as national property, and they should have the right of constructing new ones.

3. In each diocese the metropolitan and the Bulgarian bishops should choose another residence than that of the high Greek prelates.

4. A special synod for the Bulgarians presided over by a Bulgarian primate should have its seat at Constantinople. . . .

5. The spiritual supremacy of the patriarch should be recognized and his name mentioned during the divine service.[9]

These proposals did not go far toward reconciling the Greeks and Bulgarians. Perhaps they were not designed to. In the first place, the third and fourth provisions were contradictory, inasmuch as at Constantinople both a Bulgarian and a Greek prelate were to have their residences. In the second place, the Turks were not supposed to reveal these proposals to the Bulgarians; yet Fuad Pasha, the Turkish foreign minister, did so, and later the Porte authorized their publication. Moreover, the Greeks were offended that the Porte should venture to interfere in their religious affairs. Gregory was also coming more and more under the influence of Greek nationalists. The situation was a difficult one for Ignatieff, who did not want to antagonize either the Bulgarians or the Greeks. He was accused by the Greek party of having suggested to the Porte the proposals it had made, though at this time he was genuinely anxious that the two parties should agree. The proposals were definitely rejected by the Greek party on the ground that they were contrary to religion, that they were "opposed not only to the canons of the church but in essence even to the spirit of Christianity, that is to say to the dogma of the faith."[10] The principle of nationality ought not to take precedence over the ties of the church. These efforts at reconciliation having proved unsuccessful, it was next proposed that an ecumenical council should take the matter up. The Greek party and Ignatieff were in favor of this proposal; the latter, so that he might avoid the necessity of taking one side or the other in the controversy. The Turks opposed the council fearing that the Russians would have too much influence with it, and the Bulgarians opposed it because they feared it would decide against them. In fact the

[9]Troubetzkoi, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-81.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 183.

location of a Bulgarian metropolitan with his synod in Constantinople, where the Greek patriarch and his synod were located, was in direct contradiction to the twelfth canon of the fourth ecumenical council which declared that two bishoprics could not exist in the same place when the only distinction between the churches was that of race.[11] Accordingly, the Bulgarians, encouraged by the Turks, decided to become rebels and declare their independence of the Orthodox church. The archbishops of Philippopolis, of Sophia, and of Loftcha, who were Bulgarians, sent their resignations to the Greek patriarch and told him that they intended to reconstitute the ancient Bulgarian church. The Bulgarians hoped also for recognition by the Russian Holy Synod.

On the question of holding an ecumenical council, Ignatieff and the Holy Synod at St. Petersburg did not agree. In support of his views, Ignatieff had written to the Russian government:

> Our situation is very delicate. We cannot recognize the creation of a Bulgarian synod at Constantinople nor enter into communication with an autocephalous Bulgarian church before it is recognized by the patriarchate. Otherwise we shall alienate not only the ecumenical patriarch, but all the other patriarchs of the Orient as well as all the other Greeks. If, however, we do not recognize the Bulgarian hierarchy the Slavs will see in us enemies making common cause with the Greeks; moreover the Bulgarians would be perhaps tempted to follow suggestions from the Western Powers and the Turks and accept union with Rome.[12]

Such were the views of the Russian ambassador at Constantinople. The Holy Synod at St. Petersburg agreed with him as to the desirability of reconciling the two parties but thought the holding of an ecumenical synod would make matters worse. "The convocation of an ecumenical council," they thought, "would entail consequences most unfortunate if the Bulgarians should show themselves recalcitrant to its decisions." In that case all hope of bringing things back to the right way would be lost. The Holy Synod was in favor of granting a certain degree of independence, but thought that as long as the Bulgarians did not have an independent state it was not fitting that they should have a church absolutely independent.[13]

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 184.
[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 186-87; Hajek, *op. cit.*, pp. 213-14.
[13] Troubetzkoi, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

Meantime, the position of Turkey had changed and she could act in a more independent manner. The Congress of the powers, meeting at Paris, had thought it best not to interfere in the Cretan affair. Turkey, therefore, did not feel the need any longer of catering to the desires of the Bulgarians. She was becoming more inclined to favor the Greeks, especially as the Greeks were then hostile to Russia. Accordingly, the Porte did not at this time urge the project she had put before the patriarch the year before. So that was dropped, and it was proposed that a mixed commission take up the matter. Accordingly, a commission of three Bulgarians and three Greeks was appointed, all laymen. That the results of their discussions turned out so favorably to the Bulgarians was due largely to the influence of Ignatieff. He was in close relations with Gabriel effendi Krastevitch, one of the Bulgarian members of the commission. Ignatieff's efforts were directed to the reconciliation of the two parties, and due, no doubt, in large measure to his influence, the commission came to an agreement. The plan they proposed was similar to the one agreed to by Gregory in 1867. It had been worked out by Gabriel effendi in collaboration with Ignatieff and was accepted with modifications by his colleagues. The territorial limits prescribed were more extensive than those offered by Gregory two years before, and were not exactly defined. The Bulgarian synod was not to have its seat at Constantinople, but in Tirnovo or Ochrida. Before the project could be put into effect, the consent of the patriarch had to be secured and that proved a difficult matter. The great obstacle was the clash of nationalities. The Bulgarians thought only of their desire to advance their aspirations for political independence, and the Greeks only of their fears that the establishment of an independent Bulgarian Church would stand in the way of the consummation of the Great Idea. In consequence of this dispute, the plan agreed upon by this commission was not accepted, and matters were again left up in the air.

A possibility hoped for by some of the Bulgarian leaders and feared by the Russian ambassador was the renewal of the proposition of the union of the Bulgarian Church with that of Rome. The Vatican Council was being held and there seemed a possibility that the minority, if the ultramontanes were in the major-

ity, would unite themselves with the church of the East. Just then the Protestant missionaries, too, seemed to be more than usually active. Ignatieff consequently became more anxious than ever for a settlement which would quiet the restlessness of the Bulgarians.

The agreement that proved to be impossible by consent of the Patriarch could be effected now only through the Porte. That government now, as ever, was reluctant to come to a decision. Certain events, however, acted as a spur to action. Because affairs in Egypt and in Montenegro were in a state of unrest, as they had been in Crete and Bulgaria itself three years before, and because the Bulgarians themselves were again restless, their leaders thought it a good time to make a demonstration to emphasize their demands. So an unusual number of complaints over the delay in settlement came from Bulgarian regions, and the bishops at Constantinople put what pressure they could upon the grand vizier, with the result, that on the twelfth of March, 1870, the firman constituting the Bulgarian national church was issued. The provisions were as follows:

1. There should be formed an ecclesiastical circumscription under the name of exarchate.[14]

2. Over this circumscription should be a synod presided over by a principal metropolitan who should have the title of exarch.

3. The internal organization of the exarchate should set out to make a body of rules conformable to the canons of the Orthodox Church which should be agreed to by the Ottoman government. The body of rules should be made on the principle of autonomy without reserving to the patriarch the right of intervening in spiritual affairs or in the elections of the bishops and the exarch. The patriarch apprised by the synod of the election of the exarch should deliver without delay a letter of confirmation.

4. The exarch named by a berat of the Sultan should mention during his term of office the patriarch of Constantinople as directed by the canons.

5. The exarch should have the right to enter into relations with the Porte and the local authorities for all the affairs which pertain to them. Only by their interposition could the bishops of his circumscription receive the berats of investiture.

6, 7, and 8. Contain the rules concerning the relations between the exarchate and the patriarchate in spiritual matters. The Bulgarian synod was to

[14]The Bulgarian exarchate included the following eparchies: Rustchuk, Silistria, Shumla, (Sumen) Tirnovo, Sofia, Vratza, Loftcha, Vidin, Nish, Pirot, Kustendil, Samokov, Veles, Varna—without the cities of Varna and Kustendje; Sliven—without Mesembira and Anchialo; Sezopolis and Philippopolis—without the cities of those names, and a few other places.

receive the Holy Eucharist from the ecumenical patriarch. Free passage for bishops going from either of the two churches to the circumscriptions of the other should be allowed.

9. After the example of the patriarch of Jerusalem, who has a house with a chapel in the Phanar, the Bulgarian exarch should have in the same locality a church and a chapel which he can use each time when he has to attend to affairs in Constantinople.

10. The dioceses forming the new circumscription were to be named as in the project of the mixed commission. If the Orthodox inhabitants of a locality (besides those which are enumerated) express the desire unanimously, or even by two-thirds of the population, of affiliating with the Bulgarian exarchate, and if the justice of their demand is recognized, such diocese should be granted.

11. The organization of the monasteries which are within the circumscription of the exarchate was not to be changed.[15]

The promulgation of the firman came as a disagreeable surprise to the Greeks at Constantinople, and no one except the Russian ambassador seems to have expected the Porte to take action just at that time. Ignatieff had been urging the Porte to come to a decision, but he was not taken into their confidence as to the tenor of the firman and could not approve of the parts which were contrary to the rights of the ecumenical patriarch. In regard to the settlement of the question thus brought about, the Russian ambassador wrote to the office of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg:

For my part, I admit that an arrangement made directly without the intervention of the Turkish government certainly seemed preferable, but I am obliged to agree at the same time now that that entente is established, it could not have been done without the sanction of a governmental firman, and that it would have encountered difficulties greater, if not insurmountable, from the side of the Porte and the Western powers. As for the Porte, it is worth while to observe that in yielding the firman to the Bulgarians, it has been brought to recognize the same principle of nationality that it has been so careful to exclude up to this time from the factors which constitute its internal organization. It today admits the enunciation of the popular desires as a basis for the separation of Slavs and Greeks. In short, one is permitted to consider the outcome which has resulted as a happy crowning of five years of efforts on our part.[16]

The Russian ambassador congratulated himself too soon. The controversy was not settled. The Patriarch claimed that the Porte had exceeded its authority and had included in the firman establishing the Bulgarian exarchate provisions out of its

[15]This is taken from Troubetzkoi. The text is in Baker, "Turkey in Europe"; Noradounghian, *Recueil des actes internationaux*, IV, 492-95.

[16]Troubetzkoi, *op. cit.*, pp. 399-400.

sphere, and that, although the Turkish government had no right to violate the laws and canons of the ecumenical church, it had so done. In a message sent to the Porte the Patriarch said: "The Patriarchate cannot submit to a political ultimatum in a question purely religious, and all the more when the provisions of that document are notoriously contrary to the holy canons, as well as to the rights and privileges of the Church."[17] The two features of the firman most objectionable to the Patriarch and to the Greek party were, first, the almost complete breaking of the tie between the patriarchate and the exarchate and, secondly, the wide territorial limits granted to the Bulgarians together with the provision that new districts might be added by vote of two-thirds of the voting population. Gregory demanded of the Porte that it permit an ecumenical council to be held to determine whether the patriarchate could accept the firman. A little later Gregory resigned, not being able to get the consent of the government to the council, and seeing no other way in which he could serve the cause. Anthimos, who had already twice occupied the office, succeeded him.

As in the case of his predecessor, Anthimos, when he first came into office, was inclined to be conciliatory and to make a real effort to come to terms with the Bulgarians. He made many concessions. The Russian ambassador, for his part, as before the issue of the firman, was anxious to prevent a breach between his two protégés. But the Greek nationalists on the one side, and the Bulgarian on the other proved intractable. Bulgarian radicals capped the climax by working up a demonstration in which three of their bishops, accompanied by a crowd of supporters, went to the residence of the Patriarch at nine o'clock in the evening and demanded from him canonical sanction for the bishops to perform their sacred offices on the next day, which was Epiphany. The sanction, demanded in such a way, was not given, but the bishops celebrated mass in the neighborhood of Constantinople notwithstanding. This act of rebellion on the part of the Bulgarians seems to have been planned for the express purpose of preventing an agreement between the Patriarch and the more moderate members of the Bulgarian party. At any rate, that was the result. The Patri-

[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 400-401.

arch's good will was forfeited and the moderate Bulgarian faction withdrew from association with their recalcitrant comrades. With so much feeling on both sides, it was impossible for moderate counsels to prevail. The Greek press vigorously denounced the conduct of the Bulgarians, and the Bulgarians in Odessa sent letters urging their compatriots on the ground to persist in their course. The Russian ambassador tried to reconcile the two parties and prevent a breach in the Orthodox faith, but it was in vain.[18]

Sentiment in the autocephalous churches of the East was strongly against the Bulgarian party. Sure of almost unanimous support, the party of the Phanar called for an assembly of all the heads of the autocephalous churches and of the bishops of the ecumenical patriarchate. This was not an ecumenical council, for none could be held without the consent of the Porte. Its consent was, however, obtained for this less authoritative council.

Meantime the breach had been made wider by the action of the Bulgarians. With the sanction of the Porte, they had elected their exarch and their bishops were consecrating more bishops. In September, 1872, the Bulgarian Church was proclaimed schismatic by the assembly of bishops and patriarchs, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, only, objecting. Perhaps he was under the influence of the Russian ambassador, as his colleagues thought, or it may be he had a clearer vision of the situation than the rest and saw that selfish interests had more to do with the decision of the council than devotion to the welfare of the church. The words of the act proclaiming the schism really condemned those who passed it, as well as the Bulgarians. "We denounce with disapprobation and condemnation philetisms, that is, the distinctions by race, the conflicts, the quarrels, the jealousies and the national divisions in the Church of Christ."[19] Ignatieff tried, even after this, to reconcile the two parties, but

[18]Ignatieff's indignation at the conduct of the Bulgarian extremists and the three bishops who acted with them is expressed in a letter he wrote: "I am under no illusion," he said, "as to the future of a hierarchy whose membership is made up of elements like those we have seen at work. Bishops so unworthy will always be incapable of founding an Orthodox Church which deserves the name." Troubetzkoi, *op. cit.*, p. 409.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 414.

it was in vain. He had thought it in the interests of Russia that he should be impartial and should bring them to an agreement, believing, however, that no agreement was possible without recognizing the Bulgarian aspirations. After the final breach, when he had to take sides, he held with the exarchate and encouraged their aspirations to political freedom. Indeed he not only encouraged it, but stimulated it, as will be seen later. The policy of the Russian Holy Synod had been, as we have seen, somewhat different from that of the Russian ambassador. That body had thought it wise to express no opinion on the conflict between the Greeks and the Bulgarians, for the reason that they foresaw that any advice they might give contrary to the will of the Patriarch of Constantinople would be disregarded. Other European powers represented in Constantinople seem to have taken no interest in the Bulgarian exarchate. Of course always, as well as during this crisis, the Russian interests were more concerned in Turkish affairs than those of other powers; but in the next crisis, other European powers, as well, especially England, became deeply concerned. On this phase of Turkish history, however, Sir Henry Elliot, who was British ambassador at the Porte from 1867 to 1876, has nothing to say in his reminiscences.

The Turkish government did not seem to see the possible consequences of the formation of an independent Bulgarian Church. Perhaps they thought that Bulgarian nationalism would be satisfied with the freedom thus gained, and would not regard the independence of the patriarch of Constantinople as merely a step toward independence of the sultan of Turkey. In 1870, many other subjects of the Porte had patriarchs of their own, yet remained subjects of the sultan. The Bulgarians themselves, the Porte may have remembered, for many years had had a church largely independent of the patriarch of Constantinople.

CHAPTER III

REVOLTS AND ATROCITIES

In the years immediately preceding the insurrections in Herzegovina and Bosnia and the atrocities in Bulgaria, there was not much interest among outside nations in the Eastern Question, except in Russia. England was going along under a policy of isolation. Gladstone was prime minister and engrossed in domestic problems. France had lately been beaten by Prussia; consequently her hands were full with the indemnity to be raised, and her government to be stabilized. Austria, Germany, and Russia, in 1878, formed the League of the Three Emperors. It was understood that Russia was to have her own way with the Poles, that Russia was not to interfere in the Balkan States contrary to the interests of Austria, and that neither was to encourage liberal movements to the detriment of the other.[1] Austria under the direction of the Hungarian statesman Andrassy was ready when the time should come to take an active part in Eastern problems. Russia could never afford to let go her grip on Turkish affairs.

Russian policy during this time was much affected by the Pan Slavic or Pan Slavonic movement, which manifested itself in various ways. The Pan Slavic Congress at Prague in 1848 will be remembered. The Czechs took an active part in promoting the idea at that time. The Slovak, Kollar, between 1832 and 1849, wrote poems to inspire his fellow Slavs. Their theme is: "Slaveeya, dearest mother, arise! Show thy face to the world and gather together thy children."[2] In Russia the Slavic ideal had a different meaning. To the Austrian Slav it meant freedom from the Hapsburg domination, to the Russian it meant the extension of Russian domination. The Russian could not think of a Pan Slavic state with Russia taking a place in it as an equal and not as a superior. Among the numerous titles of the Tsar was that of Prince of Bulgaria, and Russian patriots in the time of Nicholas I delighted in recalling that title.[3] Some found

[1]J. Larmeroux, *Politique exterieure de Austrie-Hongrie*, I, lx.
[2]E. L. Mijatovics, in *Fortnightly Review*, July, 1873, p. 94.
[3]Klaczko, in *Revue des deux mondes*, June 15, 1842, p. 932.

a bond of union in language, one writer trying to prove that all Slavic dialects were as nearly alike as those of the ancient Greek had been, and that therefore they might readily become fused into one Slavic speech, this to be the Russian, as the true Slavic language. Others found the bond of union in the Greek Orthodox Church. Dostoievsky prophesied that Russia's mission was to convert Roman Catholics to Greek Orthodoxy, Romanism being too material a faith.

In 1867 was held at Moscow a Pan Slavic Congress recalling the famous Congress at Prague in 1848. It was, however, not a Congress in form but a scientific gathering, a meeting of the Society of Natural Sciences to which Slavs were invited from various countries. The Russian government had no official connection with the meeting, but gave it its sanction and allowed free transportation on its railroads to those who were invited. They came from everywhere except from Poland, which was not, for reasons well known, on good terms with Russia. The Pan Slavic ideal was expressed in a speech at a meeting of the Congress by a Czech visitor, Rieger:

> The Slavs are the most numerous nation of Europe. But, alas, that nation is not the first. We find the cause of that situation in the fact that they are members of a race which is widely dispersed. Each group has had to struggle against a separate enemy, one against the Magyar, another against the German, a third against the Tatar. But when the sun shall rise upon Slav solidarity, when we shall have recognized that we are only one people, when we shall have learned to sustain ourselves mutually, we shall be a great nation in reality, as we are in numbers.[4]

Again M. Rieger showed himself a good Russian Pan Slavist.

> All nations manifest their greatness upon the world's theatre in succession. It is now the turn of the Slavon. It is for you, Russia, now to take the offensive.

A Czech poet spoke of the "tsar liberateur." "And these words," he said, "will make free the border lands of Russia."[5]

The Russian historian Pogodine hoped for union on the basis of a common language. "We observe," he said, "that our Congress may be the commencement of constant relations in the interest of science, of industry, of commerce, of colonization, and that all the Slavs having in view a common end, will adopt a common language."

[4] L. Leger, *Le Panslavisme*, p. 216.

[5] "The Eastern Question," in *Eclectic*, Vol. 70, p. 702.

A prominent advocate of the extension of Russian influence was General Fadieeff, who, two years after this Moscow Congress, published a little book which was translated into English and attained considerable notoriety. The General was a thorough Pan Slavist. He urged that the Slavonian movement be supported by intellectual means. If Russia has need of men of learning, he would obtain them from Slavonian sources. Russian literature, he says, should be disseminated among Western Slavs. Russians should be made acquainted with the Slavonian world. Slavonian chairs of history, statistics, etc., should be established in Russian universities and upper schools on an equality with Russian chairs. The service of Russia, particularly on the military side, should be open to Slavs of foreign origin, Greeks and Roumanians to be included.[6] Constantinople should become, he thought, the free city of a tribal union.[7] The great Eastern family should consolidate its union by a "community of thrones in one dynasty."[8] To realize these ambitions a display of force would be needed, he thought, for Turkey and Austria would oppose such extensions of Russian power.

Ideas such as these were in the minds of influential Russians during the period with which we are concerned. Ignatieff was a thorough Pan Slavist, and he did what he could to carry out a Pan Slavic programme. There was a good deal going on in the Balkan regions in the time from 1867 to 1876 for which Russian officials were responsible. For Russian propaganda in the Balkans, an organization was formed with headquarters at Moscow, a subcommittee at Vienna, and other committees or agencies on the ground. For example, in December, 1872, orders were given for an organizing committee to be constituted at Mount Athos. Its mission was to be:

1. To establish, in the convent named Roussikon, a depot of arms and munitions of war.

2. To send into Macedonia, Thrace, Bulgaria, and Old Servia, emissaries charged to distribute books and money, and to send partizans of the Slavic cause and volunteers for the patriotic movement.

3. To establish in the peninsula of Athos, Russian and Bulgarian colonies, with a view to transforming that territory into an essentially Slavic country.

[6]Fadieeff, *The Eastern Question*, p. 62.
[7]*Ibid.*, p. 98.
[8]*Ibid.*, p. 100.

To this end you will neglect no means to dispossess the Greeks within the space of some years of all the convents and lands of Athos which still remain in their possession.

The central committee at Moscow goes on with further promises and directions. The Organizing Committee was to have at its disposal annually the sum of 50,000 roubles, the employment of which was to be controlled by the Imperial Embassy at Constantinople.

The direction of the Committee will be confided to the Imperial Consul at Salonica, who will be bound to reside during half the year at Athos. In his absence the Presidency will pass to the Rev. Father Hieronymus to whom will be adjoined three of the monks whom you have recommended to the protection of the Committee, namely the Fathers Macarius (of Roussikon) and Benjamin and Stephen (of Lavra).[9]

A little before this, in August, the central committee had ordered the establishment of an agency at Vidin, and 5,000 roubles was to be allowed for maintenance up to January 1, 1873.

In the book by Giacommetti, from which these communications are taken, are other documents which show some particulars of the working of the system.[10] On the 8th of October, 1872, the Moscow committee had a meeting at which, among other things, they showed interest in "Slavic pupils newly arrived in Russia, and admitted to crown schools." A portrait of Anthimos was presented to the committee, sent with the blessing of His Holiness. It was decided that copies of this portrait should be made and distributed widely among friends of the Bulgarian cause. It was also resolved to address a letter to the exarch "expressing thanks and sympathy with his cause and especial fraternal sentiments toward Bulgarians who hold firmly aloft the Slavic flag against the intrigues of the Phanariotes." In secret session of this same date, their expenses are given: 21,000 roubles for the maintenance of 216 bursars, presumably pupils in Russian schools; 15,000 roubles for the ordinary expenses for permanent agents in the Slavic provinces of Austria and Turkey (65 persons); 2,500 roubles for extraordinary expenses for emissaries in Bulgaria, Galicia, Bohemia, and Hun-

[9]G. Giacometti, *Russia's Work in Turkey*, pp. 39-40. (Dispatch from the central committee to the consul at Salonica.)

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 49.

garian Russia.[11] Prayer books and money were contributed on other occasions for the benefit of the Orthodox Church in Bulgaro-Serbian territory.[12]

Moral support was also given. A dispatch from the Moscow committee to the Vienna committee enjoins them to assure all agencies and subcommittees that, notwithstanding the League of the Three Emperors, Russia is not abandoning the cause of her brother Slavs. Those secular enemies of Slavism, the Poles, represented things otherwise. It is promised that "Russia will never leave her brethren by race without aid and assistance and she remains as in the past, ready for any sacrifice in order to insure them a future worthy of the race to which we have all of us the happiness to belong."[13]

In 1872 and 1873, arms were sent to Serbia and Montenegro. It was reported in February of the latter year that arms furnished by members of the imperial family for Serbia got to Belgrade without arousing suspicion, and a letter from Prince Nicholas of Montenegro to the Grand Duke Nicholas, showed that Russia was furnishing him arms in large quantities. In acknowledging them he said: "My people, Monseigneur, rests its whole hope on the magnanimous heart of the great emperor of Russia, the All Powerful Father and Protector of the Slavic family."[14]

Turkey had her suspicions, and it was reported by the committee in Russia that Turkey was making an investigation in Vidin and Rustchuk, and that it was best just then to send emissaries into other places. Later she got hold of these documents published by M. Giacommetti, and after some delay ventured to make them public.

These intrigues of Russian officials and agents, the making war "incognito," gave the enemies of Russia an opportunity they were looking for to condemn her and excuse Turkey. When, therefore, the insurrections broke out in Herzegovina and Bulgaria in 1875 and 1876, they held Russia chiefly responsible. It was a practice cut out of the same cloth as the later sub-

[11] *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 49.
[14] *Ibid.*, pp. 59-60.

ventions to the French press inducing them to write articles favoring subscriptions to Russian bonds and advocating the Dual Alliance.[15] Perhaps the chief difference was that in the seventies the Russians were plotting against a government, while in the nineties they plotted against a people. In either case it was damaging to have their secret practices become known, and they did not intend that this should happen. Ignatieff, who, of course, was concerned in these underhand dealings, was in special favor at this time with Turkey; for we are told that he was given in 1873, the insignia of the order of Osmanie set in diamonds, a favor never conferred before on an ambassador to the Porte.[16]

The Bulgarians themselves were active in their own behalf. In 1867, contemporaneously with the troubles in Crete, there were uprisings in Bulgaria. Serbian help was again expected. A South Slav tsardom was contemplated with Michael Obrenovitch at the head. The band of rebels was dispersed after a bloody fight and Midhat Pasha, at that time making for himself a reputation as a reforming Turk, was responsible for a frightful inquest from which many innocent Bulgarians suffered.[17] During the later sixties and early seventies the promotion of the Bulgarian revolutionary movement became the object of leaders of importance. One of these leaders was the patriotic poet, Rakovski, who died in 1867. In the previous year there had been founded a Revolutionary Committee for freeing Bulgaria with its headquarters at Bucharest. Rakovski was their first leader and the inspirer of their enthusiasm and activities. He would accomplish his object by a Balkan league such as was achieved in 1912. Roumania and Serbia, he hoped, would take up the Bulgarian cause and make it their own. There were in Bucharest at the same time, that is, in the sixties, two other groups besides the one with which Rakovski worked, one looking to Russia for deliverance, and the other proposing to establish a Bulgaria with the sultan as tsar. This second group hoped to unite their country to Turkey by a personal union; Dualists, they were called. Rakovski stood aloof from both these

[15]It must not be supposed that Russia is the only power guilty of this practice. See G. L. Dickinson, *International Anarchy*, p. 44.

[16]*Times*, Oct. 25, 1873, p. 3.

[17]Hajek, *Bulgarien unter der Turkenschaft*, p. 234 ff.

groups.[18] He was a hater of Russia, believing her selfish.[19] After his death in 1867, he was succeeded by two of his countrymen, Lubin Karaveloff and Vassil Levski, a former monk. Karaveloff, himself an editor, spread his ideas and worked for his ideals through newspapers, and by personal contact, mostly in Bucharest. Levski was most zealous in the cause. "We will shed instead of tears bullets, our hope is in arms," he wrote in a letter. He was for a universal revolution, the ousting of Turkey from the whole Balkan peninsula and the setting up of a "democratic republic."[20] In 1871, he and Karaveloff founded a new Revolutionary Committee to go from group to group and perfect their organization. There was to be a kind of provisional government for Bulgaria with its secret police and its secret post.[21] The president and vice president both were dignified with the title of marshal. The committee of which they were leaders was composed of thirty to forty persons and had oversight of subcommittees in various Roumanian cities. These subcommittees worked with other committees or agents in Bulgarian territory. The purposes of the organization were to accustom the people to a revolt against the Turks, to see to the procuring of weapons, and to collect funds to be forwarded to the committee at Bucharest. When the day for action should come they had a plan worked out by which all Bulgarian patriots should rise and gather at the sound of the church bells, set fire to their own and Turkish villages, then surprise and disarm Turkish garrisons. Slavic Roumelia was to be divided up into districts with a special agent over each who was to act as a governor and establish a provisional government. These agents put themselves into communication with the Herzegovinian and Bosnian leaders as well as with Serbian and Russian agents.[22] At the end of 1872 everything was supposed to be ready for a universal rising, and there was encouragement from the Serbian government. But Levski's plans were upset and the whole movement brought to an end by an adventurer who robbed a Turkish transport, was

[18]Radeff, *La Macedoine et la renaissance bulgare, au XIX^e siècle*, p. 226 ff.
[19]Hajek, *op. cit.*, p. 222.
[20]Hajek, *op. cit.*, p. 241.
[21]*Ibid.*, p. 242.
[22]Bugistre-Belleysan, *Intrigues Muscovites*, pp. 136-38; Staneff, *Geschichte der Bulgarien*, pp. 71-72; Hajek, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

caught, and was induced to tell all he knew of Levski's plans. A little later Levski was betrayed by a trusted follower and put to death. Other leaders, however, carried on the work zealously, but ineffectively.

So the stage was set for the reappearance of the Eastern Question. Those on the ground, Turkish subjects themselves, were prepared to take an active part, as they had not been prepared twenty years before when the Crimean War was fought. We must not, however, make the mistake of thinking that the desire to engage in war against the Turkish government was universal in European Turkey. The more prosperous classes were opposed to any conspiracy. In Bulgaria it is probable that only a small minority was ready for violence. The outbreaks against Turkey began in Herzegovina in July, 1875. Turkey was not able to take the field and put down the insurrection promptly and the disorder spread, involving Bosnia. It seemed necessary for the European Powers to interfere and to decide on a method of procedure, since the Porte was not able to handle the situation to the satisfaction of any one.

Russia, of course, was most interested. How much the revolt was due to the intrigues and how much to intolerable conditions under Turkish rule, no one can say. It is hard to say also how much Russia's interest was due to selfish ambitions and how much to genuine sympathy for her Slav brothers. No doubt there was some unselfish interest, especially among the Russian people; and no doubt there was some selfish ambition, especially in government and military circles. The Russian government felt, and perhaps ought to have felt, some responsibility for the welfare of fellow members of the Orthodox faith and the Slavic race. We can say, I think, that Russia was glad because of the outbreaks in the Balkan peninsula and that she hoped to profit by them; but that she hoped also that her fellow Slavs would profit too. The Russian representative at Constantinople from 1864 to 1877 was General Ignatieff. We have seen the important part he played in the Bulgarian efforts to win independence for their church. He was a clever diplomat, perhaps too clever, for he was not trusted by his fellow diplomatists, who called him "Father of Lies." At any rate, he was an ardent Russian, anxious to promote the interests of his country.

Austria-Hungary, too, was deeply concerned in the Balkan peninsula. Bosnia and Herzegovina were on her borders and their inhabitants were closely related to Austrian and Hungarian subjects. The foreign office was at this time in the control of Count Andrassy. As a Magyar aristocrat, he had no high opinion of the Slavic race. To him was largely due the thwarting of Czech plans to make the Dual Monarchy a triple state. Andrassy is sometimes represented as a tool of Ignatieff, and sometimes it is said that he used Russia to further Austrian interests.[23] The truth would seem to be that the alliance of Austria and Russia at this time was the cause of the extension of the influence of both countries in the Balkan region. Andrassy was not always firm in his devotion to the alliance with Russia.

Great Britain was represented at this time at Constantinople by Sir Henry Elliott, an experienced, hard-working diplomat, whose course, however, during the crisis of 1876 was severely criticised. Lord Derby was foreign secretary, and Disraeli, prime minister; the former, cautious; the latter, brilliant, and prone to take too bold a course. Disraeli was developing an intense interest in the colonial and foreign concerns of the British Empire. He was resolved that Great Britain should not continue to occupy the inconspicuous place in world affairs which she had held under his rival, Gladstone. Bismarck was, during this period, at the height of his prestige and power and was a personage to be reckoned with. He was not, however, directly interested in Balkan affairs. He was in a position, according to his own well-known phrase, to act as "an honest broker."

In 1875 and the first half of 1876, Bulgaria was not the center of interest in Eastern affairs. Nevertheless it will help us to understand diplomatic action concerning that region if we follow briefly the course taken by the European powers with regard to the outbreak in Herzegovina and Bosnia. On December 30, 1875, was issued a statement by the three emperors known as the Andrassy note. That document simply made recommendations to Turkey for the settlement of the troubles. The European Powers approved them, and Turkey agreed to them some-

[23]Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, p. 1; Sir Henry Elliot, *Some Revolutions and other Diplomatic Experiences*, p. 201 ff.

what reluctantly; but the insurgents who at that time were getting the best of the Turks, refused to lay down their arms without some guarantee that Turkey would keep the terms of the agreement. They had had experience with Turkish firmans, hattis, and irades, and were unwilling to give up their struggle for freedom upon the mere issuance of another scrap of paper. On March 10, 1876, they published a proclamation containing their refusal and expressing their reliance upon help from their fellow Slavs of Russia and Serbia. "We can lay down our arms," they say, "only if we are accorded an autonomy similar to that which Montenegro enjoys. We hope, we expect, we are certain, that the powerful, brave, and glorious Russia, will come to assure the liberty of the Serbo-slavs. We do not refuse the help of other European powers, and we hope that that aid will not fail us."[24]

So the revolt continued, and in the next few months things happened to make the situation ten times worse. In the summer of 1876, Bulgaria became the centre of anxious attention on the part of the European Powers. Before that, however, the Powers made another attempt to settle the troubles in Herzegovina and Bosnia. Again it was the three emperors who worked out a programme to apply to the situation. It was Gortchakoff this time who was allowed to propose the solution. The document drawn up by the Russian diplomat was put forth on May 13, 1876. It was sanctioned by his Austrian and Prussian colleagues and is known as the Berlin Memorandum. It was also agreed to by France and Italy. Great Britain, however, refused to accept it. Its distinctive feature was the proposal to use force upon Turkey to assure genuine reforms, and Great Britain would not consent to such a violation of the sovereignty of Turkey. It would be a breach of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The British prime minister thought that the "efficacious measures" recommended would be efficacious in breaking up the Turkish Empire.[25] Moreover, British honor, which the ministry of that period guarded jealously, would be violated if they accepted a policy about which they had not been consulted. "It is almost a mockery," Disraeli said to his cab-

[24]Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
[25]Buckle, *Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, VI, 25.

inet, "for them to talk of a desire that the Powers should act in concert, and then exclude France, Italy and England from their deliberations and ask us by telegraph to say yes or no to propositions which we have never heard discussed."[26]

The rejection of the Berlin Memorandum by Great Britain seems to have had the result of inspiring in Turkey an undue confidence in England's support no matter what happened. For this result, Great Britain was blamed. Lord Odo Russell, British minister at Berlin, feared grave consequences on account of the rejection of the Berlin note. Queen Victoria was for a while anxious about the matter and Gladstone, most of all, condemned the decision of the government. However, public opinion was mostly in favor of Disraeli's policy at the time.[27] In view of what happened in this same month of May, 1876, it was unfortunate that the British government should place itself on the side of the Turks against the other Powers. However, it was nothing new for England to stand for the integrity of Turkey, and it should be remembered that the Berlin Memorandum was issued before the Bulgarian atrocities were known. In this same month took place also the murder of the French and German consuls in Salonika by a Turkish mob, indignant that Europeans should attempt to rescue a Bulgarian girl from her ravishers, and on May 30th occurred the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Aziz. The change in the Turkish ruler, it was hoped for a short time, would lead to real reform.

The Berlin Memorandum did not concern Bulgaria directly. But in the summer of 1876, and from that time on for two years, the Eastern Question was very largely the Bulgarian Question. We have seen how the lines were laid by a few Bulgarian leaders who had the sympathy and help of Russian agents. There were slight outbreaks easily suppressed before May, 1876.[28] In that month they became more serious. The hope was to free the

[26]*Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 26 ff.

[28]The proclamation issued to Bulgarian cities and villages closed as follows: "From today on, we make known in the name of the Bulgarian people before all the world that we demand: Freedom or death to the people! Forward, forward, Brother, God is with us." As a signal for revolt, blood letters were sent around with a design, usually a cross, made with the blood of the first Turk killed. Hajek, *op. cit.*, pp. 262-64, note.

Slavs from the Adriatic to the Danube, and when victory was obtained to establish three kingdoms: an enlarged Montenegro comprising besides Montenegro, Herzegovina, and a part of Albania; a Greater Serbia including Bosnia; and a new Bulgaria extending from Novi-Bazar to Thessaly. Prince Nicholas was to remain ruler of Montenegro and Prince Milan, of Serbia, but there was no ruler named for Bulgaria. The three states were to form a confederation and were to engage to help each other in time of war.[29]

The revolt began on May 1. A few Turkish officials were killed and a few Turkish villages were burned. The rising was by no means so extensive as the promoters hoped. Many of those relied upon did not appear on the stage for action. For example, of the sixteen men designated for the burning of Philippopolis, nine deserted.[30] The revolt was put down easily. The Turks, however, alarmed at the extension of disorder from Bosnia and Herzegovina to other parts of their domain, were not satisfied at the suppression of the few outbreaks which occurred; they were bound to teach their rebellious subjects a lesson and to make sure that there would be no chance of another insurrection. So the Bulgarian atrocities resulted.[31]

[29]Bugistre-Belleysan, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

[30]Extract from *Levant Herald* in Mills', *Ottomans in Europe*, p. 148.

[31]The autobiography of Zachary Stoyanoff makes vivid what the rising of 1876 meant to the Bulgarians who took part in it: the confidence of the leaders, the timidity of most of the peasants, the hostility of the trading classes, the elation of the conspirators for the nine days before the Turkish soldiers and bashi-bazouks were able to repress their little rebellion, the adventures and near starvation of the fugitives, and the barbarities of the Turks toward their prisoners.

The Bulgarians did not expect to accomplish their purpose without bloodshed. Berkoffski, one of their ablest and most forceful leaders, says, "the slave of 500 years can do nothing until he is blooded."

The faith of the peasant in Russia is illustrated by a conversation the writer heard: "'I expect now if the truth was known, Russia was behind all this business of yours?' said the oldest of the three, pointing to the north." "'We're all her children, you know, it's to her we look to free us from the infidels. . . .'"

"'But Russia's the country where they keep the faith and God's laws. I've heard tell by popes and old people as how that's where the True Cross is kept, and also the wooden sword of the Blessed Virgin that the Turks had when they took Stamboul. That's why no soldiers can stand against her Christian armies! The Cross is in front of their cannon when they march.'" Zachary Stoyanoff, *Pages from the Autobiography of a Bulgarian Insurgent* (London, 1913), p. 198.

The scene of the uprising was not in Bulgaria proper, that is, in the Bulgaria of the Congress of Berlin, but in the district south of the Balkans whose chief city was Philippopolis. It is not our purpose to describe it, but to trace its effect upon opinion, public and diplomatic, and upon the course of events which were directed by the European chancelleries. The massacres and attendant horrors were atrocious; there can be no doubt about that. However, the news of them came to the civilized world very slowly; and when it came it was hard to believe, especially for the British representatives. How the news trickled into Constantinople may be gathered from the Journal of the American, H. O. Dwight, who was residing there at the time. Under the entry, May 9th, we read: "The Government gives no information whatever of the situation in Bulgaria. . . . The Bulgarians of the city are jubilant, believing that suppressed news must be favorable to their people." On May 13th, "The papers publish some details from Bulgaria." On May 14, "The Turkish papers now give more news from Bulgaria. It seems that the troops have bombarded a church at Perushtitza, near Philippopolis, and that in consequence, six hundred Bulgarians have surrendered." Other particulars were given but nothing of unusual cruelties. May 18th, "The official dispatches announce more victories in Bulgaria." On May 19th, there were "More victorious bulletins from the Turkish army in Bulgaria. . . . The Turks are elated and pray lustily for divine aid to their troops. The Bulgarians of the city are correspondingly dejected, but still hope that these official bulletins lie." On this day there is a hint of irregularities: "The city (Adrianople) is full of wild ruffians, Circassians, and others, who are on their way to Bulgaria to fight as volunteers,—that is to say, under no orders, and under no organization. The presence of these people in Adrianople is leading the Christians to place their valuables in the heavy stone Hans for safe keeping in case of a riot." Under the entry for May 29th, we read: "The whole Bulgarian rebellion was ended a week or more ago, but for some inscrutable reason, dispatches announcing the fact were withheld from publication by the Government." It was not until June 1st, that Mr. Dwight heard anything of atrocities.

It seems that the Bulgarian revolt has been the excuse for fearful outrages by the Turks. . . . The Turks have acted with perfect ferocity toward the

Bulgarians, but despots are never wont to treat rebels with leniency. The Pan-Slavist agitators ought to have remembered this, and have taken pity on the women and children before teaching these ignorant peasants that it was their duty to revolt for the good of the cause.[32]

News came to Sir Henry Elliot in much the same way, but he took them more exclusively from the Turks perhaps, for he heard a good deal about outrages by Bulgarian insurgents, and little for some time about those of the Turks. However, he feared excesses in putting down the revolt when he learned that bashi-bazouks were to be used.

I again and again protested to the Porte against the employment of irregulars, whose excesses I had foreseen and attempted to guard against even before the rumour of any having been committed had reached me or any of my colleagues at Constantinople.[33]

Mr. Dwight, on June 1st, had a good many particulars of Turkish barbarities, but Sir Henry says:

It was not, in fact, till the middle of June, six weeks after we first heard of the outbreak, that any particulars of the occurrences arrived there, when a dispatch from the Vice-Consul at Adrianople which in the ordinary routine of the service ought at once to have been committed to me, was improperly withheld from me, and given to the correspondent of the *Daily News*.

He resented the charge of his negligence.

Every scrap of information that reached me was at once sent home, and my published dispatches of May 28, June 8 and 19, reported the repeated protests I had been making against the employment of bashi-bazouks, who, I said, had been acting with cruelty and brutality.[34]

Mr. Maynard, United States minister, however, says that Bulgarians "placed in the hands of Sir Henry Elliot, much documentary and other evidence of the treatment to which Bulgaria had been subjected. He did not appear to regard it as authentic."[35] The truth is that the Tory government in power in England at this time was reluctant to believe anything very much to the discredit of the Turks. Sir Henry Elliot acted at times as confidential adviser of the Porte, and had been urging prompt and decisive measures for the suppression of the Bulgarian revolt.

[32]H. G. Dwight, *Turkish Life in War Time*, p. 4 ff.
[33]Sir Henry Elliot, *op. cit.*, pp. 259-60.
[34]*Ibid.*, p. 260.
[35]*Senate Executive Document No. 24, 44th Congress, 2nd Session*, II, 2.

When the first detailed account of the cruel suppression of the Bulgarian revolt was published in the *Daily News* of June 23rd, the government was as much surprised apparently as the public. On June 26th Disraeli was asked in Parliament about the report, and he said that "the information which the government had received did not justify the statements in the *Daily News*."[36] The account was written by Edwin Pears, who after this became one of the leading authorities on Turkish affairs. Mr. Gallenga, correspondent of the Times, sent a report at the same time, but that paper did not see fit to publish it.[37] The *Daily News* was Liberal, being the leading opposition sheet. Later when more details had been published, Disraeli maintained about the same attitude. The reports in the papers, however, produced a much greater effect on the public, and were very damaging to the party in power, and especially to the upholding of the Turkish government which depended so much for support upon Great Britain. Harcourt expressed Liberal sentiment when he said on August 11, in Parliament, that European opinion would support any power that "would emancipate Europe from the curse which afflicted her and redeem Christendom from the shame by which she had been too long dishonored."[38] It was a little less than a month after this that Gladstone came out with his famous pamphlet. By that time the newspaper reports had been confirmed by those of the American, Eugene Schuyler, and of Walter Baring who had been commissioned by Sir Henry Elliot to make an investigation of the alleged barbarities of the Turks.[39] Both of these men were men of honor, and were sent to the scene of events. Their reports agreed substantially and confirmed accounts already published. Schuyler estimated the number of Bulgarians killed, men,

[36]Buckle, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

[37]Robert College people had details of the atrocities. They first told Sir Henry Elliot, and also Mr. Pears of the *Daily News*, and Mr. Gallenga of the *Times*. (Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople*, p. 104) Mr. McGahan, who investigated the massacres in the places where they occurred is sometimes credited with the *Daily News* account of June 23.

[38]Buckle, *op. cit.*, VI, 47.

[39]Baring's official report was not published until September 19th; the preliminary report had been issued in August.

women, and children, at 15,000, and Baring at 12,000.[40] Baring was perhaps a little more inclined than Schuyler to blame the Bulgarians and Russians who instigated the insurrection. Schuyler found proof of the Bulgarians having killed two women. He found evidence of no violations, nor of any Mussulman having been tortured, of any purely Turkish village attacked or burned, of any Mussulman house pillaged, nor of any mosque destroyed or desecrated.[41] The Turks also sent official investigators, one Edib Effendi, who reported a "tissue of falsehoods," and later Blacque Bey, late Ottoman minister to the United States, whose report was said to confirm those of Baring and Schuyler, although it was not published.[42] When Gladstone's pamphlet appeared, the country was already pretty well aroused against the Turks, and his fervid rhetoric intensified the feeling, and excited indignation against the British government, as it was designed to do. He speaks of "fell Satanic orgies." Disraeli had used the phrase "coffee house babble" in reference to some exaggerated reports he had heard. In an often quoted passage, Gladstone urges a distinctly anti-Turk policy upon the Tory government:

> An old servant of the crown and state, I entreat my country men, upon whom far more than perhaps any other people of Europe it depends, to require and to insist that our government which has been working in one direction shall work in the other, and shall apply all its vigour to concur with the other states of Europe in obtaining the extinction of the Turkish executive power in Bulgaria. Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely, by carrying off themselves. Their Zaptiehs and their Mudirs, their Bimbashis and their Yuzbashis, their Kaimakams and their Pashas, one and all, bag and baggage, shall, I hope, clear out from the province they have desolated and profaned.

A few days after the pamphlet on the Bulgarian Horrors was issued, Gladstone in a speech at Blackheath explained his position by saying that Turkey should keep the nominal sovereignty of her European dominions. Many meetings were held in England over British policy in the East. Disraeli, now Lord Beaconsfield, complained of Gladstone's course and that of

[40]A late estimate makes the number killed 3,694, more than half of them women and children. Argyll, *The Eastern Question*, Vol. i, p. 229.

[41]Senate Document, as given under (35), p. 3.

[42]See the *Nation*, Sept. 7, 1876, p. 143.

other Liberals as hampering the free action of the government.[43] Liberal criticism outside of England was rather severe, if we can judge from this extract from a Geneva paper:

> To rule India, they say, the oppression of Oriental peoples is necessary. The subjection of the followers of Christ assures that of the followers of Brahma. Indian interests, or Brahman, or Mohammedan, are of more importance than Christian, European and humanitarian. England, ritualized, Catholicized, Judaized, Toryized, in spite of its dogmas, missions, Bibles, sabbaths, revivals, is no longer the representative of Protestantism, the true Christian people. . . . No, England, you are no longer the true Christian people, nor the true humanitarian people. You are an England Indianized, Mohammedanized. You have exchanged your Christian sceptre for a turban.[44]

British policy had been encouraging the Porte no doubt more than the British administration meant that it should. The Andrassy Note had been approved by England, but only grudgingly and after consultation with Turkey. The Berlin Memorandum had been rejected because force was contemplated and the Porte could not consent to that. In May the British fleet was sent to Besika Bay, and the Turks thought it was for their protection against Russia. Then, in the summer and autumn of 1876, had come the indignation over the Bulgarian massacres. Meetings held, as the one at Blackheath where Gladstone spoke, and deputations sent to remonstrate with the foreign office obliged the government to change its course in some degree. Disraeli had said that agitation would make no difference in the policy of the government.[45] But it did. September 4th he wrote: "I fear there must be a Congress, though I hate it, and I am quite confident we could have managed without it, had it not been for the Bulgarian bogey".[46] Lord Derby, at this time Foreign Secretary, said that the Porte had incurred by its own guilt or negligence a misfortune greater than the loss of a pitched battle in forfeiting the sympathy of England.[47] About the 10th of October he sent a dispatch to the Porte strongly reproving it

[43]Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, II, 553 ff; Buckle, *op. cit.*, VI, 60; *Nation*, Nov. 2, 1876, London correspondence of Oct. 5, p. 270.

[44]Baron A. d'Avril, *Négociations relatives au traite de Berlin*, p. 157, in *l'Alliance liberale.*

[45]Buckle, *The Eastern Question*, *op. cit.*, vi, p. 61.

[46]*Ibid.*, p. 54.

[47]*Saturday Review*, Sept. 16, 1876, p. 340; see also Argyle, *op. cit.*, I, 266.

for the massacres, demanding reparations and telling it that it had incurred the just indignation of Europe.

Statesmen in other countries too were aroused at the Turkish barbarities. The Italian Foreign Minister declared to the English ambassador at Rome that "the Powers could not interfere too soon, but it was horrible to contemplate the idea of Europe having held its hand while such barbarities had been committed." He said that Europe had allowed this to happen to save itself from war, that this was an egotistical policy, and that he was shocked to think of the blood that might have been saved if the Powers had not been supine and content to hope that the reports which reached them were not true. He added that public feeling in Italy had been greatly in favor of the insurgent provinces and of the Christian states at war with the Porte, and that had it not been for the restraining influence of the Government, a large army of Italian volunteers would long ere this have swelled the ranks of the enemies of the Sultan.[48] Public opinion in Russia, already strongly biased in favor of the Balkan insurgents, was greatly aroused against Turkey. In Russia public opinion was not the same thing as in England, where deputations of workingmen took up the cause of the oppressed nationalities in Turkey. Journalists, military officers, and civil servants spoke for the nation there, and, though only a small proportion of the Russian people, they exerted a considerable influence. Many Russian volunteers went to join the Serbian army. Tchernaieff, the general in chief of that army, was one of them.

In Austria-Hungary sentiment was divided. General Klapka joined the Turkish army, giving as his reason that he felt it his duty as a Hungarian to oppose the founding of a South Slav Confederacy. On the other hand, the governor of Dalmatia favored the insurgents. Larger supplies of money and of arms were said to have been furnished them from Austrian territory than from any other quarter.[49]

In the summer or autumn of 1876 the Bulgarians made a diplomatic move in their own behalf. The group of Bulgarians

[48]Argyll, *op. cit.*, p. 262, quoted from *Parliamentary Papers, Turkey, 1, 1877, No. 44*, pp. 32-33.

[49]*Saturday Review*, July 29, 1876, p. 126.

in Constantinople, acting as representatives of the nation, sent a delegation of two to the European chancellories with a carefully prepared statement. The bearers were Tsankoff and Balabanoff. First they went to England, where they were much pleased with their reception. Lord Derby listened to what they had to say and promised to consider Bulgarian affairs, although he said that he stood for the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The *Daily News* and other papers reported their favorable reception. There were many demonstrations in their favor, notably in London and Birmingham. Several thousand came to a meeting in Hyde Park. "I am," wrote Balabanoff, "quite unable to describe the enthusiastic cries and applause with which the many thousand people have received and greeted the Bulgarian delegates. It was not a greeting, it was an ovation."[50]

The delegates found France averse to a war. "Do you know then what a war is?" Thiers asked them. Italy was sympathetic and likely to support the policy of Russia, hoping at some time to get her support for the addition of the Italian provinces which were still outside Italy.[51] In Germany they met Bismarck, and if we can trust Balabanoff's account, his remarks were more sympathetic than some of the expressions attributed to him.

> We have no direct interest in the Orient. We are interested though in universal politics, and in your fate as Christians. Austria has a greater and more direct interest in the Balkan Peninsula, wherefore we seek to unite it with that of Russia who stands unreservedly at your side. The views of Russia and Austria in regard to the Balkan Peninsula do not accord and I am exerting myself as far as possible to reconcile them. Austria is not in feeling hostile to Russia, but views things from another standpoint. Russia from her standpoint would openly hold with you. . . . I can declare frankly to you that we sympathize with you, and that we will do everything in a diplomatic way that lies in our power to change your situation; we will not however, declare war on that account. Should a war have to take place, then Russia will undertake it but we are, as I said, friends of Russia. . . . Be assured of that. . . . The Kaiser, my master, is deeply interested in your affairs also, and wishes sincerely that your situation grow better. He remembers still the struggle of Greece for their freedom from Turkey. He, as well as I, sympathizes with you. Doubt not, you will have success, Europe is with you.[52]

[50]Hajek, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-5.
[51]*Ibid.*, p. 310.
[52]*Ibid.*, pp. 312-13.

The address the Bulgarian delegates presented to the Powers began with a lament over their loss of independence toward the end of the 14th century.

The loss of their independence was indeed a great misfortune for this people; but their conquerors have soon made them realize that they were not only conquered, but they were reduced to a state of slavery in the true sense of the word.

It is impossible to get even approximately an idea of what that unhappy people has suffered for nearly five centuries under the debasing domination of the Turks. It is a miracle indeed that they have been able to survive to this day, a secular martyr destined to afford a living witness before the civilized world against the cruelty of their oppressors.

A people hard-working and peaceable as a people ever was, the Bulgarians have with the sweat of their brow for five centuries watered the land which they cultivate only to the exclusive profit of their oppressors, who can never be satisfied. As recompense, they treat this people as animals only to be exploited in whatever manner is the most lucrative: the life of a Bulgarian, his wealth acquired with so much labor, his honor, the honor of his household, his wife and children, are at the mercy of the most insignificant of the Mussulmans or at the mercy of the first Zaptieh, who appears, veritable scourges of the country. . . . Victim of murder or of plunder at the hands of the Turk, defrauded of its claim to ownership of land that it cultivates so carefully to render it more productive, wantonly insulted or mistreated without any cause, humiliated and put to shame (all this always with the approval of the official rulers), the unfortunate Bulgarian rayah is in advance sure of losing whenever his case comes before a Turkish judge; and unhappy is the one who at the end of his patience dares, in order to ward off the attack, to have recourse to legitimate defence. That right exists in Turkey today for the Turks who, although having no reason to carry weapons, (for no one dares to attack them), use them freely and with all the less restraint because the carrying of arms strictly forbidden to the Bulgarians is permitted to the former who are armed often from head to foot not only in the country, but even in the cities. Each year, especially for the last twenty years, we can reckon by the hundred Bulgarians struck down by the fatal attacks of fanatical Turks without Turkish justice ever taking the pains to seek out and punish the guilty. The life of the Bulgarian giaour is not worth living with the Turks masters of the country. Although they are subject to excessive payments, the unhappy Bulgarians enjoy no advantages at all proportional to the taxes they pay. . . .

Promises of change for the better, as in 1839 and since have made them hopeful, but the higher their hopes, the greater their disappointment at the outcome. The more they make progress in culture and ambition, the more ways are found of keeping them in a state of servitude.

Admitted by the consent of the European powers, Turkey has not changed its system. On the contrary, the idea that the Christian powers have agreed to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, renders it more bold in its conduct toward its oppressed people.

After recalling the recent massacres of their countrymen, they go on as follows:

> Resigned and patient in their long martyrdom, the Bulgarian people can endure no more. The cup of their misfortunes and sufferings has been more than filled. As they do not see that their condition of servitude under the Turkish government is a necessary condition to the maintenance of European equilibrium or to the progress of the human race, they address the Christian governments of Europe, representatives of civilized peoples, to solicit from them conditions which will permit them to live, not as flocks or herds of animals to be shorn or slaughtered when it pleases their masters, but like men enjoying imprescriptible rights and those necessary for their intellectual, social, and moral development. Experience having demonstrated the nature and efficacy of Turkish reforms, the Bulgarian people, which by its traditions, its geographical position, its numerical importance, with the qualities of a people adapted to farm life or industry, possesses all the elements desirable for peaceful progress, put no confidence any more in reforms. They pray then that the powers, protectors of Christians in the Orient, intercede and obtain for them the right henceforth of governing themselves. They demand in other words, full autonomy with a national government guaranteed by the great powers, protectors of the Christians in the Orient, the only way of living peaceably and becoming gradually cultured. The autonomy of the Bulgarian people under these conditions, could alone render them capable of becoming by their inherent qualities (par ses propres forces) one of the most active and constant agents for the progress of civilization in Eastern Europe; it would be at the same time the surest guarantee of a durable peace in the principal part of the Balkan peninsula.
>
> It is the only policy which can hinder in the future such atrocities as have deeply aroused the indignation of the civilized world. . . . They like to believe that, after the cruel trials to which they have had to submit at the hands of their masters, Europe would not wish to put them henceforth in a situation such as to force them to acts of desperation even to the sacrifice of their lives.[53]

Bulgaria had not much force of a material sort with which to make an impression, but the address was a dignified and worthy presentation of their case and no doubt helped their cause. Meantime the Powers had the war between Turkey and the states of Serbia and Montenegro to deal with. They could agree that the war ought to stop, and they could agree on what Turkey ought to do to alleviate conditions, but they could not agree as to what to do when Turkey was recalcitrant and was unwilling to accept the judgment of the Powers. They succeeded in inducing Turkey and Serbia to cease hostilities from September

[53] A. Chaunier, *La Bulgarie, étude diplomatique et de droit international*, pp. 13-15. Quoted from D. Tsankoff and Marco D. Balabanoff, *La Bulgarie*, Appendix.

14th to October 3rd. During that interval it was agreed that Turkey ought to restore the status quo in Serbia and grant autonomy to her discontented provinces, but Turkey objected. Russia and Austria proposed that Austria occupy Bosnia and Russia occupy Bulgaria, but Great Britain would not hear to that and when it was proposed that a joint fleet should seize the straits, the British government objected to that too. The preceding July Russia and Austria, without making a formal treaty, had come to an understanding concerning Balkan affairs. In case Turkey were victorious in the war impending they were to make common efforts to guarantee to the insurgents the liberties and reforms which have been requested of the Porte and promised by it. In case the Turks were defeated Bulgaria, Roumania and Albania might form autonomous states, and Serbia and Montenegro might be slightly enlarged. Whatever of Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be annexed to these two states was to go to Austria. Russia was to get compensation by resuming the frontiers of 1856, and by making additions to the territory from regions about the Black Sea.[54]

[54]Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, II, 189-191.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONFERENCE OF CONSTANTINOPLE AND THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR

The troubles in the East continued to be a matter of concern to the Powers of Europe. The Andrassy Note and the Berlin Memorandum having failed to produce any results, it was determined at the suggestion of Great Britain to hold a conference of the Powers at Constantinople for the purpose of arranging for terms of peace between Serbia and Montenegro, and of remedying evil conditions in Bosnia and Bulgaria. It was agreed by all that Turkey must not be allowed to have her way with her subjects. The problem was to induce Turkey to take this view of the matter. It was upon the representatives of England and of Russia that the responsibility for the success of the conference mainly rested. Salisbury and Elliot were to act as the agents of Great Britain, and Ignatieff, of Russia.[1] Elliot and Ignatieff were already in Constantinople. Salisbury, coming from England, took the opportunity, in order to increase his understanding of the situation, to stop to interview the chancelleries of the Powers of central Europe and of Italy. He found Bismarck wishing for a war between Turkey and Russia, but anxious that England should not engage in it. Bismarck was willing that the fighting power of Russia should be diminished, but he did not want to have to play the difficult part of a neutral if England and Russia should get into a war. He thought the conference would be a failure and that the important question pending was what to do with the territory of Turkey when she collapsed.[2] Salisbury found Andrassy also "thinking very little of what was to be done at the Conference and a great deal of what was to be done after it had broken up."[3] In Italy, "They are earnestly for peace—but their sympathies are Russian."[4] The Italian

[1]Baron de Werther represented Germany; Count Zichy and Baron Calice, Austria; Count de Bourgoing and Count de Chaudordy, France; Count Corti, Italy; Safvet Pasha and Edhem Pasha, Turkey. *State Papers*, 1876-77, p. 1114.

[2]Cecil, Lady Gwendolen, *Life of Salisbury*, II, 199.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 104.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 107.

minister of Foreign Affairs, Meligari, said he was opposed to military occupation of the Turkish provinces, but thought there should be guarantees of good government there.[5]

When the delegates came to Constantinople, they thought they ought to hold preliminary meetings among themselves and come to an understanding in regard to what they should demand of Turkey, believing that Turkey would not venture to refuse what united Europe asked of her. This mode of procedure was not calculated to predispose Turkey in favor of the wishes of the Powers. These preliminary meetings, moreover, were held at the headquarters of the embassy of the Russian government, at this time regarded as an enemy of the Turks. The conference met on the 23rd of December with the decision of the six Powers ready to present to the Porte. Agreement had been unexpectedly easy. To the surprise of everyone, and to the disgust of Sir Henry Elliot, Salisbury's colleague, who had been for several years in Constantinople and who did not at all approve of General Ignatieff, Great Britain and Russia came quickly to a complete understanding. What they agreed to no one else cared to oppose. Territory was to be added to Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina were to have an autonomous government with a governor named for five years by the Sultan with the consent of the Powers. Bulgaria was to be divided into two parts, the dividing line running from north to south. The chief city of the eastern vilayet was to be Tirnovo, that of the western, Sofia. The former extended south to include Kirk Kilisse, almost to Adrianople. The latter included Nish and Uskub on the west, and Strumnitza on the south west. Over each of these vilayets or provinces was to be a governor general, appointed for five years with the consent of the Powers. In each vilayet was to be an assembly elected for four years to advise with the governor general. Of the revenue collected, 70% was to go to the vilayet, and 30% to the Ottoman Government. The vilayets were to be subdivided into smaller territorial units and a considerable amount of self-government was to be allowed them. An army made up of regular Ottoman soldiers was to be cantoned in fortresses and the principal cities of Bulgaria. It was primarily for defense from external enemies, but might be used

[5] *State Papers*, 1876-77, p. 1084.

to maintain internal order on the demand of the governor general. For keeping order on ordinary occasions there was to be a gendarmerie made up of Christians and Mussulmans proportioned in each district to the number of each in the population. According to the plan agreed upon by the Powers, there was also to be an international commission, to be nominated for a year by the guaranteeing Powers, to watch over the execution of the regulations made for the benefit of the Bulgarians.[6]

The Ottoman Government very seriously objected to the regulations laid down for them by the unanimous agreement of the Powers and refused to accept the conditions. Safket Pasha, their principal representative, resented the title "Bulgaria" inserted in these regulations at the head of those designed for the "Oriental" and "Occidental" vilayets. The Turks also objected to the boundaries fixed for these districts. The design of the Powers was to exclude those portions in the south of this region which were mostly Mohammedan and include those largely Christian, but the Turks thought it was best to fuse those of the two religions. The chief objection, though, was to the international commission. "The simple enumeration of the powers of the International Commission suffices to show," they said, "that its formation is equivalent to the suspension of every action of the Imperial Government over Bosnia, as well as over the two vilayets Oriental and Occidental."[7] Also it was contrary to the Treaty of Paris.

"Moreover," said the Turks, "these demands of the Powers are quite superfluous." Turkey was actually in the process of reforming herself. Just at the time of the formal opening of the conference a new constitution had been proclaimed. While Safket Pasha, the Turkish minister of foreign affairs was addressing the conference, a salvo of artillery was heard. "These salutes," he said, "announce the promulgation of the Constitution which the Sultan grants his Empire. That act changes a form of government which has lasted for six hundred years and inaugurates a new era in the prosperity of the Ottoman people."[8]

[6]Noradounghian, *Recueil des Actes Internationaux de L'Empire Ottoman*, III, 411.

[7]*State Papers*, 1876-77, p. 1154; Noradounghian, *op. cit.*, III, 448.

[8]Noradounghian, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

He also claimed that:

The country inhabited by the Bulgarians was one which, during the period since the Treaty of Paris, had profited most by material and administrative concessions. The Bulgarian people and its moral needs had been the object of quite special solicitude, so much so, that among the other peoples of the Empire, there were those who went so far as to accuse the Sublime Porte of partiality in favor of its Bulgarian subjects.[9]

If Turkey would not submit to the decision of the Powers, what was to be done? One recourse was to reduce the terms. They were already at an irreducible minimum, Ignatieff had said; nevertheless, Russia consented to a further modification. This was not sufficient. Turkey still was stubborn and the Conference gave up. Some thought the failure due to British encouragement, that Turkey was led to believe not only that England would not be a party to the use of force, but would not permit any one else to use it. Indeed, Lord Derby seems to have made a statement to that effect to Musurus Pasha, the Turkish ambassador to London. The grand vizier telegraphed his deep gratitude for British favor.[10] However, Sir Henry Elliot and Lord Salisbury had told the Turks more than once that England could not support her and had urged her to yield to the demands of the Conference. Salisbury, at least, seems to have been in earnest, but he thought others were encouraging the Turks.

I am trying very hard to make them understand that in no case will they have any assistance from England, but I do not know whether I shall succeed. There is a colony of English and Greeks who make money by war contracts, and who think that by urging the Turks to stand out they will force England to spend money here. Nor are they alone. Sir Henry Elliot of course behaves quite loyally, but that is not the case with his entourage on the embassy, and the Turks are too much disposed by their own practice to believe that official declarations are mere blinds, and that the truth is only to be discovered by backstairs gossip.[11]

Again he writes:

Several of the minor diplomats who see much of the game as spectators, assure me that the Turks are still convinced that if there is war, England must be drawn into it on their side. . . . I get the same impression from many other quarters. The other ambassadors attribute this state of things to the attitude and language of Sir Henry Elliot. . . . I do not for a moment suggest any doubt of Sir Henry's loyalty. He is a thorough gentleman and means to act quite fairly. But he allows it to be seen that his sympathies are with the

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 403-4.
[10] MacColl, in *Contemporary Review*, March, 1879, p. 778.
[11] Cecil, *op. cit.*, II, 117-18.

Turks, and against the proposals of the Powers. . . . I feel that, however disagreeable it is, I am bound to recommend to the Cabinet on some pretext or other to get him away.[12]

Elliot was removed, but not until the conference was over. Possibly he would have been removed earlier, had not advice for the same action, made either from indiscretion or malice, been presented to the cabinet at the same time as Salisbury's. In an article in the Nineteenth Century, published in 1888,[13] Sir Henry argues that the Turks really meant reform when they issued the constitution of 1876.

That constitution provided for most of the reforms which had been asked for in the provinces. If the conference had received communication in regard to it formally and officially, the Powers would have had the right to insist on its observation (sic). The Sultan could not have openly repudiated it. The Powers would have been seconded by the immense majority of the Sultan's own subjects. The members of the conference were not aware of the earnestness of the reformers. What was good was passed over and what was bad was commented on. Two sessions of the Turkish Parliament held were most encouraging and showed the members fully determined that their control over the government should be a real one. Midhat Pasha of the reforming party was under the disfavor of the Conference. If he had not been, Abdul Hamid would not have ventured to dismiss him.

Beaconsfield and Derby were more inclined to agree with Elliot than with Salisbury in their attitude toward Turkey. The policy of the cabinet, as resolved on at the time of the opening of the conference at Constantinople, was decided to be what Derby had expressed to the Turkish ambassador shortly before:

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

[13] *Nineteenth Century*, Feb., 1888, pp. 294 ff; also in Sir Henry Elliot, *Some Revolutions and other Diplomatic Experiences*, Ch. XI. "It was universally believed that Sir Henry Elliot was commissioned privately to encourage the Turks to resist." Says George Washburn, "England and Turkey," *International Review*, Sept., 1879, p. 317. See also Gallenga, *Two Years of the Eastern Question*, II, 241; also Hardinge's *The Fourth Earl of Carnarvon*, II, 341. Sir Stafford Northcote who was a member of the cabinet at this time, comments as follows on the conduct of Elliot and Disraeli at this time. "The difficulties have been considerably increased by the imbecility of Elliot and (in the profoundest secrecy be it said) the unfortunate levity of our chief." Letters to Carnarvon in Hardinge, II, 335.

Concerning Salisbury, Carnarvon observes: "His antagonism to Turkey was of the strongest, not to say of the bitterest kind, and I understood and believed him to consider the case of the Christians to be one of absolutely essential vital importance." *Ibid.*, p. 340.

"not to coerce the Porte nor sanction coercion by others but to use every means of friendly influence and persuasion."[14] In a letter of December 28th, he wrote to Derby: "Salisbury seems to be most prejudiced, and not to be aware that his principal object in being sent to Constantinople is to keep the Russians out of Turkey and not to create an ideal existence for Turkish Christians."[15]

Midhat Pasha who was Grand Vizier during the time of the conference wrote in an English magazine a year or two later:

> Turkey was not unaware of the attitude of the English Government towards her; the British cabinet had declared in clear terms that it would not interfere in our dispute.
>
> This decision of the English Cabinet was perfectly well known to us; but we knew still better that the general interests of Europe and the particular interests of England were so bound up in our dispute with Russia, that it appeared to us to be absolutely impossible for her not to interfere sooner or later in this Eastern dispute.[16]

When war broke out a little later there were many Englishmen who joined the Turkish army, although it is said that their help to the Turkish cause was of inconsequence. One of them was Hobart Pasha who had distinguished himself as a blockade runner during the American Civil War. He was put at the head of the Turkish navy.

No doubt the diplomatic course for Great Britain to pursue was difficult to determine. Mr. Herbert A. L. Fisher has summed up in a sentence the complexities of the situation:

> Here there was British diplomacy subjected to a complicated mass of conflicting strains and stresses, policy pulling one way, religion another, liberal ideas prompting the emancipation of the subject races, imperialist fears suggesting that emancipation was but a cloak for Russian aggrandizement, desire whispering that the Turk could be made respectable, experience replying that he would be a barbarian till the end of time, the short view counselling that the Turkish Empire must be preserved from going into liquidation, the long view adding that care must be taken to ensure an equitable distribution of the reversionary interests.[17]

[14]Buckle, *Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, VI, 109.

[15]*Ibid.*

[16]*Nineteenth Century*, June, 1878, pp. 987-88. Washburn says that Midhat Pasha, not the Sultan, was responsible for the non-acceptance of the terms proposed at the conference, also that the state of feeling was such in Constantinople that the Sultan would not dare accept the proposals of the conference. *Ibid.*, pp. 310-12.

[17]*Edinburgh Review*, April, 1924, p. 281.

The Bulgarians themselves were not at this time able to take much part in their diplomatic history. They were anxious onlookers. They were afraid the new constitution might be approved by the Powers, and their hopes of a nation of their own disappointed. "Hence the Bulgarians denounce the constitution as an insult to Europe and they ridicule the idea of a sovereign granting a constitution to his subjects as something in itself opposed to liberty."[18]

So the concert of Europe was unable to deal successfully with the Turk. Nothing would answer but force, and, if she could prevent it without too much sacrifice, Great Britain would not allow that. The Pan-Slavists of Russia were eager to make war on Turkey and war seemed imminent. Under these conditions, the chancelleries of Europe began actively to seek some advantage, each for himself. In July, 1876, Russia and Austria had made the treaty at Reichstadt, already spoken of. In January, 1877, while the conference of Constantinople was in session and apparently failing, that treaty was reaffirmed and added to by the treaty of Bucharest. "Considering that in the pending diplomatic negotiations disagreements might arise of a nature to bring about a rupture between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in conformity with the close friendship which binds them and with the urgency of obviating the possibility of a collision between the interests of their respective states it seemed best to reach an understanding in contemplation of that eventuality." They agreed that there should be established, "In Bosnia and Herzegovina an autonomous régime not too greatly exceeding the measure fixed by the dispatch of December 30, 1875 (the Andrassy note), and the guarantees of the memorandum of Berlin. As Bulgaria is placed under more favorable conditions for the exercise of autonomous institutions, they mutually engage to demand for this province in the conference a larger autonomy buttressed by substantial guarantees."[19]

It was also agreed that "in case of a territorial modification or of a dissolution of the Ottoman Empire the establishment of a great compact Slavic or other state is excluded. In compensation, Bulgaria, Albania, and the rest of Rumelia might be con-

[18]H. O. Dwight, *Turkish Life in War Time.*

[19]Pribram, *The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary*, II, 194-95.

stituted into independent states."[20] Out of these conventions Austria gained Russia's consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Russia, the assurance of Austria's neutrality when the war with Turkey should break out.

Austria, not satisfied with a treaty with the enemy of Turkey, about the same time came to an understanding, a secret one, with Great Britain, her friend. The provisions were as follows:

> No power can have an exclusive protectorate over the Christian population of the Balkans. No state has the right to pretend to determine alone and definitely the consequences of the Russo-Turkish war without cooperation of the other protecting powers. No great Slav state may be formed to the detriment of the population of the Balkans. Much less could they grant a political autonomy with a native chief at the head.[21]

These attempts to provide against the consequences of a war in the East did not prevent further attempts to avert it. The Tsar and Gortchakoff seem not to have been desirous of war, but there was strong pressure brought to bear upon them by the Pan-Slavists. The official attitude is shown in a dispatch of January 31 from Gortchakoff to Schouvaloff, the Russian ambassador to England. "The refusal of the Turkish government," he wrote "threatens the dignity and the tranquillity of Europe." He said that Russia desired to act in common with other European Powers, but was anxious to know what they are going to do about it.[22]

No immediate answer was given to Russia. The course of the Powers had been such, and continued to be such as to encourage both Russia and Turkey. Demands were made of Turkey for the better treatment of the Christians in her Empire. They all agreed that reform was imperative. Some said the Ottoman government was weak and lacked the power to protect her Christian subjects. Others were convinced that she didn't care to. So, if Russia used coercion, she could feel herself justified. On the other hand, the Powers had refused to use coercion. So, Turkey could satisfy them with promises and fail to keep the promises. She knew she ran some risk of bringing the Russian armies down upon her, but that was a risk she felt

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 203.
[21] Max Hoschiller in *Revue de Paris*, July-August, 1915, p. 609.
[22] *State Papers*, 1876-77, p. 1105.

able to meet, especially as she thought there was a high probability of England's assistance.

Russia did not care to adopt an aggressive policy immediately after the conference at Constantinople. It was winter and the weather not favorable to a campaign. Then the diplomatic position of Russia would be improved by another attempt to bring the united pressure of Europe on the recalcitrant Turks. So Ignatieff, the Russian ambassador was sent on a mission to the various courts of Europe in order to keep Turkish affairs to the front, and if possible, to obtain a fresh condemnation of the Ottoman government.

Meantime, two events had been taking place, one of which was favorable to peace and the other, unfavorable. Unfavorable to peace was the dismissal of Midhat Pasha. He had been succeeded by Edhem Pasha. Looking toward peace was the conclusion of the war between Turkey and Serbia, although Montenegro had not ceased hostilities. It is true that the Turks had been stubborn at the Conference of Constantinople with Midhat Pasha as Grand Vizier; nevertheless, he was regarded as the one responsible for the dethroning of the inefficient and reactionary sultans during the preceding summer. He was, moreover, the one chiefly interested in the new Turkish constitution. Edhem Pasha belonged to the party having no sympathy with reformers. Russia was taking the position that unless there was real reform and adequate assurance that the Christians of European Turkey would be protected, she must interfere. No year of grace could be allowed, Ignatieff declared to the Italian ambassador at Berlin. "Russia could not remain so long under arms, and if she disarmed, she would appear to have abandoned the Christians of the Ottoman Empire to Turkish fanaticism." So Ignatieff was commissioned to visit the courts of Europe in order to get the powers to agree to a statement he had drawn up for the ameliorating of conditions among the Balkan Christians. "Provided that Europe," he says, "accepted the document and put its signature to it, Russia would be assured that Europe assumed the guardianship of those interests in behalf of which it had assembled, in conference at Constantinople. If, however, the anticipation should not be verified, Russia would be constrained

to regulate her action solely on the basis of her interests, a result which she had the liveliest wish to avoid."[23]

Ignatieff had an interview with Bismarck in Berlin on March 4th. Bismarck thought England would not undertake the moral obligation implied in signing the document. The business was not Germany's affair. He inferred that Russia, notwithstanding her affirmation, would strike, and that she hardly expected a peaceful solution of the trouble. A little later Ignatieff was in Paris, and there he told Lord Lyons, the British ambassador, that the Russian Government could not demobilize unless something was gained, unless the Russian people were convinced that Europe had not been set at naught, and that some security had been obtained by the Christian population.[24]

Ignatieff's most important task was in England. While there he astonished Salisbury, whose guest he was, and the opposition leaders as well, by confiding to them diplomatic secrets which they might use to advantage in their attacks upon the Government. The Liberal leaders, however, refused to take advantage of their inside information, and told Salisbury of the revelations of his strange guest.

Ignatieff, notwithstanding Bismarck's prophecy, did succeed in getting the British government to accept, with a few changes, the document the Russian government had drawn up. It was signed also by the representatives of the six Powers, and issued March 31, 1877. "In view of the good intentions of the Porte," it said, "the Powers believe that they have good grounds for hoping the Porte will profit by the present lull to apply the reforms energetically." The representatives of the Powers at Constantinople and their local agents would watch and see how well the Porte was keeping her promises.

> If their hopes should be disappointed and the Christian subjects of the Sultan should not be improved in a manner to prevent the return of the complications which periodically disturb the peace of the East, they think it right to declare that such a state of affairs would be incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general. In such case they reserve to themselves to consider in common as to the means which they may deem best fitted to secure the well being of the Christian populations and the interests of the general peace.[25]

[23]From a letter of Malcolm MacColl in *The Spectator*, April 28, 1877. Quotations from the *Italian Green Book*.

[24]Argyll, *The Eastern Question*, I, 386-87.

[25]*Annual Register*, 1877, Part II, pp. 210-11.

With the protocol went three declarations, one by Russia, one by Italy, and one by Great Britain. Those by Great Britain and Italy were practically the same. They said that if the proposed peace with Montenegro and demobilization of the Turkish and Russian armies were not attained, the protocol was null and void. Russia, on the other hand, was not willing to let matters rest in case Turkey should reject its terms. The Russian ambassador declared that,

> If peace with Montenegro is concluded and the Porte accepts the advice of Europe and shows itself ready to replace its forces on a peace footing and seriously to undertake the reforms mentioned in the Protocol, let it send to St. Petersburg a special envoy to treat of disarmament, to which His Majesty would also on his part consent.
>
> If massacres similar to those which have occurred in Bulgaria take place, this would necessarily put a stop to measures of demobilization.[26]

The English government urged Turkey to accept the terms of the protocol. Lord Derby told Schouvaloff that he had protested against their rejection and had desired Mr. Jocelyn, chargé of affairs at Constantinople, to say that, "in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the Sultan would be very unwise if he would not avail himself of the opportunity afforded him to arrange a mutual disarmament."[27] The Earl of Derby had, in fact, urged the Sultan to accept the protocol. He told the Turkish Government that Turkey ought not to put herself in the wrong by rejecting it, especially as Her Majesty's Government had taken pains to remove from the document everything reasonably objectionable to Turkey.

The terms laid down, Turkey nevertheless rejected, and in her answer to them assumed an air of injured innocence.

> The Porte believes Europe is convinced that the disorders which have disturbed the tranquillity of the provinces were due to external agitation. A painful feeling was caused by the issuance of the protocol. She was ready to carry out reforms, to make peace with Montenegro and to put her armies on a peace footing as soon as Russia did.
>
> But what cannot in truth be sufficiently regretted is the small account which the Powers seem to have taken both of the great principles of equality and justice which the Imperial Government seeks to introduce into the internal administration and of its rights of independence and sovereignty.
>
> The Sublime Porte has not accepted reforms exclusively for Bosnia, Herzegovina, and for localities inhabited by Bulgarians.[28]

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Argyll, *op. cit.*, I, 403.

[28] *Annual Register, 1877*, Part II, p. 214.

Moreover, "Turkey as an independent state cannot submit to be placed under surveillance whether collective or not." Turkey felt that the new constitution adopted recently was sufficient guarantee of the genuineness of reform.

It did in fact seem a rash thing for Turkey to reject the collective will of Europe. But she felt that the Powers were not in earnest. The British government, they knew was anti-Russian. At the same cabinet session as that of the announcement of the protocol, Mr. Henry Layard was appointed ambassador to take the place of Sir Henry Elliot. That appointment was regarded as pro-Turkish and anti-Russian.[29] The Porte itself so regarded it. In a telegram from Safvet Pasha to the Turkish ambassador in London, he speaks of it as a "delicate mark of attention," as they knew Mr. Layard's "sentiments of friendship for our country." Odo Russell, British ambassador at Berlin, said a German ambassador was not to be appointed until Turkey accepted the protocol.[30] Sir Edwin Pears, then a newspaper correspondent at Constantinople, says that the English colony there "still living under the glamour of the Crimean War"[31] was anti-Russian. "Germany seems now (April, 1877) to be with Russia," said a journal of Constantinople, "and Austria-Hungary is observing a benevolent neutrality. But it is certain that at the first striking of fire Austria will be the first to demand the protection of Turkey. As for England, she will understand that she cannot save herself without declaring war against Russia."[32]

After the rejection of the demands of the Powers made at the conference of Constantinople and of the protocol of March 31st, there seemed no alternative but war. There was a further attempt of Sir Henry Layard to get the Turks to ask for mediation instead of war, but it came to nothing. The Russians could make out a very good case for their interfering, a much better one than they had for coming to the help of Serbia in 1914, a better one, also, than we had for the declaration of war against Spain in 1898. For many years they had looked upon themselves as guardians of the Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 215.
[30] *Die Grosse Politik der Europaischen Kabinette*, II, 144.
[31] Argyll, *op. cit.*, I, 405 (from *Parlia. Papers*).
[32] Edwin Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople*, p. 59.

and recent events had shown the need of their protection. Since the concert of Europe was doing nothing effectual to improve the position of these Christians, Russia, as nearest friend, seemed called upon to act. In his *manifesto* to his troops when they were ordered to cross the Turkish frontier, the Tsar said, "Our desire to ameliorate and to guarantee their lot has been shared by the whole Russian nation, which shows itself to-day ready to bear new sacrifices to alleviate the situation of the Christians of the Balkan peninsula."[33]

In explaining her action to Great Britain she said: "In these circumstances, every chance is closed for efforts of conciliation. There remains no alternative but to allow the state of things to continue which the Powers have declared incompatible with their interests and those of Europe in general, or else to seek to obtain by coercion what the unanimous efforts of the Cabinets have not succeeded in obtaining from the Porte by persuasion.

> Our august Master has resolved to undertake this work which His Majesty had invited the Great Powers to pursue in common with him.
>
> He has given his armies the order to cross the frontiers of Turkey. . . .
>
> In assuming this task our august Master fulfils a duty imposed upon him by the interests of Russia, whose peaceful development is hindered by the permanent disturbances of the East. His Imperial Majesty has the conviction that he responds at the same time to the sentiments and interests of Europe.[34]

Although the British government were not surprised at the course Russia was taking, yet they could not approve it. In Derby's reply he reminded the Russian government that Turkey had again affirmed her intention of executing reforms and said that with patience and moderation, the objects Russia wished to attain might have been realized. "They cannot believe that the entrance of (Russian) armies on Turkish soil will alleviate the difficulty or improve the condition of the Christian populations throughout the Sultan's dominions." Besides, Russia was acting in violation of the Treaties of 1856 and of 1871, he said, and was not acting in the interest of Great Britain and that of the other European Powers, as she claimed.[35]

Russian public opinion supported the course of its government. Mr. Aksakoff, "fountain head of Muscovite opinion,"

[33]Quoted in Lavisse and Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, XII, 435.
[34]*State Papers*, 1876-1877, p. 845.
[35]*Annual Register*, 1878, Part II, p. 216.

said to the Saint Petersburg correspondent of the Times: "We do not seek military glory or material advantage. We are fighting for the political and intellectual emancipation of the Slavonic races of which we form a part. As Russia is the only politically independent powerful Slavonic State, it is our duty to take the lead."[36]

A Russian paper of Moscow said: "When we are trying to do our best for them, you English come and say, 'You must not do anything, for if you do, you will injure our interests. Let the Turks massacre as many as they choose. English interests are the first thing to be considered.' How can we be otherwise than angry with you."

War began on April 24th. The Turkish armies were not ready and could not prevent the Russian armies from crossing the Danube as they did on that date. An alliance with Roumania had enabled the Russians to cross the Pruth two months earlier. Upon entering Bulgarian territory the Tsar issued a proclamation to the Bulgarian people.

After reminding them of former services of Russia for ameliorating the lot of the Christians of the Balkans, he promised protection to them, and threatened punishment to the Mohammedans who had been guilty of violence toward them. The proclamation assured them that, as fast as Russian troops advanced into the interior of the country, the Turkish rule would be replaced by a regular organization; that the people who live in each locality would be immediately called to participate actively under the oversight of special new authorities, and that the Bulgarian legions would serve as a nucleus for a local armed force designed to maintain order and security. . . . "Obey the Russian authorities. Follow faithfully their direction. There is power and safety for you."[37]

To us who are interested in Bulgaria, this Russo-Turkish war is the war for Bulgarian independence. It was expected that the Bulgarians would take some part in it. So a Bulgarian legion was formed, as indicated by the proclamation of the Tsar. They were to serve not only as a nucleus for a local armed force to maintain order and security, but also as an aid to the Russian

[36] *Ibid.*, pp. 217-18.
[37] *Times*, Sept. 3, 1877.

army in the field. They did serve there, and with distinction. Three thousand men enlisted at first, and were put under the command of General Skobeloff. Later the number was doubled. The city of Samara offered them a flag, white, red, and blue, with the image of the Virgin and the holy saints Cyril and Methodius.[38]

The Russian armies both in Bulgaria and in Asia pushed on without much opposition until the last of July. Tirnovo, the chief city of the Bulgarians north of the Balkans, was reached early in the month and soon General Gourko was in possession of two passes over the Balkan Mountains. At the end of July, however, the Turks rallied and the Russians suffered severe defeats. Osman Pasha occupied Plevna and while he held that important strategic centre, the Russians could not advance.

But we are especially interested, not in military operations, but in the attitude of the European Powers toward this war for Bulgarian independence. It was to them no war for that object at all. Each must look out for the high interests of its own government. England and Austria regarded themselves as very directly concerned and watched the progress of events with a good deal of anxiety. Austria-Hungary felt in some degree secure after the treaty of Bucharest made with Russia in January,[39] and Great Britain had secured from Russia the promise not to interfere with British interests in the Suez Canal and the Persian Gulf. The Russian government had also engaged not to occupy Constantinople permanently. To bind itself beforehand not to enter that city even temporarily was to give Turkey an unnecessary military advantage.

The sympathy of the Hungarians was decidedly with the Turks. They remembered how Nicholas I had sent an army against them in 1849, and how Turkey at the same time had protected Kossuth and other Magyar patriots. In January, before the war broke out, there were demonstrations in Pesth in favor of Turkey, and a deputation of students was sent to present to the Turkish commander-in-chief at Constantinople, a sword whose blade had been Maria Theresa's. There was also a

[38] *State Papers*, 1876-77, pp. 877-79.

[39] Landemont, *L'élan d'un peuple*, pp. 17-18. See p. 74, *supra*.

project for raising a Hungarian legion of five thousand to assist the Turks.[41] In Croatia, on the other hand, there were pro-Slavonic and anti-Magyar demonstrations. The Russian hymn was played continuously by the bands. Resolutions concerning the barbarous and cruel oppression by the Turks were passed.[42]

In Great Britain there was a great variety of opinion. The Earl of Beaconsfield said that in November there were seven different views among government supporters, ranging from those who wished to assist the Porte and enter actively into the war to Lord Carnarvon who, influenced by Lyddon, Freeman, and other priests and professors, "wished Russia permanently to occupy Constantinople."[43] Those in opposition to the government were similarly divided. Queen Victoria's dislike and distrust of Russia was so intense that she became almost hysterical sometimes when the Russians were succeeding. Beaconsfield came near to agreeing with her but understood better than she the limits within which divided opinion in England confined him. In the early summer of 1877, when Russia was advancing, she was thoroughly alarmed. "Why not call your followers together," she writes Lord Beaconsfield, "of the House of Commons as well as of the House of Lords; tell them that the interests of Great Britain are at stake; that it is not for the Christians (and they are quite as cruel as the Turks), but for conquest that this cruel war is waged, that Russia is as barbarous and tyrannical as the Turks!"[44] Again in January, 1878, she writes, she feels she can not, as she before said, "remain the sovereign of a country that is letting itself down to kiss the feet of the great barbarians, the retarders of all liberty and civilization that exists."[45] She could not understand "the mawkish sentimentality for people who hardly deserve the name of Christians." The war for Bulgarian independence did not receive much sympathy from Queen Victoria and Lord Beaconsfield. There were, however, many in England who had not forgotten the Bulgarian atrocities, "horrors which turned men's blood to flame," Lord Carnarvon said. If it had not been for the feeling Turkish

[41] *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 222.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 225.
[43] *Ibid.*, pp. 222; *Spectator*, May 19, 1877.
[44] Buckle, *op. cit.*, VI, 194.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

cruelty aroused, England might have taken an active part in the war. To Queen Victoria and Lord Beaconsfield, the war was simply to promote Russian ambitions, but public sentiment would not allow active interference on the side of the Porte. Mr. Gladstone went so far as to propose in Parliament five resolutions, one of which asked that the influence of the crown should be employed for "the development of local liberty and practical self-government in the disturbed provinces." It was not thought best to bring this resolution to a vote, but it expressed the view of many, Walpole says, "of a preponderating mass of public opinion."[46] The Duke of Argyll thought the Russians fully justified in entering into the war against Turkey.[47] The Duke of Edinburgh, Queen Victoria's second son, thought his mother and the prime minister had a false conception of British interests.[48] His wife, though, was the daughter of Alexander II. Sir Henry Layard, whose duty it was to represent the views of the British government to the Porte, let the Ottoman government know that "she cannot expect any help from us in her struggle with Russia," but that:

> We shall be ready at a favorable moment to do our best to see that she be treated with justice and moderation, and her Christian and Mohammedan subjects alike with impartiality and equal humanity. It has been my object to raise such hopes, as I have none others to give, without committing in any way her Majesty's Government, whose views and policy it is my duty to consider and carry out.[49]

At the beginning of the war Bismarck and the Emperor were warmly pro-Russian. Writing on April 28th, William closed a letter to his nephew, the Tsar, in this way: "With you, my dear nephew, I desire with all my heart that the success of your arms shall lead to a firm and lasting peace which at last will assure the Christians of Turkey the guarantees which they need. My best wishes accompany your brother Nicholas."[50] . . . The Emperor was warmly attached to the Tsar. Bismarck did not let sentimental considerations influence him. He seems to have thought the war inevitable. He may have thought, too, that it was time for the extinction of what for many years had been a

[46] *Ibid.*, p. 217.
[47] Spencer Walpole, *History of Twenty-five Years*, IV, 143.
[48] Argyll, *The Eastern Question*, II, 158.
[49] *Die Grosse Politik*, II, 158.
[50] Argyle, *op. cit.*, II, 26-27, quoted from *Parlia. Papers.*

source of trouble to European statesmen.[51] As Salisbury found, on his way to Constantinople in 1876, Bismarck felt much as did the editor of the Cologne Gazette, who wrote that the mission of superseding Turkey was that of Austria and Greece. "We should not be disconsolate," that paper said, "were the two antagonistic animals to devour each other and like the Kilkenny cats leave nothing behind them to tell of the strife except a melancholy tail or two."[52] Bismarck told Schouvaloff, Russian ambassador to England, that he and the Emperor were saying to Alexander that his honor was involved in declaring war on the Sultan and that Russia could count on the moral support of Germany on two conditions, first, that Russia should detach herself from France, second, that the war should be short.[53] Bismarck, it would seem, was not averse to the war. However, when the war went on and Russia won, he was put in the embarassing position of having to choose Austria or Russia for his best friend.

France and Italy were inclined to favor Russia. Decazes, French foreign minister at this time, had in mind the possibility of a Russian alliance. This was the time when President Macmahon was trying to conduct the government with an irresponsible ministry. Later in the year his party was defeated and he was compelled to resign, much to the relief of Bismarck, who dreaded above all things a Franco-Russian alliance. Italy hoped for a share of the spoils if Turkey should be partitioned.

Early in the war, even before the Russian armies had crossed the Danube, the Bulgarian committee at Bucharest took measures to provide for a government in Bulgaria to take the place of the Ottoman government which they were confident would soon be ousted. Russia thought it would hardly do to let Bulgaria walk by herself without the support and guidance of her more experienced big brother. So Prince Tcherkasky was put in charge. He chose Naidon Gueroff, pedagogue, philologist and competent administrator to be governor of Sistova with Dragan Tsankoff as under-governor. As the Turks retired, he established all public services on a new basis. Russians took charge of

[51]Interview with Prince Henry of Reuss, German ambassador at the Porte, *Die Grosse Politik*, II, 158.

[52]Cecil, *op. cit.*, II, 180.

[53]*Times*, Sept. 3, 1877.

posts, telegraphs, and police. For other functions Bulgarian professors and students were procured, those who had been residing in Bucharest, St. Petersburg, Prague and Paris. Large proprietors were dispossessed, but indemnity was to be paid them within five years. The following proclamation was issued by the committee of Bucharest:

> People of Bulgaria, you will give yourself leaders of your own. For the moment, obey the provisional government, which has been named by patriots. It will be present with you soon and will act after your wishes. Meanwhile, it calls to you from Roumanian territory. Forward! God is with us. With us are our Russian brothers! Tsankoff, Panof, Entechef, Ivanov, Stambouloff, Wiskofski, Kavilizijef, Vasof.[54]

The neighbors of Bulgaria were not altogether pleased with Russian interference. The Turks were alarmed because the society of which Mr. Aksakoff was president was officially recognized by the Imperial government, while its agents were to be given places in the civil administration of Bulgaria.[55] Austria was annoyed that Prince Tcherkasky was surrounding himself with the Bulgarian agents of the Moscow Pan Slavic Committees who had lately been responsible for the insurrections of 1876.[56]

In Bulgaria, south of the Balkans, the Turks had their way and no Bulgarian or Russian government could function there until after the fall of Plevna in December. There seems to have been a repetition of the Turkish policy of massacre which had prevailed the year before. Mr. Rose, correspondent of the Scotsman newspaper, who accompanied the Russian army which advanced across the Balkans in the early days of the war, stated that in the town of Yeni-Zaghra there had been a massacre of six hundred men, women, and children. He saw other evidences in other places of the same sort of thing. For their part, the Bulgarians were not altogether guiltless of wanton bloodshed. When the Russian army came down across the Balkans for temporary occupation in the last days of July, there was a massacre of perhaps one hundred Turks, murdered, it would seem, not by the inhabitants, but by a band of Bulgarians that came down from the north, made desperate by ravages of the Turks the year before. They spared women and children as the Turks often did not.[57]

[54]Goriainoff, *La Bosphore et les Dardanelles*, p. 339.
[55]Songeon, *Histoire de la Bulgarie*, pp. 337-38.
[56]*Saturday Review*, Aug. 25, 1877, p. 226.
[57]*Times*, July 7, 1877.

In November, 1877, while the Turks were invested at Plevna, an interesting document appeared. It was a proclamation issued by the Grand Vizier asking the Bulgarians to return to his protection and offering them pardon. According to Mr. Drandar, at the time of the Conference at Constantinople, a statement professing loyalty to Turkey was issued by some pro-Turkish Bulgarians. The Turkish government hoped, perhaps, that, notwithstanding their cruelties, their reputation was not entirely gone.

> For centuries you lived under the paternal egis of the Imperial Ottoman Government, you enjoyed your nationality and you practiced your religion in freedom and security. In a word, in living with your Mohammedan compatriots and in engaging freely in trade and industry, you offered an example of a perfectly happy family. A few blind men, misled and mistaken—a feeble minority—deceived by the deceitful promises of agitators have raised the standard of revolt. The Bulgarian subjects of the Sultan are invited to return to their allegiance and to enter again their homes assured of security in the present and in the future.[58]

Soon after this, Plevna fell and there was nothing to check the Russian advance. Adrianople was taken, Constantinople threatened, and there was nothing for Turkey to do but to sue for peace.

[58] *State Papers*, 1876-77, pp. 879-80 (condensed).

CHAPTER V

THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO AND THE TREATY OF BERLIN

Early in the war, before the Russians had crossed the Danube, they informed the British minister of Foreign Affairs what their terms of peace would be, if Turkey would yield before the Russians should cross the Balkans. They were as follows:

> Bulgaria up to the Balkans to be made an autonomous vassal province, under the guarantee of Europe. The Turkish troops and officials to be removed from it and the fortresses disarmed and razed. Self-government to be established in it with the support of the national militia to be organized as soon as possible. The Powers to agree to assure to that part of Bulgaria south of the Balkans, as well as to other Christian provinces of Turkey, the best possible guarantees for a regular administration.

Certain provisions for Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina were also mentioned.[1]

These conditions were not presented formally to the Sultan, but Mr. Layard sounded the Porte six weeks later and found that it would not consider them. The Turks at that time were confident after the successes at Plevna and Eski-Zagra.

After the Russians took Plevna, December 10th, 1877, the Turks in alarm appealed to the Powers to use their good offices to bring about a peace between them and the Russians, but the Powers were unwilling to interfere. A little later, the Turkish government appealed to Great Britain for mediation, "which we are convinced will not be refused by our ancient and constant friend." Upon this, Great Britain consulted the government of the Tsar and they replied that an armistice might be negotiated after Turkey had agreed to a basis for peace, and that Turkey should appeal to the commanders-in-chief in Europe and Asia for terms. After some further hesitation, that was done, and the armistice was signed on February 1. For some weeks after the taking of Plevna, the British government had been exceedingly nervous on account of the rapid Russian advance toward Constantinople. On January 17, Parliament had met two weeks earlier than planned and voted a fund to meet any emergency

[1] *Annual Register, 1877*, p. 236.

that might arise. On the twenty-third of January, the fleet had been ordered from Besika Bay to Constantinople; whereupon, Derby, who was strongly opposed to any war-like steps, had resigned. However, on the twenty-fourth[2] the government was reassured by news of the armistice and by the guarantee that Gallipoli would not be occupied. The order to the fleet was therefore countermanded and Derby returned to office. Hardly had the message reached Besika Bay, however, when England was again alarmed by the advance of the Russian army toward Constantinople. When Russia explained that the terms of the armistice permitted such movement of their troops, Great Britain was for the moment appeased, but a little later sent orders for a part of the fleet to move towards the Turkish capital. This time the Porte under Russian influence would not consent to the passage of the British ships; but the British government thought the occasion warranted disregard of the Turkish prohibition, and accordingly the fleet entered the sea of Marmora and anchored a short distance from the Russian land forces. "The Turks were moved and agitated at the insolence of the English," so a Russian writer said.[3] It was a precarious situation, but it passed without any breach of the peace. On March 3, the treaty of San Stefano was signed.

By the terms of the armistice, a principality of Bulgaria was to be established within limits determined according to the majority of the Bulgarian population which should be no less than that indicated by the conference of Constantinople. About this time a document was issued expressing quite fully and clearly the Russian point of view as to the new Bulgaria. It was meant for the Austrian foreign office, but Oubril, Russian ambassador to Berlin, showed it to Bismarck before it was seen by Andrassy. Three aspects of the problem of Bulgaria were discussed, first, what degree of autonomy it should have, second, what should be its boundaries, and third, how long Russian troops should occupy it. These were matters for discussion among the diplomats before the congress of Berlin and at the congress, and this document sets forth what the Russians planned and succeeded in incorporating in the treaty of San

[2]The armistice was signed a week later.

[3]Max Hoschiller in the *Revue de Paris*, July 15, 1897, p. 435.

Stefano when they had no one to deal with except defeated Turkey.

The "de mi measures of Constantinople," the Russian document said, "were not applicable." Something more than administrative autonomy was necessary. If other powers had joined us to compel Turkey, the necessity would not have arisen, but now "complete autonomy with a simple tie of tributary vassalage and the removal of Turkish troops" must be insisted upon. The document continues:

> The principal objection made to the constitution of Bulgaria as a vassal state consists in the inconvenience of an autonomous state at the gates of Constantinople. It is said that it would be the ruin of the Turkish rule in Europe. But the programme of the conference implies the same result. Either the proposed reforms would be seriously applied, in which case they would have worked out for the people of Bulgaria in such a way as, in a certain time, to result in their moral and material ascendancy over the Mussulman population, and in consequence their predominance in the internal administration of the country, or else the reforms would have been illusory, in which case Europe would have sanctioned an abuse, which, after actual war, is out of the question. Neither the honor nor the interest of Europe is consistent with that. As for Russia her honor and her interest absolutely forbid it.

On the question of boundaries, the Russian foreign office said that Bulgaria was divided at the conference of Constantinople, because a large Bulgaria was felt to be incompatible with an Ottoman Empire of any consequence. The division had been longitudinal then, and it was far from the purpose of the powers to cut off the southern part of Bulgaria where the massacres had been, and where were the densest population, the most fertile, rich, and developed part of Bulgaria. With two Bulgarias, Europe could have no repose. The Powers should remember the experiment of dividing Roumania in two. Diplomatic Europe would be upset each time an attempt to unite them was made. It was not a time for artificial transactions.

> Europe must either pronounce a decree of death upon the Bulgarian nationality in condemning it irrevocably in the name of European interests to succumb under the weight of Turkish oppression, increased by everything that fanaticism, hatreds, violence of one against another [has aroused]; or else must grant to the Bulgarian nationality the imprescriptible right to exist;[4] and also since an absolute separation of the two races is not judged possible, we proceed to a physical (de corps) separation which allows them to exist side by side. . . . As for us, we must persist in our resolution upon this essential point of the

[4]Bismarck writes in the margin: "u(nd) Polen?"

programme, for which *Russia made the war*, namely a Bulgaria united, compact, autonomous and tributary. We think that an autonomous state, far from being incompatible with the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire, is the only means of prolonging its existence by keeping quiet its Christian subjects.

On the third phase of the Bulgarian question, Russia said that the principality could not be left to itself immediately after the peace when the foundations of social life had been nearly all destroyed. Mercenary adventurers were undesirable, the best troops would be those who were friendly to the inhabitants, who had fought for them and who would guarantee that the task accomplished should not be made of no account.

If, besides, it is judged necessary to find combinations such as will assure Europe a part in the accomplishment of that work in view of the general interests, we shall not refuse to talk things over with them, provided that they are inspired with the desire of advancing in a practical way the social education of the Bulgarian state, and not that of paralyzing in the embryo the national existence to which it is our purpose to call it.[5]

The principles of this "Russian orthodox sermon" were applied in the Treaty of San Stefano. Instead of administrative autonomy, it was provided that Bulgaria should be constituted as an "autonomous tributary Principality" with a Christian ruler and a national militia. . . .

The Prince of Bulgaria shall be freely elected by the people and confirmed by the Sublime Porte with the assent of the Powers. No member of the reigning dynasties of the European Powers may be elected Prince of Bulgaria. . . . An assembly of Bulgarian notables . . . shall construct, before the election of the Prince, under the oversight of an Imperial Russian Commissioner, the organization of the future administration, conformably to precedents laid down in 1830, at the peace of Adrianople for the Danubian Principalities. . . .

The amount of annual tribute was to be determined by a commission with members representing Russia, Turkey, and the Powers.[6]

In the article providing for the boundaries of Bulgaria, a single compact state was designated. The Bulgaria proposed in the terms announced in June, 1877, before the Russians had crossed the Danube was, it will be remembered, to extend only from the Danube to the Balkans. The conference Bulgaria was much larger, but was to be divided longitudinally. The Bul-

[5] *Cambridge Historical Journal*, I, 328-29.

[6] The Treaty of San Stefano is given in the *Annual Register*, 1878, Herstlet, etc.

garia of San Stefano was a little larger than that of the conference. The most important difference was the extension of the southern boundary so as to give Bulgaria a coast line on the Ægean Sea.

Other articles determined the part Russia was to play in the organization of the new Bulgaria. Paragraph five of article seven reads:

> The introduction of the new regime in Bulgaria and the oversight of its functioning shall be entrusted for two years to an Imperial Russian Cabinet. At the expiration of the first year after the introduction of the new regime, if an agreement on that subject is established by Russia, the Sublime Porte and the European Cabinets, they may, if it is judged necessary, add to the Imperial Russian Commission special Delegates.

Russian troops were to be stationed in Bulgaria until the Bulgarian militia could be organized" for the maintenance of order, security and tranquillity," and should number no more than 50,000 men.

Mr. Miller in the *Cambridge Modern History* calls the treaty a wholly Slavonic settlement, and of course it was.[7] Perhaps Russia was not justified in taking such complete advantage of her victory as she did, yet the part of the treaty which aroused the most opposition, the creation of a great Bulgaria, had received the sanction of the Powers at the conference of Constantinople a little more than a year before. It was not to be wondered at that Greece, Serbia and the Albanians should be alarmed at the appearance among them of a new state larger than any of them. No doubt too, some Greeks were included in the southern part of the Bulgaria of San Stefano, and some Albanians and Serbians in the western part, to say nothing of the Turks in the east. The little states of the Balkans all protested, the Greeks sending an "erudite disquisition" to Great Britain and the Albanians forming a league "to resist until death." The creation of a new state, large or small, was a blow to the prestige of Turkey, but a great Bulgaria reaching the Ægean would completely sever her western possessions from the capital.

Russia seemed to have forgotten her treaty with Austria, which precluded the erection of a large Slav state in the Balkans, and promised Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria as a reward

[7] *Cambridge Modern History*, XII, 393.

for her neutrality. Not long after the signing of the treaty of San Stefano, however, Ignatieff was sent to Vienna to talk matters over with Count Andrassy. They came to no agreement, Austria-Hungary's terms being considered too high. She demanded:

1. An increase of Montenegrin territory to the north instead of to the east.
2. Novibazar and Mitrovitza to be given Bosnia with an enlargement of Serbia toward the south instead of to the west.
3. Bulgaria to go west to the railway line from Saloniki to Mitrovitza, thus cutting off the southwestern corner of the Bulgaria of San Stefano, but giving them Nish, as well as Sofia.
4. Bosnia and Herzegovina to go to Austria and the rest of western Turkey to remain in her possession, or given autonomy under Turkish suzerainity.
5. The Russian force in Bulgaria to be cut down to 20,000 men, to remain only six months, and the only connection between Bulgaria and Russia to be by way of Varna and Burgas on the Black Sea.

There was no suggestion of a divided Bulgaria. Andrassy thought a little should be cut off from Bulgaria in the region of Adrianople, but had no objection to her possession of a coast line on the Ægean. He thought that with her only outlet on the Black Sea, she would be more likely to remain under Russian influence, than would be the case if she were more accessible to other European states by possessing ports on the Mediterranean.[8]

Bismarck had expressed himself fully on the situation in a speech in the Reichstag on February 19th. He had informed himself from the Kiepert maps, the most authentic source available, he said, and found the boundary laid down by the conference of Constantinople running somewhat north of the line of nationality in the east, though mixed with a Turkish population, and in the west running somewhat into regions with a large admixture of Albanians. It was in this speech that Bismarck called himself the honest broker who wished to bring things to a successful conclusion, and said he did not wish to go the Napoleon way and be the dictator, but just the school master in Europe. A congress of the powers had already been talked of and Bismarck was expecting to be asked to preside.[9] Another view, set forth by Windhorst, leader of the opposition to Bismarck was somewhat more far-sighted, at any rate more accord-

[8] *Die Grosse Politik*, Vol. II, pp. 252-57; see also map, p. 176.
[9] Fürst Bismarck als Redner, IX, 64-66.

ing to Bismarck's actual policy. "I do not consider the interests of Germany in this conflict so small as we are taught to consider them to be, . . ." he said. "In my opinion, the main point of this Eastern problem lies in the question, big with responsibility toward the future—which of the two elements, German on the one hand, Slav on the other, is to dominate the world?" (Cries of "very true.") "We must embrace the German interest in its universality."[10]

It was not Austria or Germany, but Great Britain that was determined to prevent the formation of the Greater Bulgaria. It is true she had consented to the conference Bulgaria which was nearly as large, but that was to have merely administrative autonomy and was to be divided. What is, perhaps, of more consequence, public opinion in Great Britain was quite different in the winter of 1877-8, from what it had been the winter before. Then the memory of the Bulgarian atrocities was fresh in the British mind, while a year later Russia had humbled Turkey and was at the gates of Constantinople. It was this winter that the London music halls were popularizing the famous rhyme:

> We do not want to fight, but by jingo if we do,
> We have the ships, we have the men, we have the money too.

The jingle of the music halls expressed pretty accurately the sentiments of the Queen and the ministry after the resignation of Carnarvon in February, and that of Derby in the last of March when troops from India were ordered to Malta.[11] Salisbury took the place of Derby. On April 1 was issued the Salisbury circular giving the official views of the government, while Beaconsfield in a speech before the House of Lords a few days later, repeated them.

Salisbury contended that no validity could be granted to the treaty of San Stefano unless it was made the subject of formal agreement among the parties to the Treaty of Paris; that all

[10]Windthorst on "Bones of a Pomerarian grenadier," Gabriel Hanotaux, *Contemporary France*, IV, 327.

[11]A memorandum written by Carnarvon just after his resignation, gives a clear and forcible account of the attitude and activities of the British Cabinet and its members during this period. He speaks of the conviction which "not only I, but many of my colleagues entertained," that Disraeli was determined to force us into an alliance with Turkey and a war with Russia. Sir Arthur Hardinge, *Fourth Earl of Carnarvon*, III, 371.

questions raised in the recent treaty must be submitted to the Powers. In answer to the Russian assertion that the government reserved to itself the liberty of accepting, or not, the discussion by the Powers of any question raised concerning the treaty, Salisbury insisted that all questions must be submitted to the Powers. "Every material stipulation which it contains involves a departure from the treaty of 1856." Salisbury specifically objected to the new Bulgaria. It would be a strong Slav state under the "auspices and control of Russia," with harbors on the Black and Ægean Seas and "conferring on that Power a preponderating influence over political and commercial relations in those seas." Besides,

> It will be so constituted as to merge in the dominating Slav majority a considerable mass of population which is Greek in race and sympathy, and which views with alarm the prospect of absorption into a community alien to it, not only in nationality, but in political tendency and in religious allegiance. The provisons by which this new state is to be subjected to a ruler whom Russia will practically choose, its administration framed by a Russian Commissary, and the first workings of its institutions commenced under a Russian army, sufficiently indicate the political system of which in the future, it is to form a part.

The great objection to the treaty was the increase in Russian influence. As a consequence of that, Turkish influence, which meant at this period British influence, was considerably decreased.

Prince Gortchakoff replied to Salisbury's circular and took issue with some of his conclusions in regard to Bulgaria. "It is not accurate to say," he began, "that the Treaty of San Stefano has created a new Bulgaria, or a very strong Slav State under the control of Russia. Bulgaria existed, though in a state of oppression. Europe perceived this, and was desirous of providing a remedy." He argued that the Bulgaria, established in germ by the conference of Constantinople, was brought to maturity by the treaty of San Stefano. Moreover, the treaty of San Stefano was only a preliminary one to be applied later after "technical studies, an exact appreciation of geographical necessities, and the conciliation of numerous interests."

He believed that "The Treaty of San Stefano has not placed the new state under the control of Russia. The Imperial Cabinet has done only what it accomplished in 1830 for Moldo-

Wallachia." Some of Prince Gortchakoff's arguments may have been less sound than clever, but the past history of Moldo-Wallachia and the future history of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia both are witnesses to the wisdom of his next observation. "It may be added," he said, "that if Moldo-Wallachia, which owes its existence to, and borders upon Russia, has been able to make itself independent of her, with yet stronger reason should one count on the same result for Bulgaria, the territory of which would be separated from Russia, in the foreseen event of a cession of the Dobroudja to Roumania."

The term of two years occupation by Russian troops was thought necessary for the establishing of order, but the Imperial Cabinet was willing to shorten it if it seemed best.

"The delimitation of Bulgaria has been indicated only in general terms," he continues, "The sole principle which is laid down is that of the majority of the population, and, certainly, any more equitable and rational can hardly be imagined." As for the assignment to Bulgaria of ports on the Black Sea, "the Constantinople Conference itself decided that unless these countries debouched on the sea, they could not prosper." As for the possession of the Ægean ports, "The commercial development of Bulgaria has alone been in view. Certainly Russia will not profit by this development so much as England and those Powers whose Mediterranean commerce—much more active than that of Russia—has always been a powerful lever for the maintenance of their political influence."

Gortchakoff denied that the preliminary treaty in any way placed Bulgaria under the domination of a chief chosen by Russia, claiming that there were provisions in the treaty which prevented that.

> Also, the provisional measures taken by the Russian authorities for the administration of the country are far from being framed with the view, as has been affirmed, of making Bulgaria a part of the Russian political system. Almost no change has been made in the institutions to which the country was accustomed. The State of seige to which the country was reduced during the war rendered the nomination of Russian governors indispensable. Bulgarians have in all quarters been appointed vice governors in order that after the peace, ... these vice governors may serve without causing any interruption in the administration of the country. The exclusive object of all these provisional measures has been to protect the national development, and to render

possible the reunion of the first Bulgarian Assembly called to regulate the institutions of the principality.[12]

To compose these differences four months of negotiations and a congress at Berlin lasting another month were necessary. Austria first proposed a congress shortly after the armistice of January 31. It was hoped to have it in March, but Great Britain and Russia could not agree as to the scope of the congress. The former continued to insist on Russia's submitting the whole treaty to discussion, and on possible revision by the assembled Powers, while Russia was willing to have discussed only those articles which Russia should judge to be of European interest. Finally Schouvaloff visited London, and, with Salisbury, drew up a secret agreement as to what both Great Britain and Russia would insist upon at the Congress. Following are the essential terms of this understanding, so far as they applied to Bulgaria:

1. England discarded the longitudinal division of Bulgaria.
2. Bulgaria was to have no Ægean port.
3. The western frontier was to be rectified.
4. Bulgaria was to be divided into two provinces separated by the Balkans.
5. The troops of Turkey were to retreat from South Bulgaria. England reserved the right to insist upon the right of the Sultan to canton troops on the frontiers of South Bulgaria.
6. The superior officers of militia in South Bulgaria were to be named by the Porte.[13]

Neither party agreed to abstain from any effort to have these terms modified, but it was understood that neither England nor Russia would go to war for anything not agreed to in the memorandum.

Schouvaloff has made the following interesting comment on his negotiations with the British government.

From the opening of our negotiations, I perceived that England's chief object was the division of Bulgaria into two parts with the line of the Balkans left to the Sultan as a means of defence against our future aggressions. However serious was the change of frontier in Asia Minor, and the Abandonment of Kars to Russia, and of Batoum, especially it was the question of the Balkans which loomed most largely in the eyes of the British government. This was an error on the part of Lord Salisbury and Lord Beaconsfield. It was evident that the separation of Northern Bulgaria from Southern Bulgaria would be but

[12]The *Annual Register*, 1878, gives the Salisbury circular, the reply of Gortchakoff, and the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin.

[13]*Annual Register*, 1878, pp. 245-47.

factitious, even with the defence of the Balkans left to Turkey, and I remember suggesting to Lord Salisbury when he was considering names for these two Bulgarias, that one should be termed "Bulgaria Satisfied," and the other "Bulgaria Discontented."[14]

The "Schouvaloff memorandum" was designed to be kept secret from France, Italy, Austria, and the British public, but on the morning of June 14th it was published in the *London Globe* much to the disgust and surprise of Salisbury and Beaconsfield. An under clerk who had been given the document to copy was responsible for letting it out. It was on this occasion that Salisbury lied and defended himself afterward for doing so. He said in Parliament that the version of the memorandum published was "wholly unauthentic," although in fact it was all correct except in one particular of no great importance. Public opinion, at least among diplomats, was that Salisbury's offense was much less than that of those responsible for making the document public. No one thought of objecting to this exhibition of secret diplomacy, unless it may have been those who thought that they should have been included among the sharers of the secret.

With Austria, as well as Russia, Great Britain made an agreement as to common action at the Congress. They were to act together to limit the boundaries of Bulgaria, to assure the Sultan adequate political and military supremacy in the territory excluded, to limit Russian occupation in the Balkan region in time and number of men, to substitute European for Russian commissioners in certain articles of the treaty of San Stefano. Last, but by no means least, England was to support any proposition with respect to Bosnia which Austria might make at the Congress.[15]

The Congress met in Berlin June 13th and completed its business in just a month. The most distinguished statesmen of Europe were there, Gortchakoff and Schouvaloff for Russia, Beaconsfield and Salisbury for England, Waddington for France, Corti for Italy, Andrassy for Austria-Hungary, and Bismarck as president. The principal purpose of the Congress was to prevent Russia from becoming the dominating power in the near East. That was made possible by the pre-Congress

[14]From Schouvaloff's unpublished memoirs in Hanotaux, *op. cit.*, IV, 335-36.

[15]*English Historical Review*, January, 1926, p. 111.

agreement of Russia and Great Britain. At the same time, it was recognized that Russia must be compensated for her sacrifices and also that the Christians of the Balkans must be, so far as convenient, protected from Turkish oppression. The best way to check Russian ambitions, the Congress thought, was to cut down Bulgaria.

They decided that instead of the one big Bulgaria, there should be two, as in the Schouvaloff memorandum, and a third portion given back to Turkey. The first Bulgaria was to have the powers and the degree of freedom promised the San Stefano Bulgaria. The second was to have administrative autonomy. The first Bulgaria was to extend south to the Balkans. There was some discussion as to whether the sandjak of Sofia should be included, but, inasmuch as this region was largely Bulgarian in population, the city of Sofia and a part of the district was added, but not Nish, although that was Bulgarian too. Varna on the Black Sea was given to Bulgaria instead of to the southern province. Bulgaria proper contained somewhat less than two million inhabitants, and 24,861 square miles. The second Bulgaria was smaller, containing about three quarters of a million inhabitants, and 13,663 square miles.[16] Philippopolis was its principal city and Bourgas its Black Sea port. It was in this province that the Bulgarian atrocities of May, 1876, had occurred. Beaconsfield insisted that it should not be called South Bulgaria, that if it were, it would be impossible to keep them from uniting. So it was called Eastern Roumelia, and thus it was made known to its Bulgarian inhabitants that they were to become Roumelians and not remain of the same nationality as their brothers farther north. As for the rest of the big Bulgaria, there were some provisions on paper for the good government of these regions, but, apart from those, the Christians were thrown back upon the mercy of the Turks. There was considerable indifference among European statesmen as to the fate of the Christian subjects of the Porte. They were held to be not very good Christians, and, even if they were, European interests, or rather the interests of each European Power, were of too much importance to be neglected for the welfare of a people partly civilized

[16]Figures from A. Chaunier, *La Bulgarie; étude diplomatique et de droit international*, and reduced from square kilometers.

and of an inferior type of Christianity. The portions of the great Bulgaria given back to Turkey were mostly to the south and southwest. Pirot, to the northwest went to Serbia and a small region in the southwest went to Turkey. The Ægean ports were lost to Bulgaria, the old capital city of Ochrida, Monastir, and Seres, the valleys of the Struma and the Vardar. There was talk of constituting a Western Roumelia, but that was not done. Also the Dobroudja, the northeastern portion, was taken for Roumania.

Another matter for discussion at the Congress was the time during which the Russians should occupy Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. The treaty of San Stefano said two years, but the Congress decided that nine months was enough. But the subject which proved the most difficult and over which the Congress nearly broke up was the occupation of the Balkan frontier of Eastern Roumelia by Turkish troops. Russia contended that it was not safe to allow Turkish troops in South Bulgaria, Great Britain, that, in the country south of the Balkans, the Sultan should exercise real political and military power. Beaconsfield was very firm in his tone, and insisted so decidedly, that he had his way. "I have to hold terribly firm language,"[17] he said, and he seemed proud of his success. It was on this occasion that he had a train ordered for Calais, and probably would have taken it, if Russia had not given in. He got much glory from his victory, but it was a fruitless one, as Turkish troops never were introduced into Eastern Roumelia.

The treaty of Berlin repeated the provision of that of San Stefano in regard to the prince. An assembly of Bulgarian notables, convoked to meet at Tirnovo, was to construct a constitution for the principality. In localities where Bulgarians were mixed with Turks, Roumanians, Greeks, or others, they should be given a voice in elections and constitution making. No discrimination was to be allowed on account of religious belief. Religious freedom was to be assured all cults and sects. The provisional government of Bulgaria, to last no longer than nine months, was to be directed by a Russian Commissioner with an Ottoman Commissioner and Consuls delegated by the Powers to assist. Whatever international obligations the Otto-

[17]Buckle, *Life of Benjamin Disraeli*, VI, 324.

man government had incurred, must be fulfilled by the Bulgarian government, such as those allowing extra-territoriality, commercial treaties, and charges for railroads constructed. Tribute was to be paid by Bulgaria to Turkey, and Bulgaria was to assume a proportional share of the Ottoman debt, the amount in each case to be determined by the signatory powers. The Ottoman army was not to stay any longer in Bulgaria, and all the fortresses were to be razed at the expense of the Principality within a year or less.

Eastern Roumelia was to remain under the political and military authority of the Sultan. The degree of autonomy granted it was partly determined by treaty, but was to be further defined by an International Commission. By the treaty, internal order was to be maintained by a native gendarmerie and a local militia made up according to the religion of the inhabitants. The officers were to be named by the Sultan. Frontier forces were to consist of soldiers of the Sultan, but must not be bashi-bazouks or Circassians. The regular soldiers must not be quartered on the people, and must not tarry as they passed through. In case of necessity, the governor-general could call in Turkish troops, but, in such case, the Sublime Porte must apprise the representatives of the Powers at Constantinople, and tell why the use of the troops was necessary. The governor-general of East Roumelia must be a Christian, and was to be appointed by the Porte with the assent of the Powers for a term of five years. The powers and attributes of the governor-general, as well as the administrative, judicial, and financial regime of the province were to be based on the present laws of the vilayets, and the proposals made at the eighth session of the conference of Constantinople. The European Commission, in accord with the Porte, was to be charged with the duty of administering the finances of the province until the regular government should be instituted.

As was the case with Bulgaria, treaties in force at the ratification of the treaty of Berlin were to remain in force; but, as was not provided for Bulgaria, new treaties made were to be in force in Eastern Roumelia just as in other parts of Turkey. Russian troops not to exceed 50,000 men were to remain in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia for nine months.

The treaty of Berlin was looked upon as a defeat for Russia and a triumph for the British and Austrians. Beaconsfield went home elated and spoke of peace with honor, although some provisions taken over from the treaty of San Stefano, he had denounced a few weeks earlier. In a letter to Sir Drummond Wolff written November 4th, 1880, Beaconsfield wrote:

> Next to making a tolerable settlement for the Porte, our great object was to break up and permanently prevent the alliance of the three Empires, and I maintain there never was a great diplomatic result more completely effected. Of course, it does not appear in the protocols; it was realized by personal influence alone, both with Andrassy and Bismark. (Beaconsfield's spelling.)[18]

Salisbury's later judgment was not so favorable, for he concluded that he had backed the wrong horse. That the motives of the Powers were selfish goes without saying, for the time had not yet come when a higher standard than that of Nietzsche and Machiavelli could prevail. Russia, who, when she entered the war, showed a good deal of enthusiasm for the deliverance of her brother Slavs, became convinced before the war was over that she must be compensated for her sacrifices. So, at the end of the war, she was responsible for the meanest thing that happened at the Congress of Berlin, the taking of Bessarabia from Roumania, who had been her ally during the war. She also secured a strip of Asia Minor from Turkey. The revision of the treaty of San Stefano also gave Austria the administration of the northwestern possessions of Turkey, and Great Britain, that of Cyprus. This was not a partitioning of Turkey, Beaconsfield argued, though to his critics it looked much like one, and it seemed strange for one who stickled so for the integrity of Turkey to acquire a Turkish province and consent to the acquisition of another by Austria. Such criticism Beaconsfield regarded as superficial, for Turkey he claimed would be strengthened by enabling her to concentrate her efforts on a more compact territory. The French, Germans, and Italians got nothing directly by the treaty. The French in the discussions it was claimed, "put the interest of humanity above those of European equilibrium" while the Germans "recognize only egotism."[19]

[18]Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, *Rambling Recollections*, II, 265.

[19]d'Avril, *Négociations relatives au traite de Berlin*, pp. 330, quoting the *Pall Mall Gazette*.

To one interested in the welfare and progress of the Bulgarians, the treaty of San Stefano seems preferable to that of Berlin. Events showed that the influence Russia was to have in Bulgaria was much overrated. No doubt Bulgaria ought not to have been divided, and ought to have had an outlet on the Ægean. The separation of the two Bulgarias upon which Great Britain so strenuously insisted, was fruitless and a source of much irritation and a possible cause of war. The exclusion of Western Roumelia put back under the wretched rule of the Turks many Bulgarians and other Slavs.

CHAPTER VI

BULGARIA FROM 1878 TO 1881

When the Turks were driven out of Bulgaria, the administration was taken over by the Russians, as provided in the treaty[1] and Prince Vladimir Tcherkaski was put at the head. Under him, in one capacity or another, were employed all those Bulgarians, who seemed qualified by intelligence and experience. Tcherkaski died at San Stefano on the day of the signing of the treaty at that place, and Prince Alexander Dondoukoff-Korsakoff was put in his place. He seems to have been a competent administrator, and was well liked by the Bulgarians. Being very wealthy, he kept open table and his liberality no doubt added to his popularity. He strove to govern with an iron hand in a silken glove.[2] After the treaty of Berlin was ratified he left Philippopolis and went to Tirnovo leaving General Stolypin as governor of Eastern Roumelia. Dondoukoff's sympathies were with the Pan-Slavists, and he was very indignant that the European Powers had robbed Russia of the fruits of victory. He told one of the British Commissioners that he would put every obstacle in the way of carrying out the English programme; that there was no use disguising the fact, they were face to face as enemies; and that he and his countrymen were, as it were, upon their trial. He ridiculed the Treaty of Berlin, the Rhodope Commission, the Eastern Roumelia Commission, and everything that had been done at, or since, the Congress, applying to them such expressions as Offenbachisms, comedies and bouffonades.[3] He was accused of promoting demonstrations against the Treaty, and of inspiring the people with a spirit of hostility against the Turks.[4] In December, 1878, he visited the Tsar at Livadia and received the Emperor's approval of his course.[5] However, in May, 1879, the Tsar issued an ukase to

[1] P. 89, *supra.*

[2] Jiracek, *Das Fürstenthum Bulgarien*, p. 317. The Marquis of Bath speaks highly of him as an administrator in his book on Bulgarian Affairs.

[3] *Parlia. Papers, 1878-79, Turkey, No. 9*, pp. 33-35, 54.

[4] *Times*, June 14, 1879.

[5] So the *Times* correspondent said. *Ibid.*, Dec. 7, 1878.

the Bulgarian people of Eastern Roumelia, urging them to accept and carry out the Treaty.[6]

With the exception of Dondoukoff at the head, advisory consuls of foreign Powers, and a Turkish Commissioner, also advisory, most of the administrative force were Bulgarians. "At the beginning of 1879, the new civil administration consisted of 2,121 Bulgarians, namely, 768 appointed, and 1,353 elected, and 150 Russians. The judicial and instruction services were wholly Bulgarian."[7] To put the army on a more substantial footing, a large number of guns were given them by the Russian government and, in addition, 20,000 horses as a present from the Tsar. Money was contributed by Russians to restore most of the 400 churches damaged during the war.[8]

To set the new government going the Bulgarians must, first, make a constitution, and, second, choose a prince. To frame the constitution, an assembly was gathered together of 231 notables, partly elected, partly appointed by the Russian Commissioner, partly ex-officio, or representing special interests. They made a good impression on the *Times* correspondent. Nearly two-thirds could speak French, about half French and German, and a dozen knew English.[9] Before the constitution was discussed, an attempt was made to get the assembly to send a petition to the Powers for a union of all Bulgarian lands. There were present in Tirnovo at this time representatives from Eastern Roumelia and Macedonia who had been asked to come by Dondoukoff. The discussion of Bulgarian union delayed matters until a telegram from Gortschakoff threw cold water on the design to present an official memorial to the Powers. Other European agents, also, said that it would be impossible to transmit officially, or to accept a petition contrary to the treaty of

[6] *Ibid.*, May 10, 1879.

[7] Jiracek, *op. cit.*, 318.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 317.

[9] Dr. Washburn, however, observing the other side of the picture says: "The assembly was unique, made up largely of peasants, many of them in their sheepskin clothes, and I think there was no one in the assembly who knew anything about parliamentary law except the old students of Robert College who were then in force," *Fifty Years in Constantinople*, p. 173. There may be a confusion of the assembly chosen to make the constitution and the one elected to choose a prince.

Berlin.[10] So the plan was given up, or at least modified, so that the document when presented to the representatives of the Powers was unofficial, and did not receive the endorsement of the Assembly, only of some of its members and the delegations from outside Bulgaria.[11] The Russian Commissioner, Prince Dondoukoff, naturally influenced the deliberations in an important way. They had the assistance also of the Russian expert, Lukijanoff, and of other advice from Russia which was nearly always in the direction of liberalism. Just then liberal ideas were in the Russian air.[12] The constitution was based largely on that of Serbia. The first draft, approved by Dondoukoff, provided for two houses, both to be in part appointed by the Prince. On the nature of the constitution, two parties were formed, one led by Tsankoff, Karaveloff, and Slaveikoff in favor of liberalizing it, the other led by Volkovitch, Nacovitch, Grecoff, and Stoiloff. The Liberals for the most part were educated in Russia, the Conservatives in France. The latter feared that Bulgaria was too inexperienced in political matters to be given much freedom at first. They proposed trying the constitution as drafted for five years, then, if it seemed best, amending it. The Liberals, however, opposed this plan, and, proving to be in the majority, had their way. The upper house was done away with, all of the lower house was to be elected, and the constitution was not to be subject to revision for five years. The Russians were not averse to the changes. Dondoukoff in his opening speech before the Assembly had assured them that the draft presented was only a programme, and that they were expected to speak freely and make changes if they thought best. One reason given for Russia's allowing, and, even favoring changes in the direction of liberalism, is that by this means Bulgaria might outbid the Eastern Roumelian constitution makers, and so make the Southern Bulgarians more eager to unite with them.[13] Dondoukoff may have had reasons of his own for wishing the change. Those who believe he had, say that, when the original draft was presented to the Assembly, he was hopeful of being made Prince. In March, however, word came from the Russian

[10]Queillé, *Les commencements de l'indépendance bulgare*, p. 14.
[11]*Times*, Mar. 3, and Apr. 7, 1879.
[12]Staneff, *Geschichte der Bulgarien*, p. 58.
[13]Jiracek, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

government that it would be impossible for a Russian subject to be given that dignity. So they say he desired a constitution for Bulgaria that would not work too smoothly and would necessitate the interference of some good friend to compose the difficulties; that good friend, if not himself, would be some other Russian.[14] This Assembly closed after twenty-seven sessions, on April 28th, and the concluding protocol was signed by the Russian and Turkish Commissioners, the representatives of the Great Powers, and two hundred and eight deputies.[15]

Before the Treaty of Berlin was signed, the question of who should be made Prince of Bulgaria was discussed. At first some thought he should come from the Bulgarians themselves, and it was determined that a committee of eminent Bulgarians should be appointed to select a prince from the Christian population of the country. The Vogorides family, which had been prominent earlier, was thought of. The candidate they had to offer became, a little later, the governor of Eastern Roumelia, but his name was soon dropped as a candidate for the throne of the principality.[16] A little later there was agitation for the election of the Prince of Montenegro.[17] The Prince of Roumania had been approached on the subject by the Tsar before the treaty of San Stefano had been signed, but Karl just then did not feel like following the suggestions of the Tsar who had just been stealing Bessarabia. Later in the year, however, he wrote to Alexander of Battenberg that if Alexander did not heed the call, "I am ready to take over the duties of the government."[18] Salisbury thought him not eligible as a member of one of the ruling families of Europe, though his kingdom could hardly be called one of the Great Powers. When it was thought a Russian might be allowed to serve, Count Ignatieff was talked of, and quite probably he or Prince Dondoukoff might have been elected if the Tsar had not vetoed the choice of any Russian. Other can-

[14]Corti, *Prince Alexander*, pp. 58-59.

[15]Jiracek, *op. cit.*, p. 32. Queillé says that the Turkish delegate did not sign because of the words in the document, "Liberator of Bulgaria," and that the Austrian delegate did not sign, and did not go to the Te Deum and banquet held in celebration. *Op. cit.*, p. 9.

[16]*Times*, June 28, July 1, 1878.

[17]*Ibid.*, Oct. 14.

[18]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

didates considered were Prince Henry of Reuss, German ambassador at the Austro-Hungarian Court, Vlademar of Denmark, and Alexander of Battenberg. These were the three names presented to the National Assembly meeting on April 29, 1879, and elected for the special purpose of choosing a Prince. Dondoukoff opened the proceedings, then the three candidates were put in nomination. There was no hesitation, the minds of the delegates were made up, and Alexander of Battenberg was elected by acclamation. He was apprised of his election by the following declaration:

> The representatives of the Bulgarian people appreciating your noble qualities and certain that your Highness will not only be imbued with the interests of Bulgaria, but will defend them to the utmost of your power, as you have already defended them during the war of liberation, have confided to you lofty sentiments, the future destinies of their country, electing you voluntarily, and with unanimity Prince of Bulgaria.[19]

The Russian minister, Giers, claimed to have found Alexander and recommended him to the Tsar.[20] Accordingly, he was the candidate of Russia. Since she was the European power most interested, everyone expected that the Russian government would have much to say about the election. Without doubt, the knowledge that Alexander was the Russian candidate accounted for the enthusiasm with which he was accepted by the Bulgarian National Assembly. However, he was not objectionable to the other governments. He was in a way a European personality. His father was German, his mother Polish, and a cousin had married one of Queen Victoria's daughters.[21] Alexander's aunt, his father's sister, was the Tsarina. Moreover, his father, Prince of Hesse Darmstadt, had been an Austrian gen-

[19] *Times*, May 8, 1879, quoting from the *Cologne Gazette*.

[20] Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 56. Schouvaloff told Baddeley that he was responsible for the appointment of Prince Alexander. Schouvaloff went to Bismarck with the suggestion, who said that he didn't object, if Andrassy did not. Then Schouvaloff went to Andrassy who was at first opposed to the candidacy of Alexander, but who after half an hour's persuasion yielded. Schouvaloff said that the Tsar at first was angry that Alexander did not refuse the throne, for the Tsar had only supported him out of politeness, having some one else in mind. The Tsarina also did not approve. "Quoi donc, cet imbécile là?" she said. Baddeley, *Russia in the Eighties*, p. 407.

[21] Later his brother Henry married another.

eral, and he himself had served with the Russian army in the war against Turkey. The man who was about to undertake the task of presiding over the new Bulgarian state had much in his favor. He was tall and imposing, of military bearing, and seems to have been of more than average intelligence. However, he was only twenty-two years old, and the difficulties he would have to meet as ruler of a new state with a people not having much political experience were neither few nor small.[22] He hesitated about accepting, and his father advised him not to accept unless the constitution just framed should be altered and the Prince given more power. The Tsar, however, would not hear of a refusal. "He reproached the Prince that he should make such difficulties, appealed to the loyalty and love of his nephew, and was finally so moved that tears ran down his cheeks." He promised also to telegraph Dondoukoff to have a paragraph added to the constitution that, if in the course of time, a provision should be found impracticable, the Prince might take the initiative in having it nullified. Dondoukoff answered: "The order of Your Majesty is executed." So Alexander consented to become Prince of Bulgaria. While he was with the Tsar there came a delegation from Bulgaria to greet him and to express their gratitude to the Tsar. Alexander II received them with the words: "From my hands receive your Prince, love him as I love him."[23]

Before going to Bulgaria, the Prince thought it best to make a tour of Western Europe in order to visit the courts of the Great Powers. The journey was to be undertaken, first, to thank the Powers who had helped to create the new Bulgaria; and then to expound to them, very carefully and candidly, his views on the difficulties and responsibilities of the task entrusted to him;

[22]Lord Carnarvon who met him after his abdication in 1887 says: "He is striking and attractive in manner, and on the whole, equal to his general reputation, simple, frank, soldierly." Hardinge, *op. cit.*, III, 237. Klaeber in his life of the Prince says that even his enemies came altogether "sous son charme," p. 65. On the other hand, Dr. Roy thought him rather a diplomat than a soldier, though a debutant at diplomacy, sometimes letting escape intimate sentiments. "He never engages himself, and if perchance he does, he keeps always in reserve a way out." Dr. Chas. Roy, *Souvenirs politique*, p. 158. Von Huhn in his "Struggle of the Bulgarians," etc., says: "Prince Alexander is a wise statesman, a brave soldier, a remarkable man in every way," p.6.

[23]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

thirdly, to ask the Powers to execute all obligations affecting Bulgaria. It would be impossible for him to do his duty by Bulgaria without good order in Eastern Roumelia. The organic statute should be fully applied there and Turkey should abandon her attempt to garrison the Balkan frontier. Fourthly, he took upon himself to ask for reforms in Macedonia in accordance with Article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin.[24] He had a talk with Andrassy in Vienna, with Bismarck in Berlin, and, in England, with Beaconsfield, Salisbury, and the Queen. He has left an account of his interview with Andrassy, and may be supposed to have said something of the same sort to the others. In this interview, the Prince said that the separation of the two Bulgarias was due to the ignorance of Lord Beaconsfield concerning the character and efforts of the Bulgarian people; that Beaconsfield had no idea as to what the separation of the two Bulgarias meant. The Prince also said that he feared the movement for union would become so strong that the whole would unite and "like an avalanche, overthrow Prince, ministry, Berlin treaty, and everything that stood in the way."[25] His interview with Bismarck was not long or important. It is commonly told that Bismarck advised him to take the place offered him, that it would be a pleasant recollection in his old age; but according to Bismarck himself, it was Prince Karl of Roumania to whom he said it.[26] When Alexander arrived in England, Queen Victoria granted him an interview at Balmoral in Scotland, although she was not accustomed to receive any one there. Evidently she wished to be friendly; indeed she showed her friendship later.

Before going to Bulgaria, the Prince thought it best to visit the Sultan in Constantinople. Since he was not well received there his visit was a short one. On July 8, 1879, he took the oath to the constitution at Tirnovo, and on July 13th, was at Sofia, the capital. This city was nowhere near the centre of the

[24]From the *Russian Messenger* in the *Times* of June 2, 1879.

[25]From a manuscript in his own handwriting in the Hartenau Archives. Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

[26]*Ibid.* Corti refers to Wipperman, *Bismarck in Ruhestand*, S. 31. Wolff in his *Rambling Recollections* tells this remark of Bismarck's: "This question (a provision of the treaty of Berlin) will have to be treated by the Prince of Bulgaria—if there exists in the world a being unfortunate enough to take that position," II, 194.

country. Located in the southwestern corner, it reached down into Macedonia and suggested a future extension in that direction. Its location, moreover, made it somewhat more difficult for Serbia to take a portion of Bulgaria some time in the future. Alexander was greeted with continuous ovations on the way from Tirnovo to Sofia. At Sofia there was a procession and triumphal arches. In the procession Stambouloff carried a banner with the inscription: "Remember all-Bulgarians," held especially high.[27] On a triumphal arch was the greeting: "Welcome, Prince, we have expected you for 500 years."[28]

So things started with great good will, but it was too much to expect that they should continue to run smoothly. The Prince was young and inexperienced, and so was his principality. Then the Prince came with a prepossession against the new constitution, and to ardent Pan-Slavists like Dondoukoff he was not acceptable because he was German. It will be remembered that the Tsar had secured a promise from Dondoukoff to insert a provision allowing the Prince to change the constitution if it should prove unworkable. Either Dondoukoff did not want to have the clause added, or could not get the consent of the Assembly to such a provision, for the clause inserted provided that no change in the constitution could be made without the consent of two-thirds of the Ordinary Assembly, the change to be voted on also by the Great Assembly elected for the purpose.[29] The Prince's experiences from the first confirmed him in the opinion that the constitution should be changed, and he be given more power.

The Prince tried for twenty-two months to play his part under this constitution and then became convinced that he could not make it go. A brief summary of his experiences will show us how he came to lose his patience. He found in existence the two political parties or factions which had formed themselves in the assembly that had adopted the constitution. It was to be expected that he would find the members of the Conservative party more congenial. They were, besides having views more in accordance with those of the Prince, perhaps more gracious in

[27]Staneff, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

[28]*Times*, July 15, 1879.

[29]The Bulgarians had two assemblies, one the legislative, the other called upon to act upon any change in the constitution.

manner, due to contact with Western Europe. Queillé, at least, describes the Liberal leader Karaveloff as a "bear in manners, his head covered with a forest of long curly locks, his shoulders like those of an Atlas carrying the world."[30] His advisers had named to Prince Alexander the leading Bulgarians who might be available for his ministry, both Liberals and Conservatives; and Alexander, hoping to avail himself of all the talent at hand, tried a coalition cabinet. Tsankoff, however, would not serve with Grecoff, and the Prince appointed a ministry of the Right. In October, an election was held for an Assembly and the party of Tsankoff and Karaveloff won. Alexander did not understand how "people who kneel before me and kiss my stirrups can let themselves be led by those whom they know to be my enemies and whose perfidy they have proof of."[31] The position taken by the Prince in making himself definitely a member of the Conservative party was one of the unfortunate elements of the situation. Nevertheless, he did ask Karaveloff to form a ministry in harmony with the majority in the Assembly. Unfortunately the leader was unable to do so, because, it was said, his party was so lacking in good men.[32] The *Times* correspondent was probably nearest the truth when he gave other reasons for the failure of Karaveloff. Alexander insisted, he said, that Karaveloff should keep Grecoff and Natchovitch in his ministry, but Karaveloff refused saying, "How can we accept these men as our associates in the cabinet when the National Assembly has just censured them by an overwhelming majority?" Alexander, not having been educated up to the British idea of ministerial responsibility, dissolved the Assembly and appointed a conservative ministry.[33] Soon another election was held. The result, as before, was in favor of the Liberals. This time the Prince thought it best to accept a ministry of the Liberals, and Tsankoff succeeded in getting one together. He served until November, when he was forced to resign under circumstances to be recounted later. Karaveloff, who had been given a place in Tsankoff's cabinet, now took his place as premier and remained in power until May, 1881.

[30]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
[31]*Ibid.*, p. 29.
[32]Lamy in *Le correspondant*, Dec. 25, 1908, p. 1055.
[33]*Times*, Dec. 29, 1879; Jiracek, *op. cit.*, p. 325.

The first assembly which the Prince called did not accomplish anything during its six weeks session. In the early days of the session it spent much time in a discussion over the way the Prince should be addressed, whether with the title "Visochesto," Highness, or "Svetlos," Splendor, the constitution designating the latter, and Alexander and his friends insisting on the former. At other times and in other matters, he clashed with his Assembly. The second Assembly under the lead of Stambuloff put through a law denying citizenship to any one not born in Bulgaria. Apparently the law was aimed at Grecoff who was born in Roumania. The Prince induced them to withdraw the bill by a threat to dissolve the Chamber.[34] The Assembly, too, was disorderly and would not allow the Conservative minority to be heard.[35] It would not appropriate money for the reconstruction of the palace. According to Drandar that was one of the principal reasons for the coup d'état which Alexander brought about a little later. There was pressure upon the Prince to get incompetents into offices, some of whom, he complained, could not read and write.[36] He believed that those who held office, from the highest official to the last gendarme, were corrupt, and that every law proposed for two years had the most selfish purposes for its basis. During Karaveloff's ministry in 1881, the Prince was receiving petitions from all parts of the country complaining of arbitrary and illegal proceedings of the ministry. Outsiders were admitted into the council of ministers, threatening instructions were sent to the courts; judges, he learned, were arbitrarily removed; election returns for local officials were falsified. In one city, the mayor was imprisoned for sending a petition to the Prince, and the Prince himself was unable to get him released.[37] Concession hunters, Bulgarians, and foreigners helped to make life miserable for him,[38] and not the least of his burdens was the presence of the Russians in the country.

About the time Alexander arrived in Bulgaria, the Russian troops who had been there since the war were removed, but some

[34]A. G. Drandar, *Cinq ans de règne*, p. 53; Lamy, *op. cit.*, p. 1058.

[35]Drandar, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[36]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

[37]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-8; *Parlia. Papers, 1881, Turkey No. 1*, p. 2.

[38]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 70; Interview of correspondent of *The Standard* quoted in the *Nation*, July 28, 1881.

Russians remained to instruct the Bulgarians in military affairs. The Minister of War was a Russian. Both he and his Bulgarian subordinates were supposed to be subject to the orders of the Bulgarian government. Besides these there was the Russian agent whose duty it was to represent the Russian government at the Bulgarian capitol. The other great Powers had their agents there too. Besides, there was in the early days of Alexander's career in his adopted country, Colonel Schepeleff, who was to be his special adviser, and two Russian captains (or perhaps just corporals) of industry, one a banker, and the other an engineer. By means of these men and others, Russia hoped to make Bulgaria her province. Something of the sort was expected by the Powers; hence the insistence upon a truncated Bulgaria. Bismarck said in 1888, that all opinions at the Congress of Berlin were that Russian influence would prevail in Bulgaria after she had renounced Eastern Roumelia. However, he was mistaken as to Andrassy's opinion, for the Austro-Hungarian statesman thought that circumstance not inevitable and wished to hasten the departure of the Russian troops, so that Bulgaria might stand on her own feet.[39] Each opinion had much to support it. On the one hand Russia was anxious to control Bulgaria, and Bulgaria expected help and counsel from her benefactor. She was, besides, grateful for the degree of independence she had attained. On the other hand, Bulgaria wished to be really independent. Prince Alexander, for his part, felt he needed the support of the Tsar. He made frequent trips to Russia. The Prince once said that if Russia deserted him, he would be compelled to turn to some other Power for support, Austria-Hungary, for example.[40] The desire of Russia to control, and the desire of Bulgaria to gain independence both of her benefactor, and of her former oppressor as well, almost necessarily led to trouble. It was sure to do so unless there was exercise of the utmost tact. The Prince got along very well with the Tsar, and the influence of his aunt, the Tsarina, was always in his interest. Unfortunately, she died in 1880, and Alexander II was killed in 1881. The foreign minister, Giers, was for moderate counsels, but the Pan-Slavist pressure was very great and worked for extreme

[39]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-3.
[40]*Ibid.*, p. 85.

measures, pushing forward the cause of Russia in season and out of season. The great zeal of the Pan-Slavists often defeated itself by arousing unnecessary antagonism. That was the case in Bulgaria as we shall see.

Perhaps the most influential of the Pan-Slavists was Miliutin the Russian war minister. One of his officers said to the Prince one day: "Highness, you take everything too tragically. No Russian officer considers you as his commander-in-chief. We stand at an advanced post and fight only for Russian interests! Your disfavor is the best recommendation for me in Russia."[41] Prince Alexander once, in the presence of the Tsar and Miliutin himself, had protested with warmth against the war minister's sending orders to the Russian Parenzoff, war minister for Bulgaria, over the head of the Prince, and also against his receiving secret reports from Parenzoff.[42]

One of the Prince's many visits to the Tsar was made in March, 1880. The Prince, the Tsar, and other guests at that time had a narrow escape from death. The occasion was a dinner party at which occurred the consummation of one of the plots against the life of the Tsar. A bomb was exploded under the dining room of the Winter Palace, and the only thing that prevented the annihilation of the whole party was the delay of the train which was bringing the Prince's father to St. Petersburg. His arrival was awaited in another room. In his interview with the Tsar, whose nerves naturally were a good deal upset by his narrow escape and constant danger, the Prince had three requests to make. In fact, if they were not granted, he intended to refuse to return to Sofia. They were:

1. The revision of the Constitution.

2. Full powers in writing to dismiss most of his Russian officials and functionaries.

3. The immediate removal of Parenzoff, minister of war and Schepeleff, confidential adviser.

The Tsar, influenced by Miliutin and his party, was not willing to grant the first request, but advised the Prince to reconcile himself to Tsankoff and his friends.[43] Parenzoff and Schepeleff

[41]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[42]*Ibid.*, p. 82.

[43]Queillé, *op. cit.*, pp. 37-9; Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 81.

were recalled, and whether or not the power of dismissing Russians in his service was given at this time, Prince Alexander later exercised that power. He was in Russia again for the funeral of his aunt, the Tsarina, three months later. This time the Tsar was so upset by the death of his wife, and also, to a still greater degree, by his relations with Princess Catharine Dolgoruki, that no important matter seems to have been settled between the Tsar and the Prince. A month and a half after the death of the Tsarina, Alexander II was married to Princess Dolgoruki and "three-fourths of his thoughts were given to his thirty-two year old bride."[44]

With a few of the Russian representatives, Alexander had pleasant relations, but it was only too true that those men were out of favor in Russia. One of those friendly to the Prince was the first Russian agent, Davidoff. He fell into disgrace on account of Miliutin and "delations from Sofia," and was recalled at the same time as Parenzoff and Schepeleff. Instead of Davidoff, Coumani was sent, but he "irritates rather than soothes."[45] The new minister of war, Ehrnroth, however, worked cordially with the Prince. He was Alexander's right hand man at the suspension of the constitution in May, 1881. One of the things causing controversy and hard feeling was the granting of concessions for the development of the country. When the Prince first arrived in Bulgaria, he found there Gunzbourg, who asked for the monopoly of credit, and Poliakoff who asked for a contract for railroad building. Coumani, the new Russian agent, supported them, while the Prince was for Hagienoff, a Bulgarian.[46] In such matters were the seeds of future trouble.

It was expected that the other Powers, particularly England and Austria-Hungary, would watch with interest the "Russification" of Bulgaria. In the first months after the ratification of the treaty of Berlin, they were concerned lest a movement for the union of the two Bulgarias develop and get out of hand. The British government said it was using its influence against such a movement. Gierś, Russian foreign minister, said that

[44]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 98.
[45]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 46.
[46]Drandar, *op. cit.*, pp. 59-60.

he was doing likewise.[47] When in April, 1880, the Beaconsfield ministry, which was responsible in large measure for the Treaty of Berlin, was replaced by the Gladstone ministry, there was ardent hope that England would not object to the union movement. Twenty-seven congratulatory addresses were sent to Mr. Gladstone.[48] Nevertheless Bulgaria's desires were not fulfilled, and it became necessary for her to restrain herself and "to prove to Mr. Gladstone and to Europe that we merit their sympathies."[49] The opinion of Gladstone was obtained on the advisability of changing the Bulgarian constitution. Farley, an English subject in the Bulgarian service, had published a brochure picking the constitution to pieces. He asked Gladstone's opinion on the matter. Gladstone said that the fundamental law should not be changed, and this view was conveyed to the Bulgarian government.[50]

During the twenty months to which we are now giving our attention, Bulgaria had rather unimportant conflicts with Austria and France. One of these led to the dismissal of Tsankoff from the headship of the ministry. A Bulgarian who happened to be Tsankoff's brother (or cousin) was on the international commission for the regulation of the navigation of the Danube. The Austrian member thought it was his prerogative to be at the head of this commission and the Bulgarian member, for what he thought were good reasons, voted against him. The cabinet member was held responsible for his brother's vote; he was compelled to exchange his dignity for that of an ordinary cabinet member, because "he dared to trifle with a grand Austrian lord."[51] The trouble with France was over annulling the contract of the French finance-counsellor. "The breach of contract is explained only through blind opposition to all regulation." Later, M. Queillé, another Frenchman, occupied that position for two and one-half years.[52]

[47] *State Papers*, 1879-80, p. 651.
[48] *Times*, April 9, 1880.
[49] *Times*, May 19, 1880.
[50] Drandar, *op. cit.*, pp. 49-50.
[51] Drandar, *op. cit.*, pp. 64-67.
[52] Jiracek, *op. cit.*, p. 327, note. Others tell the story somewhat differently. A. Koch, *Fürst Alexander des Bulgarien Darmstadt*, pp. 64 ff.

The representatives of Austria-Hungary watched developments in Bulgaria a little jealously, although it was no doubt understood that Russia was to have her chance in Bulgaria, as Austria-Hungary had hers in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Haymerle, who succeeded Andrassy as foreign minister, said he was quite sympathetic with Bulgaria and its Prince, but not with the ruler of a little Russia. Khevenhüller, the Austria-Hungarian representative at Sofia, urged the Prince to rid his land from "this pest" and to exert his authority. He even wrote home that Alexander had already become a Russian puppet—a charge that was hardly deserved.[53] Austria, on her part, was accused of stirring up trouble in Bulgaria, but that charge too lacks proof.[54] As for Bismarck, he was not much interested in Bulgaria. The treaty of the Dual Alliance signed in 1879 meant that Germany stood behind Austria, although it was not Bismarck's purpose to drop Russia. Wilhelm I was still very friendly to Russia, and when Austrian and Russian interests did not definitely clash, Germany was willing to promote Russian interests. In June, 1881, the League of the Three Emperors was renewed.

With the factions among the Bulgarian politicians, and with the Pan-Slavists and Moderates among the Russians, there was chance enough for troubling the waters. Tsankoff, with the approbation of the Russians, was plotting against the Prince. The Prince was discouraged. "I consider my mission one that has turned out an unfortunate experiment. I have been away from affairs for four months, for I can no longer tolerate what is going on there. I know no more what is happening in the country and even if I knew it, I would be indebted to foreign representatives, and not to a responsible ministry serving me."[55] He told a correspondent of the *Standard* that he didn't know what to do. Consequently, he took the Emperors of Austria, Russia, and Germany into his confidence and they all said: "Do what you please, but do not leave Bulgaria."[56]

By May, 1881, the Prince had decided what to do. He thought it time for determined action; so he issued a proclama-

[53]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
[54]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 108. Bath, *Bulgarian Affairs*, p. 102.
[55]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
[56]*Nation*, July 28, 1881.

tion asking either for a change in the constitution of Tirnovo which should give him more power, or for the acceptance of his abdication. Although he had talked over the situation with representatives of the European governments, he seems not to have told them of any definite plans, and when he threatened to leave his post, they were taken by surprise.[57] The Russian government sent instructions to their agent, M. Hitrovo, "to support the Prince of Bulgaria in the course which he had adopted." The support was given, but grudgingly. The German Government said they thought the Prince was justified in his action, and the Austrian agent was instructed "to congratulate His Highness and to express the hope of his Government that he would be successful."[58] In England the Liberal Government was in power and could not afford to approve unconditionally what seemed to be a breach of a constitution ratified by a people and sworn to by its ruler. On May 12th, Sir George Campbell asked Sir Charles Dilke, Under secretary of State in the House of Commons, whether the Prince "has violently subverted the Constitution duly established by the sanction of the Powers under the Treaty of Berlin . . . and whether Her Majesty's Consul-General at Sofia will hold any diplomatic intercourse with the usurper beyond warning him of the personal responsibility he incurs."[59] Dilke's reply was non-committal. The *Times* was unsympathetic with the Prince.[60] The British Government had to take into account both British public opinion, and the views of other Powers. For the sake of the concert of Europe, and to avoid a "dangerous situation in the Balkans," Granville, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, could not abandon the Prince. Italy and France were inclined to follow the lead of England.

On May 23rd, the Prince announced definitely what the terms were upon which he would remain as ruler.

1. He must be entrusted with extraordinary powers for seven years.
2. The National Assembly must be suspended.

[57]Hans Klaeber, *Fürst Alexander von Battenberg*, p. 106.
[58]*Parlia. Papers, Bulgaria, No. 1, 1881*, p. 2.
[59]Hansard, *Parliamentary Debates*, V, 261, Col. 269-70.
[60]*Times*, May 13, etc.

3. The Prince must be allowed within the seven years to convoke the Great National Assembly "with a view to the revision of the Constitution on the basis of institutions already created and of experience acquired."[61]

Two weeks later, the Prince issued two decrees, "one appointing special military tribunals with power to pronounce sentence of death, to take cognizance of offences committed by organs of the executive power with a view to incite disturbances, the other to take administrative steps against those accused of offences against the press."[62] Conditions such as these, a British government, especially a Liberal one, could hardly commend. The official attitude was stated as follows to the French ambassador in London:

I said that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of acting with the other Powers, and of showing every consideration for the difficult position in which the Prince was placed; that we had been reserved in the language we had held in Parliament in regard to what was passing in Bulgaria for fear any chance expression should be construed into an encouragement of the opponents of His Highness. At the same time it seemed to us, making every allowance for the defects of the Constitution, that it was a very strong measure for the Prince to present to the nation the alternative of his abdication, or of the establishment of a despotism for seven years and I did not see how we were unconditionally to support such an attitude.[63]

Granville also objected to the special military tribunals.[64]

The Russian Government naturally had no such scruples as the British over an unconstitutional course. Their official view was published in *The Journal of St. Petersburg* of June 8th, 1881:

The Imperial Government is therefore persuaded that if His Highness has deemed it necessary to declare the impossibility of performing the task under existing conditions, he has been led thereto by the profound conviction based upon a long and painful experience that he would neglect his duties if he continued to shield under his own responsibility a state of things which the Prince saw was dangerous for the future of Bulgaria. The Government is likewise persuaded that, if Prince Alexander appeals to the Bulgarian nation in order to obtain from it such powers as are indispensable to place him in a position to follow out his mission conscientiously, it is with the firm desire of labouring successfully for the prosperity of the people whose destinies have been entrusted to him.[65]

[61] *Parlia. Papers, Bulgaria, No. 1, 1881*, p. 17.
[62] *Ibid.*, p. 31.
[63] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[64] *Ibid.*, p. 43.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 23.

A little later a telegram of the same purport was sent to M. Hitrovo, translated into Bulgarian, and published in one of their newspapers.[66] Lascelles, the British agent and consul-general, thought this message would have a great effect, and probably assure the success of the Prince in the coming elections.[67] The Russian Government tried to get the other Powers to consent to a declaration somewhat similar signed by representatives of all the Powers, but the three constitutional governments objected, and no common action was taken.

Meantime, the Liberals of Bulgaria led by M. Tsankoff were trying to get support for their opposition to the Prince and his proposals at the coming elections to the Great National Assembly. A telegram was sent to Mr. Gladstone signed by Tsankoff and three others of his party. Gladstone's reply was perfectly correct, committing him to nothing,[68] though some thought he should not have replied at all. The Liberals also tried to get a word of encouragement from Ignatieff who was at that time Russian Minister of the Interior. He replied and referred them to Hitrovo or the Chancellor Prince Gortchakoff, neglecting to mention the Foreign Minister, M. de Giers, who was naturally displeased. He also said, that Russia "does not intend to interfere in her (Bulgaria's) internal matters."[69] Hitrovo, for his part, went on a campaigning tour with the Prince quite in accordance with the Russian official policy, though hardly a policy of non-interference. Tsankoff and his associates and followers resented such action. He published an open letter to Hitrovo in which he specified breaches of the constitution of which the Prince was guilty, and in which he objected to the Russian agents accompanying the Prince on his tour. In the letter occurred the sentence from an old Serbian proverb, "I do not desire your honey, but neither do I desire your sting."[70] Hitrovo thought Bulgaria ought to show her gratitude to Russia by doing what Russia wanted, and told the people so.[71] Tsankoff complained in a telegram to the Czar that a knife was held

[66] *Ibid.*, p. 40.
[67] *Ibid.*
[68] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[69] *Ibid.*, p. 48; Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 110.
[70] *Parlia. Papers, Bulgaria, No. 1, 1881*, p. 30.
[71] *Ibid.*, p. 60.

at the throats of his people.[72] With pressure thus brought to bear upon the Bulgarian people, the election was held and the Prince won a decided victory. Hardly any of the Liberal party were elected.

The Assembly met at Sistova on July 13th. Just before the session, the Prince held a reception of the Corps Diplomatique at which the German Ambassador, their Dean, addressed the Prince in the name of his colleagues wishing "that the union between your Highness and the country may be indissolubly maintained. Your Highness," he said," . . . constitutes in the eyes of Europe, a guarantee of order and tranquillity, and the pledge of a happy development of Bulgaria in the path of progress." The British agent vetoed a proposal to express the hope that the Great National Assembly would ratify the choice of the nation on the ground that it was improper interference in Bulgaria's domestic affairs.[73] The Assembly met in a session of less than an hour, and accepted the terms of the Prince. The same day, at another meeting of the Diplomatic Corps, the German Ambassador congratulated the Prince on the outcome.[74]

[72] *Ibid.*, pp. 52-53.
[73] *Ibid.*, pp. 62, 68.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 73.

CHAPTER VII

BULGARIA FROM 1881 TO 1885

The Prince came to Bulgaria without any political experience and, although an intelligent man, he was not a political genius. The preceding chapter has shown how he learned by the method of trial and error. He had tried running the government under a liberal constitution. To him it had seemed to work very badly, so he had contrived to have it set aside, and to carry out his purpose of ruling without any. In order to avoid one set of evils, however, he met others which were even worse. The Prince succeeded in putting through his little coup d'état of May, 1881, largely with the help of two Russians. The Russian Minister of War for Bulgaria, General Ehrnroth, was an important agent at that juncture; and the Prince had been materially assisted by Hitrovo, who had replaced Coumani, in the campaign before the election to the Grand National Assembly in June. General Ehrnroth soon left for Russia, and much to Alexander's disappointment was not sent back to Bulgaria. Hitrovo, the Russian agent, stayed, but did not remain long a supporter of the Prince. He is characterized as a man of the type of Fra Diavolo, "A breaker of eggs rather than a maker of omelettes."[1] A principal source of trouble, as we have seen, was over business concessions,[2] particularly over railroad building. The Russians wished to give the contract to a man named Poliakoff, and later to General Struve. The Bulgarians supported as rival, Hagienoff, already mentioned as favored by the Prince. The Russians, moreover, were bound to have their way in the location of the railroad first to be built. They insisted on the route from Sofia to Rustchuk, while the Prince was inclined to the building of Bulgaria's share of the international line which was provided for

[1]Queillé, *Les commencements de l'indépendance bulgare et le Prince Alexander*, p. 106.

[2]An anonymous writer, who was well acquainted with events in Bulgaria at this time, in his pamphlet, *Causes occultes de la question bulgare*, attributes most of Prince Alexander's troubles to a coterie of Russians whose purpose was the exploitation of Bulgaria. Hitrovo, Stuve, and other leading representatives of the Russian Government were alleged to be members.

in the treaty of Berlin. Hitrovo allied himself with the Liberal party leader Tsankoff, at that time in determined opposition to the Prince. Hitrovo also ran up against the Prince in another matter. The official residence of the Russian representative was an entrepot for munitions, and from there aid was being sent to Russian couriers and others engaged in promoting revolts in Herzegovina. The Prince was opposed to the underhand methods used, and he apprised Austria of what was going on. Hitrovo's course was not approved by the Russian government, as they wanted to keep on good terms with Austria.[3] According to his custom when in difficulties, the Prince appealed to the Tsar, now Alexander III. The Tsar supported the Prince and told his agent in Bulgaria to do the same. The support, however, was not very cordial. The Prince, moreover, was not on good terms with Kryloff, who had taken the place of Ehrnroth as Minister of War. Kryloff openly defied Alexander by giving a banquet in honor of Popoff, an officer whom the Prince had dismissed from his service. The Prince, naturally indignant at the honor shown one under his displeasure, forbade such affairs in the future.

In June, 1882, the Prince went to Russia to lay the situation before the Tsar in a personal interview. While there, he spoke in a frank, straightforward way, as was his manner, to the German ambassador about Bulgarian affairs and he also talked pretty freely about Hitrovo. He said that the Bulgarian people and a part of the Russian officers and men seemed well disposed toward him, but that another part was under the influence of Hitrovo, "who, of the bad ones, is the worst. His trouble making, his perfidy and shamelessness, as well as his unrest and insolence are beyond bounds."[4]

The Prince succeeded in having Hitrovo and Kryloff recalled. Back in Russia the former succeeded in doing the Prince considerable harm.[5] To straighten things out in Bulgaria, the Russian government after much search, found two men, General Soboleff and General Kaulbars. The former was made head of the Prince's Council and the latter, Minister of War. These men, we are told, were selected with great care and had the confidence

[3]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 108; Corti, *Alexander von Battenburg, sein Kampf den Zaren und Bismarck*, p. 119.

[4]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 121-22.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 120; Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

of the Tsar. It was a condition of their appointment that they should stay for two years. They did not prove able, however, to meet the situation successfully. Prince Alexander's judgment of them was altogether unfavorable, but cannot be taken too seriously, for he came to dislike them intensely. He said, and his saying went the rounds: "Bulgaria and I are at the mercy of two dictators, one incapable, and the other a fool."[6] The correspondent of the *London Times* says that Soboleff was not of the military type, but an intriguer, while Kaulbars was his opposite, not clever in politics. He allowed Soboleff to take the lead. Perhaps the Prince was justified in the characterization given, for Soboleff did not succeed in his intrigues. In trying to please everyone he offended all.[7] The Russian representatives, generals as well as agents, preferred at first to work with the Conservatives, and a cabinet was chosen with Grecoff, Stoiloff and Nitchovitch as leading members under the generals; but Russians and Bulgarians could not work together. It became apparent that the generals considered Bulgaria merely as a Russian military outpost and political dependency.[8] In the election of 1882 to the third ordinary assembly, men of some prominence were chosen who were inclined to act independently, and they were not willing to make the appropriations which the generals

[6]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

[7]*Times*, Nov. 14, 1883. Koch says Kaulbars was vain and conceited even to rudeness and a German hater. On one occasion Soboleff expresses the Prince's judgment on Kaulbars: "Il est fou, ce Kaulbars." Koch says of Soboleff that he was "reserved, stealthy at bottom, so insignificant that the Prince could hardly carry on ordinary conversation with him. He hates his ministerial colleagues who speak Russian indifferently, and he understands no other language." Koch, *Fürst Alexander des Bulgarien Darmstadt*, pp. 111, 138.

[8]Perhaps Soboleff's denial of this is of no special significance. He wrote a little book in defense of his course in Bulgaria (*Der erste Fürst von Bulgarien*). In it, he says: "The Russians did not want to make Bulgaria a Russian province, but wanted its complete independence and were training its military forces to that end. Russia did want to be consulted and to give her authorization," pp. 67-68. One might remark that giving authorization implies the possibility of refusing to give it, and that that means dictation; also that Soboleff's way of expressing himself shows a state of mind which recognizes that Bulgaria has a right to independence, but that Russia is reluctant to permit its exercise. At all events, this interpretation of the remark quoted represents very well the course he and most of the other Russian agents followed.

demanded.[9] Then the railroad question came up. Again, there was rivalry over candidates for the ministry of public works, and a difference of opinion as to which railroad should be built first, the line to the Danube, or the international line.[10] An incident which had much to do with the alienation of the generals from their colleagues was the affair of Bishop Meletius. He had been deprived of his office by the Holy Synod, and had to be sent into retirement. By the official document, providing for his removal, he was to be taken to Vratza. Stoiloff, for what he considered good reasons, substituted Rilo for Vratza.[11] Soboleff was not consulted as to the change, and as president of the council he felt that he should have been. In consequence of these differences the conservatives in the cabinet all resigned. Their resignations left the generals in full control. After a few months of life in such an atmosphere as this occasioned, the Prince preferred to leave Sofia, anticipating a journey to Moscow in May, 1883, when the coronation ceremonies for Alexander III and his wife were to be held. When at Athens, he sent a telegram to his ministry, directing them to put through the plans for the international railroad line. That seemed to the Prince the wisest choice for Bulgaria and so it seems to us, as impartial observers. We are told that the Prince was led to believe that Russia did not care much one way or the other about the railroads. Perhaps she did not, except that she realized that a nation loses prestige when it does not have its way in a matter.[12] Nevertheless, the Prince's decision made the breach between him and the generals wider than ever. It also gave an opportunity to his enemies in Russia to represent him as hostile to his benefactor Russia, and friendly to her Balkan rival, Austria.[13] The Prince was reluctant to break with the Russian representatives in Bulgaria, but he had to choose between them and his people. Moreover he always hoped, that when the truth was known at St. Petersburg, the Tsar would follow his usual course and sup-

[9]Staneff, *Geschichte der Bulgarien*, p. 111.

[10]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 121; Drandar, *cinq ans de régne*, p. 131.

[11]Drandar, pp. 145-46. See also, *Causes occultes de la question bulgare*, pp. 79-80.

[12]*Causes occultes*, etc., p. 53.

[13]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

port his cousin. The conduct of the Russian generals toward him was certainly inconsiderate. They not only deprived him of his legitimate place as ruler of his adopted country, but they treated him with personal disrespect. His correspondence was watched (übersacht) and he was a virtual prisoner in his palace. On one occasion, General Kaulbars took the liberty of inviting a guest to the Prince's table without consulting him. When the Marshal of the palace noticed it, Kaulbars winked at him and said it was a trick he was playing.[14] Decrees were issued of which Alexander did not approve, and officials were arbitrarily removed. A deputation from Tirnovo, which was not quite satisfied with the way things were going, was sent back with the admonition: "Russia has shed her blood for you; Bulgaria should recognize that and it will. We shall compel it."[15]

With the foreign agents of other governments, the generals did not have much to do. They forgot that they were representatives of Bulgaria and acted as Russians. In a conversation with them at one time, the Austrian agent accused them of disloyalty, though it went hard, he said, to use so strong a word. "Yes, quite too strong," Kaulbars said, and the Austrian agent answered, "It does go hard indeed, the word nevertheless must be regarded as correct."[16]

Before the Prince went to the coronation, he sent Golovine to Moscow to try to win the good-will and help of Katkoff, newspaper magnate. Katkoff thought that the generals were not good ministers for Bulgaria, and that the Prince ought to take matters into his own hands and direct Bulgaria in the right way. The only right way though, he said, was the way of Russia.[17]

In May the Prince went to Moscow, hoping to get the backing of the Tsar. Soon after he arrived there news came to him of a delegation from Sofia, sent by the mayor who had just been appointed by Kaulbars. This delegation had come to Moscow to ask "in the name of the Bulgarian people" that Waldemar of Denmark replace Alexander as Prince of Bulgaria. One day

[14]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 128. Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 134.
[15]*Ibid.*, p. 130.
[16]*Ibid.*, p. 134; Drandar, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-82; Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 130.
[17]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

during the ceremonies the Prince met this mayor on the street and asked him what he was doing there. He said that he was at the head of a delegation and that he was going to be received by the Tsar the next day. The Prince went to Giers, who had arranged the reception, and remonstrated. Giers insisted that the delegation be received. To this demand Alexander replied that the moment that band of revolutionaries was received, he would leave Moscow. "Why revolutionaries?"asked Giers,

"Because," Alexander answered, "these people claim, without having a mandate and against my orders to represent the Bulgarian people here whose only legal representative I am."

"You have no right now to give orders in Bulgaria," answered Giers, "Kaulbars is regent."

Through the good offices of the German ambassador, the matter was compromised. The Tsar said that he regretted what had happened, and that he had not known the deputation was there against the will of the Prince. He thought, however, that it would make a bad impression in Bulgaria, if he did not receive the delegation. The Prince therefore reconciled himself to its reception on condition that the entire Bulgarian colony in Moscow be invited. There were also other Bulgarians in Moscow sent from Bulgaria, members of the Chamber. These were friends of the Prince, who had complaints to make against the generals. Soboleff, however, was there when they met the Tsar, and they did not venture to present their grievances.[18]

The Prince had his interview with the Tsar and convinced him that the best thing to do was to send General Ehrnroth again to Bulgaria as adviser to the Prince to try again a Conservative ministry, and to ask the generals to be more moderate in their policy. Great was the surprise of the Prince who had been much pleased with the Tsar's response to his wishes, to read in a newspaper when on his way back to Sofia that General Ehrnroth was not to go to Bulgaria. A letter from the Tsar a little later confirmed the news. Instead, a Russian diplomat, Jonin, was to be sent. The Prince wrote to the Crown Prince of Germany. "The Kaiser had promised me a man who would help me against the generals and sent me, instead of him, one of

[18]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 131; Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

the most infamous of Russian diplomats to help the generals against me."[19] After Prince Alexander had left Moscow, the Pan Slavist party had got hold of the Tsar and had persuaded him that the Prince was not devoted to the interests of Russia. The Prince himself had convinced Katkoff, newspaper magnate, that such was the case, by frankly telling him that he was in favor of the international railroad line, which, passing from Serbia through Bulgaria, was the one Austria-Hungary desired.[20]

From this time the breach with Russia became wide and deep. During the next few months, a good deal of feeling was exhibited on both sides. The Prince was thought by Russia to be ungrateful, and the Russian representatives were arrogant and sometimes insulting. "Russia hates me," the Prince wrote to Crown Prince Frederick William, "because she fears me, but I enjoy their hate, for I answer it with my whole soul although to be sure circumstances compel me to suppress my feelings for some years."[21] He expressed himself to M. Queillé at about the same time, showing much the same state of mind: "Ah, Russia, whither are you leading me? Is it not true that one comes to understand Nihilism, to account for the infiltration of that poison even among classes high up in society, when a sovereign, given up to all sorts of intrigue, is subject to all the caprices of a lot of petty ambitions such as disgrace honest men, and whose victims have no recourse to any appeal nor any chance of justice."[22]

M. Jonin, whom the Tsar sent as Russian agent, had been Russian representative in Montenegro for some years. In Bulgaria as he himself announced, he was to play the part of the "dove from the ark." The *Times* correspondent speaks of him as "one of the most dangerous firebrands in the Russian diplo-

[19]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 139-40.

[20]*Ibid.*, p. 135.

[21]*Ibid.*, pp. 146-47.

[22]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 183. Alexander II was fond of Prince Alexander, but his son Alexander III, either through jealousy or for some other reason, disliked him intensely. Schouvaloff at one time said to the Tsar: "Then your Imperial Majesty cannot bear Battenberg?" The Tsar replied: "I should think not, the scoundrel, the villain." Cf. Bismarck's remark: Busch, Bismarck, English edition, Vol. III, p. 181. American ed., II, 418. Schouvaloff heard that when boys together, Battenberg nicknamed Alexander "Mops".

matic service."[23] Alexander had too much the character of a member of the Prussian Body Guard to submit to orders from those who had no authority over him, and Jonin's mission at once assumed an imperious character; for he brought with him an ultimatum from the Tsar in which it was demanded that the Prince publish a manifesto declaring his renunciation of governing powers, and that Generals Soboleff and Kaulbars be entrusted with the administration until a Grand Assembly should be convoked for adopting a new constitution.[24] The Prince, unwilling to yield, tried to get support from the Powers. They had made the Treaty of Berlin, and the purpose of that was to prevent Russian influence from dominating the Balkans. Now Russia was undertaking to do that very thing. The Prince felt confident that they would act, but the Powers remained silent.[25] Bismarck's policy was to do nothing to offend Russia; the British government sympathized with the Prince, but did not feel it could do anything to help him, while Austria, although she was glad enough to see the breach between Russia and Bulgaria, was bound to Russia no less than Germany by the Three Emperors' League of 1881. So, failing here, Alexander turned to Tsankoff who, banished for a year and a half, was now back in Sofia. Tsankoff demanded the unconditional restoration of the Tirnovo constitution, so no alliance was possible. Jonin for his part tried to get the help of the army, which was commanded largely by Russian officers, but Alexander, hearing what was up, went himself to the camp with his staff. He was received with cheers from the Bulgarian soldiers, and Jonin realized that nothing was possible from that quarter.[26] Jonin and the generals also tried to get support from the Liberal party and to some

[23]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 154; *Times*, Nov. 14, 1883. In an interview with Alexander soon after his arrival, Jonin shows himself quite other than dove-like. He was insolent to the Prince who finally told Jonin that he would call servants to put him out if the Tsar had not sent him. Jonin told the Prince that the Tsar had instructed him to use such language. The Prince was so wrought up by Jonin's manner and the unfriendliness of the Tsar that he told Koch to go to his parents and tell them that he must give up. "I cannot fight against the Tsar of Russia." Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

[24]*Times*, Sept. 10, 1883; Drandar, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

[25]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

[26]*Ibid.*, p. 143.

extent succeeded, as Karaveloff seems for a time to have been working in their interests, but Tsankoff was alienated by General Soboleff when the latter revealed that the purpose of the Russian government was to establish a ten-year protectorate over Bulgaria. Tsankoff, upon finding this out, went to the Prince and told him that he would not insist upon the Tirnovo constitution unconditionally, but would accept the modifications the Prince asked for.[27] So the Prince, on the 11th of September, issued a manifesto in which he promised to appoint a commission "composed of persons chosen by us among the most distinguished and respectable of the principality without distinction of political convictions for the purpose of making a new constitution or revising the old."[28] The commission was appointed, but its report was not acted upon because Alexander soon came to think it best to restore the constitution of Tirnovo without conditions.[29] Thus the Prince determined to rely upon his own adopted people for support and confirmed the breach with the Russian representatives.

Meanwhile the Prince had been trying to get rid of his Russian tormentors. They were nominally his ministers subject to his orders. So, assuming this to be the actual relation, he called them in and demanded their resignation and departure from the country. The generals said they were under the Tsar's orders and not his and refused to go. However, when the National Assembly met, and the commission for changing the constitution was appointed, they went away to Russia. Another Russian, General Rhoediger, was appointed who served for a month, then was asked to resign. He, too, said that he took orders from the Tsar, but, when Alexander threatened to have him conducted to the frontier if he was still in Sofia at noon of the next day, he decided to leave. Another Russian general, Kotelnikoff, was appointed, and Alexander said to him: "Understand me: I have appointed you, as the senior officer for the portfolio of war. If you do not obey, you will leave in twenty-four hours. When you are gone, I will call successively all the officers according to seniority, and I will declare to them, and I intend to act as I

[27]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 143.
[28]Drandar, *op. cit.*, p. 171.
[29]*Times*, Sept. 17, 1883.

speak: 'Accept or leave.' "[30] The Prince's exasperation went so far at this time that he gave orders that all the Russian officers in Bulgaria should go home and that all Bulgarian officers, serving in Russian regiments or at military schools in Russia, should come home to Bulgaria.[31] The reason for this action by the Prince seems to have been the recall from Bulgaria of two Russian officers who were friendly to him. One of them was Polzikoff, of whom Alexander said: "Polzikoff was more than aide de camp, he was almost a brother."[32]

Giers, the Russian foreign minister, was not at all pleased with the relations between Russia and Bulgaria. While the Prince was sending appeals to the Tsar to which the Tsar would not reply, Giers was expressing his anxiety over the situation, as well as indignation against the Prince. "I am indeed a mild sort of a man," he said, "but it makes the blood go to my head to have to bother myself with this unlucky Bulgarian business. Yesterday I spoke to the Tsar about it and declared that, in all the forty-five years in which I have served the country, never have I been mixed up in a thing which has disgusted me to such a degree. Yes disgusted (angekelt), that is the word, for I know what the real interests are which come into play."[33]

The Prince was held to blame for the defection of Bulgaria and it was hoped that some way might be found for his elimination. It was desired that this might be brought about by regular

[30]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

[31]Mr. Minchin, newspaper correspondent for the *Morning Advertiser* and Consul General to Serbia, tells a story of an attempt to kidnap the Prince by two Russian generals—an attempt, however, which failed, owing to the refusal of the officer on guard to admit the generals into the Prince's apartment. Neither M. Queillé, who kept a journal of interesting happenings and was in close association with the Prince, nor M. Corti who had access to his correspondence, nor M. Koch, resident clergyman of the Prince, nor anyone else so far as I can find except those who take the story from Minchin, mentions the incident and there are some inconsistencies in respect to time and persons in Mr. Minchin's story, which was not written until two or three years after the alleged event. The event is not at all improbable, however, for some of the Russian representatives felt like disposing of the Prince in any way that seemed practicable. Minchin, *Growth of Freedom*, also quoted in *Quarterly Review*, Oct., 1886, p. 495.

[32]Queillé, *op. cit.*, pp. 179, 181-82.

[33]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 147-48.

means. Jonin hoped to build exclusively from the ranks of the people a party opposed to the Prince.[34] Tsankoff was to be his agent, but we have seen how the alliance with that politician was defeated by the too great frankness of Soboleff. For the most part, moreover, the Russians seemed to have alienated the Bulgarian people as well as the Prince by the over-bearing ways of their generals and agents. A solution proposed by the Moscow *Gazette*, Katkoff's paper, was that a republic be established in Bulgaria "responsible to Russia and Europe in preference to an improvised throne without foundations or traditions, with a foreign prince who cannot possibly be with the people in their wants and aspirations, and who seems in a dictatorial manner to break with their great northern benefactors." He thought that it was a fundamental mistake not to have begun with a republic or a government like that of Eastern Roumelia.[35]

In order not to lose complete control of the Bulgarian army, as there seemed to be danger of doing in the autumn of 1883, when the Prince ordered home all the Russian officers in Bulgaria, the Russian government thought best to make some concessions. This changed attitude was revealed by the St. Petersburg paper, the *Novoie Vremna*, which had been the most violent in its attacks on the Prince. The article said: "It is time and more than time to place the question of our relations with Bulgaria upon a reasonable footing. Of what use is it to let ourselves be deceived and wilfully close our eyes? . . . Such adventurers

[34]Leonoff, *Secret Documents*. As in other publications of secret documents, there is some doubt as to their genuineness, but Rose and other historians of repute regard them as authentic. At any rate, there is nothing in them which does not fit in with other things we know of Russian methods at this and at other times. Only one must be on his guard against attributing to Russia a diplomacy to which no other European Power would stoop. During this period of extremely strained relations with Russia, the Prince sent Balabanoff to the Tsar with a letter to explain the situation in Bulgaria in order to avoid the breach that seemed to be impending. In the letter the Prince had apologized for his messenger, who was not used to court manners, and was perhaps a little uncouth, and Giers had read the letter to the messenger. The Russian court took great pains to receive Balabanoff in a distinguished manner. A high functionary was sent to conduct him to the palace in a Court carriage. The interview with the Tsar lasted for half an hour, and he showed great interest in Bulgaria. Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 252; *Times*, Nov. 1, 1883.

[35]*Times*, Nov. 12, 1883.

as Soboleff, Kaulbars, and Co. should not be sent, but those who sympathize sincerely with the cause they are working for. It is not necessary to point out that our future representative at Sofia ought to be, as far as possible, in the background and not forget that every inquisition into the affairs of the country can only do injury to the end which we have in view."[36]

It was felt above all that it would not do to lose control of the Bulgarian army, which must serve as a vanguard to the Russian army if another war with Turkey should come. Colonel Kaulbars, brother of the general, was sent down for the purpose of making an agreement in regard to the control of the army. He arrived the tenth of November, and the following understanding was arranged:

> The Bulgarian Minister of War to be appointed by Prince Alexander with the consent of the Czar, the Prince alone having the right of revoking this appointment. The Minister of War not to interfere in the internal affairs of the Principality, and to be directly responsible to the Prince and the National Assembly for his acts, and for the estimates of his Ministry. The Russian officers who come to serve in the Bulgarian army for three years with the Czar's consent to owe obedience to the Prince and the constitution, and the laws of Bulgaria.[37]

In other respects, the relations between Russia and Bulgaria did not change much during the two years after the restoration of the constitution of Tirnovo. Jonin was replaced by Cojander who was perhaps less openly hostile, but was constantly trying to undermine the influence of the Prince.[38] When Alexander proposed an interview with the Tsar, the Tsar refused to receive him. Scandals regarding his conduct in Sofia were published in the St. Petersburg papers.[39] On one occasion the Tsarina was at Darmstadt at the same time as the Prince, but would not receive him and greeted him coldly when she met him in company.

[36]Queillé, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

[37]*Times*, Nov. 16, 1883.

[38]Cojander is spoken of as little attractive externally. "He was decidedly the weakest, the most unimportant, the most deceitful, the most wanting in tact of all the Russian diplomatists who have been in Sofia. Not one of them, not even Soboleff sent such lying reports to his Government." Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 196. He was instructed to work for the removal of Alexander. "Of haughty character, creating incidents so as to find occasion to give free play to an insolence, designed and premeditated." *Causes occultes*, p. 99.

[39]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

At the wedding-feast of the Grand Duke Sergius the whole Battenberg family was invited except the Prince.[40] Those Russian officers who were friendly to the Prince were looked upon as "bad Russians." Loghinoff, a Russian officer in Bulgaria with two beautiful daughters and two other children, lost his place, as Polzikoff and others had done earlier, for that reason.[41] Once at an evening gathering in Sofia, after the supper, Cojander and the Russian officers offended against all etiquette by smoking. The master of the house remonstrated, but to no effect until he turned out the lights. In the latter part of 1883, the Tsar had to try eight times to get a general to go to Bulgaria and serve as minister of war. Finally, Prince Cantacuzene was sent.

In the spring of 1884 Prince Alexander had the opportunity of meeting Queen Victoria, and of visiting Berlin and Vienna. Queen Victoria, as always, showed herself cordial. So did Francis Joseph. The Kaiser and Bismarck, however, disappointed the Prince. It was nearly time to renew the agreement of the three emperors made in 1881, and it was a cardinal point of their diplomacy to renew and make firm that alliance. This policy of theirs affected Prince Alexander, not only as ruler of Bulgaria, but also in his private capacity as a marriageable young man. On previous visits in Berlin he had met Princess Victoria, daughter of Crown Prince Frederick William, and the two young people had become fond of each other. The possibility of their marriage was widely discussed in Berlin at this time. The Prince had conversations with both the Kaiser and Bismarck on important subjects among which were this marriage and Prince Alexander's relations to Russia. However, nothing was said directly by the Kaiser at this time concerning the marriage project. Only he questioned the Prince a little about his borrowing money from the Jews and stories concerning his private life. Borrowing money from the Jews he admitted, but said he would not have had to borrow of them, if he had become the pensioner of Russia. The Kaiser said he thought the latter preferable, and advised him to reconcile himself to Russia. Wilhelm acknowledged that Russia's treatment of him had not

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 169.

[41] Queillé, *op. cit.*, pp. 342-43.

always been praiseworthy, and especially blamed the conduct of Jonin, but he blamed the Prince for antagonizing Russia. The present situation between him and Russia was due, the Prince said, to his observance of the conditions under which he was made the ruler of Bulgaria by Europe, namely, adherence to the treaty of Berlin, and the ruling of Bulgaria for the Bulgarians. As to his private life, the Prince denied the charges made against him, and said the palace in which he lived was like a glass house, and that he could not live scandalously if he wanted to without raising a great ado. At the end of the interview, the Kaiser spoke kindly and assured the Prince that he did not believe the scandals, and that so long as he was Kaiser, the Prince would remain ruler of Bulgaria.[42]

In the conversation with Bismarck two days later, the feelings of the Prince were not spared. The Chancellor was brutally frank. He let the Prince know the principle upon which he based his policy: "Germany has no interest in Bulgaria, our interest is: Peace with Russia." Consequently, the marriage of the Prince with the grand-daughter of the Kaiser was out of the question. If he wanted to marry a princess, Princess Beatrice of England, or Princess Helen of Mecklenburg would be suitable but "I would advise you," he said, "to marry an orthodox millionaire who would establish your position in Bulgaria, for to govern in the Orient, bribery rules, and money is needed for that. . . . In your place, I would perhaps remain a German, for I apprehend that to an honorable, straight-forward character, such as yours, it must go against the grain to associate with Orientals. But, if you wish to remain in Bulgaria, then give yourself up to Russia unconditionally, take, if necessary, even an anti-German attitude! Indeed, I consider the existence of Bulgaria problematical. It has once been an object to bargain with and sooner or later, at all events some time, you will sit in the chimney corner calling to memory your stormy youth. In Petersburg they know our view. So I advise you to seize any opportunity to put yourself in good relations with Russia. Your Highness possesses the fullest sympathy of German moderate circles. I myself, regard you highly but I am the Chancellor of 45 million Germans whose

[42]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-65, from reports to the Austrian Foreign Office and reports of Prince Alexander in the Hartman Archives.

interests I cannot sacrifice for any single German." As for the marriage with Princess Victoria, that would be all right if he became again a German Prince.

When Bismarck was through with his talk, the Prince had a few words to say in defence of himself. The means Russia was using against him were, he thought, such as were not used among respectable people. He was accused of many offenses in the Petersburg papers, and he was guiltless of them all. Concerning what relates to my private life, you can very easily find out the truth through your German representative. I live as under a lamp, and anyone can come to me day or night and every Bulgarian knows how temperately and carefully I live, and gratefully acknowledges it. Bismarck said he knew the Prince spoke the truth, and the interview closed.

The Prince was received cordially in the family of the Crown Prince, and if they could have had their way, perhaps the marriage with Victoria might have taken place. Although officially, Frederick William was opposed—at least Bismarck had said so to Prince Alexander,—the Crown Prince had said to the latter, that if he were Kaiser, he would give Alexander his daughter.[43]

A reply which Bismarck sent to a letter from Prince Henry of Reuss, German ambassador at Vienna, shows clearly the same attitude which he had shown in his conversation with the Prince in Berlin. Prince Henry in his letter to Bismarck had reported some correspondence with Baron Biegeleben, Austrian Consul General of Sofia. The latter was friendly to Prince Alexander, and resented his unfair treatment by Russia. Bismarck showed in his reply how mistaken such an attitude was.

> That the Prince is in a 'depressed state of mind!'[44] I consider necessary for the peace of the three Powers and I wish him to remain so. To me, he appears in the light of an aspirant, and disturber of the peace whose marriage project favored by Queen Victoria is a political menace to us as long as he is Prince of Bulgaria. . . . If the Prince is compelled to leave Bulgaria, I cannot see any harm to the good understanding of the courts of the three Emperors. The question whether anything is 'bitter' for the Prince, or whether Russia shows too much malice, lies outside the region of politics and is an affair of

[43]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 465-68, who quotes from manuscript in the Prince's handwriting.

[44]The single quotation marks indicate quotations from the letter to which Bismarck is replying.

personal sympathy. . . . We have no interest as to whether his enemies in Bulgaria put a bridle on him or not. . . . Originally, Prince Alexander took the Bulgarian principality as a Russian governor, and in no other capacity; if he took it with other views, he has thrown off the mask too soon and has let the ground crumble away under him with his restless fumblings after Turkish, Greek, Russian, Bulgarian liberal and English dynastic support. . . . I do not at all understand why Count Kalnoky has any reluctance to let the Prince fall and cannot recognize the interest which Austria has in the maintenance of the status quo in Bulgaria, for the Austrian claims to-day do not extend beyond the line which we had under consideration when Austria made the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia dependent upon Russian decision and recognized that Bulgaria lay in Russia's sphere of operations.[45]

The point of view shown by Bismarck in this letter was more formally indicated by the agreement drawn up in 1881, and adopted by the three imperial governments. In the protocol of that treaty were the provisions affecting the Balkan peninsula. Austria-Hungary was permitted to annex Bosnia and Herzegovina when she should judge the moment opportune. The occupation of Eastern Roumelia by Turkish troops was to be discouraged as a menace to the general peace, although the Treaty of Berlin gave Turkey the right to build fortifications along East Roumelian frontiers, and occupy them with troops. The union of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria was not to be opposed.[46] This treaty was renewed in 1884, and later in the year the three emperors had a friendly meeting at Skiernewice. No definite results of this meeting were put down in black and white; "nur Courtoisie u(nd) Friedensliebe" Bismarck said.[47] It was tacitly assumed during this time and at this interview, at least by Bismarck, that while Austria had interests in the western part of the peninsula, Russia's interests in the eastern part would be respected.[48] The limits were not very strictly drawn. Serbia might come under the influence of either. The fact was that at this time Serbia was bound by treaty very closely to Austria-Hungary, and Roumania, too, was bound to the same Power by a treaty made in 1883. Austria-Hungary and Russia were never thoroughly won over to Bismarck's solution of the Balkan problem, the predominance of Russian interests in the East, and of Austro-Hungarian in the West. Neither Austria-Hungary or

[45] *Die Grosse Politik*, III, 344-46.
[46] *Ibid.*, pp. 178-79.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 369, note.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 371 and *passim.*

Germany, as we have seen, was disposed to dispute Russia's preeminent interest in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia.

So Bulgaria and Prince Alexander were the victims of a thoroughly selfish policy. Those responsible were all frank about it. They did not defend it. It was taken for granted. Neither justice nor mercy for other peoples was in the program. The virtues generally known as Christian virtues are not commonly practised in international affairs.

CHAPTER VIII

EASTERN ROUMELIA FROM 1879 TO 1885

While Prince Alexander was troubled and perplexed over the government of his principality and the intrigues of Russian agents and generals, Eastern Roumelia was traveling a similar path, but her experiences were on a somewhat reduced scale. She had similar political parties, although political rivalries were not so intense; she was a victim of Russian intrigue, but the Russian agents were a trifle more considerate, or, at any rate, less active.

The terms upon which Eastern Roumelia was to begin her career, as determined by the Treaty of Berlin, have already been given. By its provisions, it will be remembered, Turkey was to have a considerable degree of control. She was to appoint the governor who, however, was to be a Christian and whose appointment might be vetoed by the Powers. The Porte might also veto laws passed by the Eastern Roumelian Assembly. It had the right to send troops to the Balkans which separated this province from Bulgaria, and it might, upon occasion, send troops within their borders. The people of Bulgaria had made their own constitution, but those of Eastern Roumelia, though no doubt fully as intelligent as their brothers north of the Balkans, were not allowed to make theirs. That was to be made for them by a European commission which was to "determine within three months the powers and functions of the Governor General, as well as the administrative, judicial, and financial system of the provinces."[1] While the European Commission was doing its work, the Russians were to be in control and were to remain until May 3rd, 1879, when, by the terms of the Treaty of Berlin, they were compelled to leave.

After the defeat of Turkey by the Russians, the San Stefano Bulgaria was administered by them. At first, Prince Tcherkaski was at the head of the administration, and later, upon his death, Prince Dondoukoff-Karsakoff. When Eastern Roumelia was cut off from Bulgaria, Prince Dondoukoff went to Sofia and

[1]Pp. 111, 112, *supra*.

General Stolypin became chief administrator. Some control over the Russian governor was supposed to be exercised by the European Commission through the financial powers and duties given it by the Treaty of Berlin. The Commission was appointed, and met for the first time on September 30, 1878. Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, the British representative, says that the Commissioners were men of great mark.[2]

The European Commissioners, the Russian governor, and all concerned, found problems and difficulties enough to absorb their time and attention. They found the Turks expecting the restoration of Eastern Roumelia "to the condition of a Turkish vilayet."[3] That the Sultan's political and military authority over the territory included in the new province should remain intact were the instructions which Salisbury gave Wolff.[4] On the other hand the Bulgarians of Eastern Roumelia were extremely restless and anxious for fear that would take place. The Russians were reluctant to give up their control in any measure to the European Commission. The dissatisfaction of the people was manifested by numerous petitions protesting against the Treaty of Berlin and against the danger which seemed to them imminent of the restoration of Turkish misrule. The state of mind prevailing in some quarters is indicated by a protest sent to Mr. Calvert, the British Acting Vice-Consul in Philippopolis:

> We are astonished at the fearful news that this country, inhabited by pure Bulgarians, is to be separated from the other Bulgaria. . . . And why were there so many sympathies from the English people, when we see to-day that the English Government itself desires to subject us again to the unbearable Turkish yoke, the Tyranny of which we had to suffer for five centuries, with unspeakable hardships, and from which God delivers us to-day through his anointed, the true Czar of the world, His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor Alexander II.

[2]H. D. Wolff, *Rambling Recollections*, II, 197. They were Assim Pasha and Abro Pasha for Turkey, von Braunschweig for Germany, M. Kallay for Austria-Hungary, Baron de Ring and M. de Coutouly for France, H. D. Wolff and Lord Donoughmore for Great Britain, M. Vernoni for Italy, Col. Schepeleff and M. Tzerteleff for Russia and M. Izvolsky, secretary to the latter, just entering upon his diplomatic career.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 201.

[4]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1878-79*, p. 15.

A succeeding paragraph shows a good deal of feeling as well as crudities of style.

> We loudly protest against this unrighteous decision of the Berlin Congress, and we declare that we cannot accept conditions which are calculated to annihilate us. We cannot submit to the infernal authority which for five centuries was sucking our blood, crushing our bones, and burning our bodies. We declare that the Bulgarian people cannot be blotted out from the face of the earth by such fictitious designations. No, the Bulgarians will try to defend their country from the Turkish occupation to the last drop of their blood. Streams of Bulgarian blood will run again through the newly devastated plains of our unhappy fatherland.[5]

Some of the protests were more restrained and in large measure justified. Besides their objection to the separation of the two Bulgarias, it was not strange that they should object to the Turkish garrisons which seemed to them not only a threat, but a means of separating them definitely from their brothers of the North. That the Governor-General and other officials should be appointed by the Sultan, seemed to assure the repetition of their former miseries and hardships.[6] Mr. Layard, British ambassador at Constantinople at this time, was inclined to be a little short with the petitioners. "I interrupted M. Grecoff," he writes to the Marquis of Salisbury, "and informed him that I declined to listen to any representation against the Treaty and that I must request him to abstain from saying anything more upon the subject."[7] Sir Drummond Wolff was more considerate. He tried to calm their apprehensions and told them that the European governments were anxious to secure the welfare of the people, that the old state of things was not to be restored, but a new one set up, that they were to be given power to establish a sound government.[8]

Another circumstance that caused the members of the European commission some anxiety was the organization of gymnastic societies in Eastern Roumelia, the members of which actually met for military drill and were regarded as a menace to the peace of the country.[9] The Russian generals in Eastern Roumelia

[5] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 53, 1878*, pp. 70-71.
[6] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1879*, pp. 718, 918, etc.
[7] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 54, 1878*, p. 164.
[8] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1878*, p. 117.
[9] Wolff, *op. cit.*, II, 225-26.

encouraged them. In April, 1879, reviews were held by Generals Skobeleff and Stolypin at Slivno, Tatar-Bazardjik, and Philippopolis.[10] The former, at least, was much pleased with results obtained in so short a time. Against these activities, and against the distribution of arms by Russia in Eastern Roumelia the British representatives protested, and the Russian Government was induced to command the dissolution of the gymnastic societies.[11] The experience of Russian agents in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia sometimes showed the difficulty a Russian autocrat encountered in having his wishes carried out. Many of the Russian representatives in Bulgarian territory were Pan Slavists, and their enthusiasm often exceeded their discretion. They had ardent supporters in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and, whatever they did, they expected their conduct to be overlooked in government circles, and very likely approved.[12]

Another situation which made trouble for the European Commission resulted from the difficulty the Turks and Bulgarians had in getting along with each other. During the war, until the Russians drove the Turks out, there were massacres and executions of Bulgarians in Eastern Roumelia, but in 1878 and 1879, the Christians had the upper hand and there were many charges of mistreatment of Turks, some of which, no doubt, were well founded. Numerous petitions were sent in giving details of violence, murder, violations of women, and burning of Turkish houses and mosques.[13] British consuls, upon investigation, found instances of the abuse of Mussulmans.[14] Worse suffering resulted from famine and from exposure than from direct violence. A very large number of Turks left their homes upon the approach of the Russians after the Russian armies crossed the Balkans. They had much better have stayed, for

[10]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1878*, pp. 982, 998.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 975.

[12]It was a rather frequent practice for Russian foreign representatives to act independently of the Government at St. Petersburg. Cf. G. L. Dickinson, the *International Anarchy*. At one time Jonin in answer to a remark that the Prince had always been on good terms with the Tsar until the coming of Soboleff and Kaulbars, remarked: "The Tsar is not Russia." Koch, *Fürst Alexander des Bulgarien Darmstadt*, p. 184.

[13]See for example a list of petitions in *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1878*, pp. 335-42.

[14]*Ibid.*, pp. 191, 196, 197, 495, etc.

the Russians did not as a rule, treat the Turks badly. When they left their homes however, their Bulgarian neighbors or Bulgarian fugitives seized their houses and little farms and they found it hard, if they came back, to establish their claims. In some cases the claim was not justified, and where it was, the courts and magistrates were not friendly. To care for Turkish fugitives at Adrianople and elsewhere in their borders, was a duty of the Porte, but to do so was beyond its capacity, and they had to depend largely upon private charity. Many perished.[15]

Such interests were incidental to the main work of the European Commission. The tasks for which it existed were to elaborate a constitution for Eastern Roumelia and to manage its finances. The administration was to remain in the hands of the Russians until they should leave in May, 1879. However, the control of the finances was supposed to carry with it a considerable measure of control over the administration.[16] The commission sat for eight months—the Treaty allowed three. They held seventy sessions and gave to the Eastern Roumelians, an "Organic Statute" of 495 articles, with annexes of 637.[17] There was to be an assembly of one house made up of 56 members, 10 appointed, 10 serving ex officio, and 36 elected. Local government, the organization of the gendarmerie and that of the local militia as well as the functions of the central government were provided for in great detail. It was too elaborately worked out. More should have been left to the initiative of the people and

[15]"80,000 refugees at one time occupied the Caza of Gumurdjina. Of these, in three months 10,000 were carried off by disease, exposure, etc.; 30,000 more were sent to Adrianople, Constantinople, etc.; and from these places were transshipped in large numbers to Smyrna and other places in Asia. At this present moment 40,000 still occupy this district, and except between 6,000 and 7,000 who are in the town and live in huts in its immediate vicinity they are distributed in the different villages. . ." Their pinched faces and wild half-famished looks told only too plainly their story. From the report of Robert H. Walpole, *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1879*, p. 432. See also the report of D. Mackenzie Wallace, *ibid.*, pp. 433-35, and other particulars in the same volume.

[16]The principal financial regulations issued by the International Commission were that they should make the budget, make payments, regulate salaries, and appoint the Director General of Finances. *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1878-79*, p. 65.

[17]The Organic Statute is given in State Papers, Vol. 70, and in *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9, 1879.*

more chance for adaptation.[18] A provision which forbade any change in the Organic Statute was perhaps logical, as it was made by the representatives of the Powers, but was hardly wise. The Sultan had the right of veto and used it on certain occasions to the detriment of the province.[19] One of the rights given him by the Treaty of Berlin, the Sultan did not think best to exercise; that was the occupation of the Eastern Roumelian frontier with Turkish soldiers. That seems strange when so much was made at the Berlin Conference of that provision. But either he did not want to spare the soldiers, or he was afraid it would lead to serious trouble in view of the intense opposition of the province to the presence of Turkish soldiers anywhere within their borders. Representatives of the Powers in Constantinople advised caution in the matter.

The financial duties of the European Commission gave a good deal of trouble. The Russian governor claimed that whatever undertakings had been entered upon under Russian administration must be carried on by them and that money for the purpose must be reserved. Mr. Schmidt, who had been appointed Director General of Finance, received only 10,000 pounds, Turkish, from the branch of the Treasury at Philippopolis, and he had difficulty in getting hold of the amount held in Slivno. The archives of the treasury were sadly incomplete; a corrupt, or at any rate unfavorable, contract had been made with a certain M. Marechal; and a large sum of money had been sent from Eastern Roumelia to Bulgaria.[20] On his journey to Slivno, it was with difficulty that Mr. Schmidt was protected from violence. The people with whom he talked said the hostility shown was not personal but was directed against the European Commission. This body was intending to bring back the Turkish government and to take money which belonged to widows and orphans to the Sultan at Constantinople.[21] Before

[18]There were certain unimportant details which might be changed by the legislative body.

[19]C. Serkis, *La Roumélie orientale et la Bulgarie actuelle*, pp. 59-60.

[20]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9*, pp. 226-27. See also p. 349, and Wolff, *op. cit.*, pp. 222 ff.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 750. "The Governor of Slivno is still committing great irregularities. He is ordering the local cashier to make payments without any reference to the Commission or the Committee on Finance and he is prohibiting the

the European Commission was dissolved, things were somewhat better. Sir Drummond Wolff wrote to Salisbury in May, 1879, that "during the last few weeks the Direction of Finance has been progressing more favorably," that Mr. Schmidt had procured the Slivno chest, and that the sum of 80,000 l. was in the treasury.[22] However, it was not found an easy matter to raise the amount needed for current expenses, and for the dues to Turkey.[23]

The man selected to preside under the Sultan over the destinies of Eastern Roumelia was a man of Bulgarian ancestry through his mother, but Greek by his father, and of Greek education. His father was governor of Samos and had the title of Prince, which, accordingly, was also given the son. The son,

payment into our hands of certain sums due us. In short, I entirely despair of the Commission obtaining a complete hold of the finances, before the evacuation." *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9*, p. 712. Wolff to Salisbury, March 6, 1879.

[22]*Ibid.*, p. 1043.

[23]Sir Drummond Wolff's account of the work of the Eastern Roumelian Commission is worth quoting at this point: "It was determined to form a distinct Government for Eastern Roumelia, to settle that Government on a solid and economical basis, to secure for the Sultan that amount of authority which appertains to a Monarch in Constitutional countries and for the people the most ample measure of freedom, equality, and self-government, under laws and institutions adapted to local exigences.

"With this view the Governor-General, by Treaty necessarily a Christian, and approved by the Powers, was made as it were the Sultan's Minister for Eastern Roumelia. He was to act in two capacities, namely, as the head of the Local Administration, and as the Agent of the Sultan for such rights as were reserved to the Sovereign himself. The people were to be self-taxed, to collect their own taxes, and to maintain their own police and legal Tribunals. In a word, the Local Administration was separate from, and independent of, any control from Constantinople, except that of the Sultan himself. Law and justice were secured and as I hope an equitable Local Administration.

"In return, the Sultan was vested with quite as much power as the Queen exercises in her kingdom. The law runs in his name. His sanction with a limitation of time is required for the making, alteration, or abrogation of laws. He is the fountain of honor, and appoints the principal officers of the local militia and gendarmerie. His approval is necessary for the nomination of the chief officers of the province. He has the power of amnesty and pardon. He is the head of the Posts, Customs, and Telegraphs, the guardian of the frontiers, and the diplomatic organ. He has the right of coinage. He receives three-tenths of the revenues of the province for the purposes of the Central Government." *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 15, 1880*, p. 2.

Alexander Bogovides, or Aleko Pasha, as the Turks called him, had had considerable diplomatic experience as representative of the Porte. He had been Turkish ambassador in Paris and Vienna. He was an accomplished linguist, though, strange to say, he was not acquainted with Bulgarian.[24] On the whole he was popular, or at least acceptable, to the Roumelians. When his train first entered Bulgarian territory from Constantinople, the people along the route were anxious to see whether he wore the Turkish head dress or the Bulgarian. Was he to be closely under the influence of the Sultan, or was he to rule as a Bulgarian governor? He had asked the advice of the British ambassador, Sir Henry Layard, and Layard said that he wouldn't advise him, but he thought the proper thing was to wear the fez.[25] Aleko had not done so, however. When he got to the border, he took off his Turkish fez, his wife handed him the Bulgarian kalpak, and he put it on. The tacit promise he thus made was well kept, for he ruled in the interests of the province. He reminded his people in his speech read to them that no Ottoman troops could be called in without his orders, and he hoped their conduct would be such that it would not be necessary to call them in.[26] He never had occasion to send for them, and as we have seen, the Sultan never thought it best to send troops to occupy the frontier. His intention was, he told an interviewer, to fill government offices with Bulgarians, for he was confident that he could find competent Bulgarians.[27] In this matter he kept his promise, though he thought best to appoint a foreigner to manage the finances, in fact the same Mr. Schmidt who was employed by the European Commission.

This European Commission held together long enough to see the new government started, making the point especially that

[24]Aleko Pasha was wealthy, but he and his wife were loath to spend their money. For that reason, and perhaps because he liked a quiet life, he entertained very little. He was much interested in the study of language, and was fond of using a comparative word book. He spoke French, Greek, Turkish, Arabic, Persian, Italian, Rumanian, and German fluently, but not Bulgarian. In the Bulgarian language he never became proficient. Von Mach, *Elf Jahre Balkan*, pp. 146, 161.

[25]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9*, p. 1043.

[26]*Ibid.*, p. 1046.

[27]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9*, pp. 1031-32.

Turkish troops could not be called in without their consent. No action by the commission was found necessary, and it soon disbanded; to be reformed, however, a little later for the purpose of advising the Porte in regard to the organization of the other European provinces of the Ottoman Empire, according to Article XXIII of the Treaty of Berlin.

Another European Commission was appointed to ascertain conditions prevailing among the inhabitants of Eastern Roumelia, where, in the Rhodope Mountains south of Philippopolis, there was great suffering among large numbers of Turkish refugees. For much of the suffering, the Russian army seemed to be responsible. Stories of horrible murders, violation of women, and massacres of children were told to members of the Commission. The stories were not credited by some of the Commissioners and some of the British public.[28] It was held to be not the duty of the Commission to fix responsibility, but to reveal conditions in order that relief might be sent.

The internal history of Eastern Roumelia, compared to that of Bulgaria during the years 1879 to 1885, was uneventful. There was no coup d'état as in Bulgaria in 1881, and for two or three years there were no political parties. Two appeared at the elections of 1881; one called the casionists and the other the unionists, the former liberal, the latter conservative. Both names seemed to have been chosen by the conservatives. Both parties were for the union, but inasmuch as the conservatives claimed to stand for the only practicable way of bringing about the union, that is, with the help of Russia, they had to monopolize the name. The name casionist, meaning one supported from the budget, seemed to imply that those who belonged to that party were in it only for money and power. 1881 was the year of Prince Alexander's assumption of power and Karaveloff and other Liberals came to Philippopolis to help keep things active there. A newspaper was started in the interest of the Liberals. Karaveloff was not allowed by the Sultan to take an office offered him and, although he stood for election to the assembly, he failed.

[28]See *Spectator* for Nov. 16, 23, and 30, 1878. The correspondent of the *Daily News* and other English observors acquitted the Russian army of the atrocities charged.

It was the desire and expectation of Russia to rule in Eastern Roumelia, as it was in Bulgaria, but in one, as in the other, she failed for lack of real sympathy with the people. She showed herself unkind and overbearing. The Russian representatives looked upon themselves as masters, not as helpers, and their meddling, dictatorial ways did not fail to alienate the Bulgarians south of the Balkans as well as those to the north. The following anecdote is told by von Huhn in his *Struggle of the Bulgarians for National Independence.*

"An Eastern Roumelian once repeated to me the following speech which had been addressed to him by a Russian consul at an evening party: "You are a prefect? Very well, but I hope that you are aware that you only hold that post, thanks to Russia, and that it is your duty to consider yourself a Russian prefect. You Bulgarians imagine sometimes that we are only here on a visit, but you must be made to understand that we are quite at home here." "And," added the prefect, "it was not as if the consul had told me this only once! But whenever he met me he repeated the same thing, so that finally I used to get into a state of nervous excitement when I only caught sight of him in the distance."[29]

No one however could resent the fatherly advice given the Bulgarians of Eastern Roumelia by Tsar Alexander II upon the departure of the Russian troops in May, 1879. "I know there are many amongst you," he said, "who are not satisfied with the position created for your country by the Treaty, and who desire by force and revolution to attain an object incompatible with the decision of the Powers. I cannot approve of such an intention, since its execution without the will and consent of the Powers is out of the question and might involve your country in fresh disasters." Consul-General Michell however, was of the opinion that some Bulgarians were disappointed that the Tsar counselled quiet.[30]

After the Tsar's proclamation General Obrutcheff spoke. He had been chosen to present the message from Russia, because it was believed that a statement from an ardent Pan Slavist, such as he, would be more effective than from a more conserva-

[29]Pp. 13-14.
[30]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 9*, p. 1024.

tive representative. He told them that it was of no use to expect help from any outside power to accomplish the desired union. "Neither Russia or Europe desires the shedding of another drop of blood."[31] He told them he thought the presence in Eastern Roumelia of Turkish soldiers was not likely, that the strategical advantages of garrisoning the frontier were found to be of no account, that they should keep themselves quiet and not evoke the necessity of Turkish troops in their country. For a little time, the hope of the union of the two provinces in the near future was given up.

The Russian representative in Eastern Roumelia at first was Prince Tzerteleff; and as long as he was there, Russian interests did not suffer. During the last months of his holding the office he was on leave of absence and his place was taken by his secretary, M. Isvolski, the same one who played so important a part in the negotiations preceding the World War. He was a man of ability and tact, although at that time less than twenty-five years of age. In 1881 both men left, and M. Krebel was made Consul-General. He is described as a worthy rival of Kaulbars, and relations between him and Aleko Pasha soon became strained.[32] "Krebel meddled in the affairs of the country, expressed a judgment over each regulation of the Governor-General, claimed the following out of his decision and exercised pressure upon representatives of the Sobranje through his presence in person at each session." A national party began at this time; they had a flag on which was inscribed "Bulgarians for Bulgaria and through Bulgaria." Forty per cent of the representatives were included in the party.[33] In the army an anti-Russian party developed. In 1881, twelve demands were pressed for increasing the share of the Bulgarian soldiers in their own army. Some of these were, that all places on the staff should be filled by Bulgarian officers, that the Adjutant General and the Military Adviser should be native Bulgarians, that no independent commands should be conferred upon those not pro-

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 1026. Another translation is: "I say to you frankly, neither Russia nor Europe is willing to shed another drop of blood for you." Serkis, *op. cit.*, p. 96, note.

[32] Major von Mach, *Elf Jahre Balkan*, p. 170.

[33] Serge Gopcevic, *Bulgarien und Ostrumelion*, p. 278.

ficient in Bulgarian speech. If the Governor-General should not grant their demands, they said they would resign. Most of their demands were granted. Another manifestation of the dislike of Russian control of the army was the bad behavior of scholars toward Russian teachers, so that the Russian Government had to be particular as to whom it sent.[34] After a while Krebel was sent to Spain, and M. Sovokin was put in his place. He was indolent and left things to his secretary, M. Igelstrom. The latter knew nothing of the preparations for the revolution of 1885, and was dismissed in disgrace for his alleged lack of intelligence.[35]

Austria seems to have scored a point over Russia in Eastern Roumelia. The Austrian representative, Ritter von Piombazzi, was held in high esteem by Aleko Pasha and his policy of refusing to meddle in Roumelian politics was a refreshing contrast, to that of most of the Russian representatives. Here was an illustration of the fable of the contest between the sun and the wind as to which one should make the traveller take off his coat. The British representative, M. Michell, was not quite so much a favorite. He did not attach himself so closely to Aleko Pasha as Mr. Lascelles, British Consul General in Sofia, did to Prince Alexander.[36]

[34]Mach, *Elf Jahre Balkan*, p. 195 ff.
[35]Drandar, *Cing ans de régne*, p. 50.
[36]*Ibid.*, p. 47; Mach, *op. cit.*, p. 171. Revolution of Philippopolis, p. 36.

CHAPTER IX

UNION OF THE TWO BULGARIAS

On September 18th, 1885, came the event to which every good Bulgarian had been looking forward for seven years—the union of the two Bulgarias. Prince Alexander was at his castle near Varna at this time. When he came in from his morning ride there were several telegrams on his table and the first one he opened was from Major Nicolaieff, commander-in-chief of the South Bulgarian troops. It read as follows:[1]

"To His Highness Prince Alexander! The whole people of South Bulgaria has to-day in all cities and places, proclaimed the union with North Bulgaria and designated Your Highness as Prince. The army of South Bulgaria has already taken the oath of allegiance and stationed itself on the Turkish border. They await with impatience to see their new chief in their midst and to receive his orders." The Prince without much hesitation decided to accept the situation although he was apparently not at all prepared for the event. Karaveloff, his prime minister was not with him, but the Prince found him by telegraph at Tirnovo and asked him: "Are you ready to go with me to Philippopolis?"

Karaveloff answered, "Yes, for you have no choice but to abdicate or place yourself at the head of the movement."

To this the Prince replied: "I will, then, go with you to-day over the Schipka Pass to Philippopolis."

Of course the Prince knew, as did everyone else, that there were many who desired the union of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. It was expected some time, but its coming now was a surprise both to the Prince and to everyone else, except those who had successfully put the thing through. A few days before the event the Prince had been apprised of an active movement for the union, and had met two of its agents; but he had come out strongly against it, and had, apparently, won his visitors to his

[1]Corti, *Alexander von Battenberg, sein Kampf den Zaren und Bismarck*, pp. 190, 193 ff. The story is told from a manuscript left by the Prince in the Hartenau archives.

point of view. After this, the Prince seems to have given the matter no more thought.[2]

Whether the thing could be put through was doubtful. It was a breach, and a serious breach, of the Treaty of Berlin, which the six great Powers of Europe had signed, and for whose execution they were consequently responsible. Moreover, Turkey and Bulgaria's Balkan neighbors were not likely to be pleased at the event. In view of Prince Alexander's recent difficulties with Russia, there was not likely to be aid from that direction.

The Russian representatives in Bulgaria at first were at a loss what attitude to take. Col. Tschitchagoff thoroughly approved of what had happened. He threw himself into the arms of the Prince "warmly felicitating him for standing in with the Rumelists." He told the Prince that the Eastern Roumelian militia had been mobilized and sent to the frontier to defend it from Turkey, and that he had sent orders to Russian officers in different cities to submit to the new government. Captain Chivaroff had said to Tschitchagoff: "The movement is only the work of a party, and if Prince Alexander wishes to enter

[2]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 133.

There is some doubt as to the part the Prince himself played in the plot. Shortly before the proclamation of the union the Prince had an interview with M. de Giers at Franzenbad and at the end of the interview Giers said to the Prince: "It is well understood, is it not, that there will be nothing in Roumelia." The Prince replied that he saw no near at hand movement. When the revolution came only a few weeks after this, Giers, the Tsar, and Bismarck were inclined to accuse Alexander of bad faith. To the same purpose Dr. J. F. Fuller speaks of "the insurrection in Eastern Roumelia prepared long in advance with (the Prince's) approval, and probably even with his active cooperation and cites as authorities Dr. Charles Roy and Spiridion Gopcevic, both unfriendly witnesses. Fuller, *Bismarck's Diplomacy at its Zenith*, p. 20; Roy, *Souvenirs politiques*, etc., p. 16; S. Gopcevic, *Bulgarien und Ostrumelien*, pp. 303-4. M. Geo. Fillion, *Entre Slaves*, p. 103, says that ten times during the course of 1885, the conspirators had interviews with Prince Battenberg and Karaveloff. Ten times they came to Sofia, their chief, Dr. Stransky at their head, to announce that all was ready and the outbreak was at hand." M. Fillion was connected with the Havas News Agency which was pro-Russian. No doubt the Prince knew that there were projects in the air for the uniting of the two Bulgarias, but he himself was not of the stuff conspirators are made, and he may be acquitted of deliberately lying to Giers, if it is true that Dr. Stransky and his associates had been over and over again telling him of plots that never materialized.

Eastern Roumelia, I will arrest him." Chivaroff was sent to a place where he would have no chance to intercept the Prince.[3] On the reception of the news in Russia, public opinion as voiced by the newspapers was almost unanimously favorable. The Saint Petersburg correspondent of the *Times* wrote that the Russians were overjoyed. There is "but one harmonious cry of proud delight and satisfaction in the Russian Press, a rare phenomenon indeed—at this successful realization of their dearest wishes and of the aspirations of the separated Bulgarians." He said that it was the prevailing opinion that the thing was planned for by the three emperors at Skiernievice and Kremsier together with the annexation of Bosnia and the Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary.[4]

Such however, were not the plans of the three Emperors just at this time, notwithstanding the provision in the Treaty of 1881, declaring for the union. The Prince had telegraphed to the Tsar: "You love the Bulgarian nation, I therefore hope you will approve what I have done." To this, the Tsar replied: "It is because I love the Bulgarian nation that I disapprove what you have done,"[5] an answer that effected its purpose though it was not altogether true. The Tsar forbade the Russian Minister of War in Bulgaria to exercise his functions and the Russian officers to aid in the revolution. So M. Cantacuzene became the military attaché of M. Cojander and the Russian officers were ordered to Russia, though some were seen a little later going around in civilian clothes.[6] The recall of the high officers of the Bulgarian army embittered the Bulgarian people, who complained that, "having paid the Russian officers like princes during six years, they are now abandoned by them in their hour of need."[7] The conduct of the Russian agent at Sofia, Cojander, was exasperating. Nine leading members of the Chamber went to him with a message which they wished to send to the Tsar, and he refused to transmit it.[8] So the message was

[3] *Revolution de Philippopolis*, pp. 59, 61.

[4] *Times*, Sept. 21, 1885.

[5] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 6.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 103. "They came in civilian clothes to say good-bye with tears in their eyes." Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 68.

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 22.

sent directly. Also a delegation was sent to interview the Tsar, who was then at Copenhagen. The delegation was received both by Giers and by the Tsar, but not much satisfaction was obtained. The official position taken by the Russian Government was expressed in a telegram from Giers. He said that there had been no change in the sentiments of Russia toward the Bulgarian people. It was intelligible that the Bulgarians should desire the union—such was also the wish of Russia, but the Emperor could not approve the means to which they had had recourse against the wish of His Majesty.[9]

The revolution in Eastern Roumelia was of special concern to the Porte, as both Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were her dependencies, and the deposition of the governor she had recently appointed was a measure of rebellion against her authority. Nevertheless, the Sultan was not sure that it was best for him to act. The seriousness of the situation was not realized at his court until the twentieth when he sent messengers to find out from foreign representatives what their views were.[10] Then he called together all the ministers and former Grand Viziers in the capital to a council. The session lasted many hours. No action was agreed upon, but it was decided to send a diplomatic note of protest to the Powers, and to despatch a few hundred men to the frontier.[11] The Sultan himself did not want to take any decided action, and so changed the ministry at this time. He simply appealed to the Powers to have the Treaty of Berlin enforced.[12] The Powers were anxious that the Sultan should not use force, as, if he did, there was great danger that public opinion in Russia would compel that government to interfere with a likelihood of worse massacres than in 1876. They acknowledged that the Sultan had the right to attack the Prince, but argued that it

[9]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 89. The Russian Foreign Minister told the British ambassador that the Tsar held the union desirable, but that he did not approve of revolution and that they could count on his intervention if the matter should be taken up. The deputation itself reported that the Tsar promised in union with the other Powers to try to bring about a favorable solution. F. Rachfahl, *Deutschland und die Weltpolitik*, I, 547.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 4.

[11]*Times*, Sept. 24, 1885.

[12]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 10. Kiamil Pasha became Grand Vizier and Said Pasha, Foreign Minister.

would not pay him to do so. Salisbury reminded him of the probable great expenditure and danger and showed him that Prince Alexander was likely to be more favorable to Turkey than anyone else that might take his place.[13] One of the first things the Prince did after the proclamation of union was to send a message to the Porte giving assurance that the Union carried with it absolutely no hostile intention against Turkey, and promising that it would be his most earnest endeavor to protect the Turks and other Mohammedans living under his rule.[14] The Prince kept his word, and became well liked by his Mohammedan subjects of whom there were 600,000 in Bulgaria and 180,000 in Eastern Roumelia.[15]

More threatening than Turkey were the other Balkan States, with one exception. Roumania kept calm, thinking she would gain more by doing so than by fighting for a little strip of territory. Serbia and Greece began immediately to talk about compensations. If Bulgaria was to be made a Greater Bulgaria, there ought to be a Greater Serbia and a Greater Greece. M. Gavashanine, the Serbian Foreign Minister, said to the British ambassador that it would be quite impossible for Serbia to remain inactive. Her sacrifices on account of the Treaty of Berlin had been enormous, and several million francs had been expended for railroads alone, whereas neither Turkey nor Bulgaria had met their respective obligations. So Serbia insisted on the Treaty or aggrandizement. There was no money in the treasury, but that was a reason for going to war. "A naked man will jump far" is a Serbian proverb that the Serbian minister quoted. In what direction she should jump, whether toward the south or east was at first uncertain. She finally decided to attack Bulgaria and appropriate the districts lying just east of her border, the former sanjaks of Sofia and Vidin. Her army was promptly mobilized and money was borrowed through Austrian and French bankers. In Athens, a public meeting was held at which inflammatory speeches were made. One of the leaders, who seems to have been one of their most eloquent orators exclaimed: "Let the Powers go to the devil; we do not want their

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 80.
[14] Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 199.
[15] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 64.

protection nor are we afraid of their threats." When the prime-minister said that Greece wished to live in peace, the crowd responded with "Long live war." But her activities were more likely to be against Turkey than against Bulgaria.[16]

The Great Powers who had made the Treaty of Berlin were very anxious over the situation, and held interviews and sent dispatches back and forth and tried in every way to control events. It was especially the affair of Austria-Hungary, as the nearest friend of Serbia at that time, to restrain her. So Kalnoky, foreign minister, tried, and had Count Khevenhüller, Austro-Hungarian minister in Serbia, tell King Milan that Austria-Hungary would not approve of arbitrary military action on the part of Serbia. King Milan noticed that the word 'tolerate' was not used and from that fact, took encouragement.[17] At another time, Kalnoky directed Khevenhüller to say that Austria-Hungary could not forfeit good relations with other Powers for the sake of Serbia. He had added to the instructions sent for the regulation of Serbia's conduct this sentence: "If Serbia instead of its present peaceful policy changes it for an aggressive one, then it will separate from us,"[18] but Francis Joseph eliminated that statement.

Bismarck, who was contemptuous of all the little Balkan States and thought them impudent to meddle with the settlement the Great Powers had reached, was not in sympathy with the Austrian alliance with Serbia, but he acknowledged Austria to be more especially interested in the Balkans and conceded that perhaps the Austrians were the best judges in the matter. He said, however, that Germany could not fight to help them because of the French danger. In a letter to Prince Henry of Reuss, Bismarck had some interesting and appropriate things to say about the demand for compensations, which Greece and Serbia were making:

"In regard to a right of Serbia to take compensation because Bulgaria and East Roumelia were united, we cannot think in what sense the word "right" may be taken. The alleged justi-

[16]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, pp. 113-15. Greece started several months later to seize territory which she thought she ought to have. The Powers protested, and she was brought to time by a blockade of her coast.

[17]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 200.

[18]*Ibid.*, p. 206.

fication, the maintaining of the balance of power will not bear examination. . . . If one understands the word in the usual sense, that no state should be powerful enough to threaten the independence of the rest, it strikes one that we cannot possibly apply it to the relations of the Balkan States with each other. Greece, Serbia, Bulgaria, have now each something like two million people, Montenegro only one quarter million, but Roumania five or six; this relation would undergo no essential change through the addition of 800,000 Roumelists to Bulgaria. The use of the word "compensation" in the mouth of Serbia is simply a palliation of their covetousness. I would not grudge their receiving an increase of territory, if possible in a peaceful way, but to assert a rightful claim is a presumption of a childish nature such as we are accustomed to expect from the young people of the South."[19]

Serbia had had quarrels with Bulgaria over two matters during the year before the coup d'état of September 18th. One was a boundary dispute. The river Timok formed part of the boundary line between the two countries, and during the year 1884, the channel of the river had changed somewhat, so that there was a doubt as to whether a certain island near Bregovo belonged to the one country, or to the other. The Serbian occupying troops were driven out by those of Bulgaria, and a breach of diplomatic relations ensued.[20] Attempts were made by Prince Alexander and King Milan to settle the question of possession amicably, but it remained unsolved in 1885. Another matter that had led to controversy and bad blood was the presence in Bulgaria of political fugitives from Serbia, and the refusal of the Bulgarian government to deliver them up. The discussion over the little island led to a correspondence between the two rulers which reached a considerable degree of intimacy, as neither of them thought the boundary dispute very important. Their letters contained expressions of the deepest mutual regard and affection. In December, King Milan had written: "Let Bulgaria and Serbia fight one another, we are, and we were, and

[19]*Die Grosse Politik*, V, 12. He might have added, "old people of the North." Cf. G. L. Dickinson, *International Anarchy*, p. 282, apropos of the demand for compensations by Germany, Russia, and England in China.

[20]*Times*, Oct. 29, 1884, p. 8.

we shall remain true to each other."[21] No doubt he meant it at the time. When, soon after the union was declared, Serbia threatened war against either Bulgaria or Turkey, Prince Alexander, remembering the friendly relations he had recently had with King Milan, sent him a letter giving the reasons for the union of the two Bulgarias and suggesting an understanding among the Balkan States in regard to spheres of action. The Prince also suggested an intimate entente between the two countries. King Milan did not think favorably of such a plan, nor would he consider joint action against Turkey from whom Alexander was expecting an attack. Three weeks later the Prince sent a messenger to King Milan looking toward an agreement, but the Serbian ruler refused to receive him.[22]

For Great Britain, Salisbury did the correct thing upon receiving the news of the event of September 18th, and telegraphed to Sir Arthur Paget, ambassador at Vienna, asking if Austria-Hungary was disposed to join Her Majesty's Government in making strong representations to the Bulgarian Government in favor of maintaining the Treaty of Berlin.[23] To the Queen he expressed himself as in favor of a personal union of the two Bulgarias with other arrangements remaining as they were. The Queen in answer referred to the bad treatment of the Prince by the Tsar, and thought it well to encourage the building of a strong state in the Balkans, if it were to be unfriendly to Russia. She thought the deposition of the Prince would be an injustice, and a danger to Turkey.[24] On September 27th, Salisbury directed Sir William White, British ambassador at Constantinople, to strive to keep the Sultan from military intervention in East-

[21]Corti, *op. cit.*, pp. 173 ff, 203.

[22]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 203. These are the reasons given by King Milan for his refusal to receive Prince Alexander's letter: "He felt that if the contents of the Prince's letter had not received the sanction of His Highness's Ministers any such negotiations upon such a basis might be discovered by them later, and that if they were merely a platonic expression of friendly feelings which did not in reality exist, they would be useless. Besides, he might offend the Sultan by negotiating with his vassal who had violated his engagements. *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 204.

[23]*Ibid.*, p. 2.

[24]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

ern Roumelia if no violence were offered to the Mussulmans there, and to resist proposals for the deposition of the Prince.[25]

To English audiences Salisbury expressed himself on the Bulgarian situation, on October 7th at Newport and at the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9th. One thing he had to do was to explain the change of policy from that of 1878. He claimed both policies to be sound. In 1878, the Greater Bulgaria could not be tolerated when it was occupied by Russian armies. Now Bulgaria was independent of Russia, and it was in Great Britain's interest that it be strong. "Our policy," he said at Newport, "I need not tell you is to uphold the Turkish Empire whenever it can be genuinely and healthily upheld; but whenever its rule is proved by events to be inconsistent with the welfare of populations, then to strive to cherish and foster strong self-sustaining nationalities who shall make a genuine and important contribution to the future freedom and independence of Europe."[26] At the Lord Mayor's banquet he said he was sure that if the decision of the Powers were against the people's wishes, it would not stand for long. He also expressed the opinion that it was not good statesmanship to oppose the political change in Bulgaria on the ground that, if additions were made to Bulgarian territory, compensation must be given her Balkan neighbors. If the Powers went on that principle, Bulgaria would not refrain from aggression, but Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia would all go together and you would have three small Powers to deal with instead of one.[27] The British policy of 1885 was more in accord with British democratic tradition than that of seven years earlier, and no doubt the prime-minister took more satisfaction in following it than he did that of the Berlin Congress, which he had supported as Beaconsfield's Foreign Minister.

It was, of course, recognized as soon as the outbreak in Eastern Roumelia occurred that it would be necessary for all the Great Powers to act together in order to act effectively. The Russian government proposed that the ambassadors at Constan-

[25] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, pp. 29-30.
[26] *Times*, Oct. 8, 1885.
[27] *Times*, Nov. 10, 1885.

tinople should meet and agree upon a policy.[28] They succeeded after a few informal meetings in agreeing upon a declaration, of which the following are significant portions.

The Powers received favorably the Sultan's request to join him "in the task of suppressing the disorders agitating one of the provinces of his Empire." They censure severely the events which have occurred in Eastern Roumelia. . . .

The maintenance of peace being the unanimous desire of the Great European Powers, they are determined to make it respected throughout the whole of the Balkan Peninsula. . . .

"They call the serious attention of the Bulgarian people to the responsibility under which they rest, and they warn them against yielding to reckless impulse, the consequence of which they would undergo without having any hope of external aid."[29] The note was delivered to the Bulgarian government on October 15th, and a few days later they replied, promising to comply with its conditions:

> The Government have succeeded in putting the Bulgarian populations beyond the frontiers on their guard against dangerous impulses which might disturb peace.
>
> They thank the Powers for their benevolent disposition, and trust that they will intercede with the Sultan for the realization of the ardent desire of the population so that instead of seeing the peace threatened by the separation of two sister countries, they may strengthen its security by union.[30]

But the declaration of October 13th was only a gesture. In order to solve the Eastern Roumelian question, a more formal meeting of the Powers was necessary, so the ambassadors of the Six Powers and the Turkish foreign minister met in November for that purpose. As at the Congress of Berlin, Russia and Great Britain were opposed to each other. It was to be expected that Russia and England at this time should take opposite sides in a discussion on the Eastern Question or any other question of foreign policy. In this same year, war was threatened on account of Russian aggression in Afghanistan. Russia was Great Britain's most consistent enemy during the whole of the last half of the nineteenth century. The reasons for the reversal of attitude by these two Powers is easily understood.

[28] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886,* p. 15.
[29] *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

Russia could not put up with the "ingratitude" of Alexander of Battenberg. England, whose representative came home in 1878 boasting of a peace with honor, because the plan for a Greater Bulgaria had been thwarted, was pleased with it now because the Greater Bulgaria of 1885 was not friendly to Russia.

Seven formal meetings of the ambassadors were held.[31] The Sultan wished the Powers to insist on the status quo ante and persuade the Prince to leave Eastern Roumelia with his troops. The Powers, except England, agreed. If that were done, the dignity of the Powers would be upheld, and the sanctity of treaties declared. The Eastern Powers were endeavoring at this time to work together. Italy stood with them and France was not ready to assert herself against them, so England stood alone. Her representatives argued for the spirit of the Treaty of Berlin, and for material order while those of Russia, Austria, and Germany stood for legal order and the letter of the treaty.[32] Salisbury was for taking account of the wishes of the people. He thought it possible to adopt "arrangements which shall conduce to the security of the main objects of the Treaty and be in accordance with its general spirit." To disregard the popular movement in Eastern Roumelia "will be to introduce an element of increased instability into the Balkan Peninsula. Such a policy can only for a short time offer any respite from disturbance."[33]

Russia and Austria could hardly be expected to be in sympathy with popular movements, and that was one of the reasons why they were opposed to the union. Said Pasha objected to Sir William White's proposal that the wishes of the people in the Turkish dominions be taken into account. That had been done in the case of Roumania and the Sultan had lost his provinces. He repudiated the expression, "wish of the population." "That

[31]Not counting a supplementary meeting, April, 1886.

[32]How sincere the governments of the Three Emperors were in their insisting upon the sanctity of treaties may be appreciated when one recollects the secret treaty they made in 1881, by which Austria Hungary reserved the right to take Bosnia and Herzegovina at the moment when she should judge it opportune, and agreed not to oppose the union of Bulgaria and East Roumelia at some future time.

[33]Instructions to Sir William White. *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886,* pp. 188-89.

expression is contrary to the conservative ideas which prevail in Europe."[34] Nelidoff, Russian ambassador approved the principle advocated by the Turk. At an earlier meeting of the conference, he had compared the method of unifying Germany and Italy with that by which the two Bulgarias had come together. "We have here indeed," he said, "the Representatives of two Powers, which have seen their national unity established, thanks to illustrious sovereigns and statesmen, whilst violent and revolutionary attempts always failed. In Bulgaria wise counsels have not prevailed."[35] When we think of the crooked diplomacy and the blood and iron policy of the "illustrious sovereigns and statesmen" and how the union of the two Bulgarias had taken place with practically none of either, we wonder about the value of the political standards which make the practice of war and deception the regular and normal course and the carrying out of the wishes of the people concerned contrary to the plans of these illustrious sovereigns and statesmen something not to be countenanced.

The conference of ambassadors at Constantinople accomplished nothing. They had to let the Eastern Roumelian question settle itself. It seemed to be the fault of Great Britain, but Sir William White said:

"If Nelidoff had taken the least trouble to seek for a formula at the Conference which might have secured uniformity, he might have got one. But he wanted to carry things with a high hand, thought the status quo ante could be reimposed by threats, and landed Russia where she now is, recommending the Turk to put down in his own fashion Christian orthodox Slavs."[36]

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 300.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 245.

[36] From a letter of Dec. 7, 1885, by Sir William White to Sir R. Morier, British ambassador at St. Petersburg in Edward's *Life of White*. White was unusually well informed on the Eastern Questions, and was not so much inclined to overlook the faults of the Turks as Sir Henry Elliot or Sir Austin Layard. "He had," says Dr. Washburn, "a more comprehensive and accurate knowledge of everything concerning the Eastern question than any other man living, and a better knowledge of all the men with whom he had to deal here and in Europe." *Fifty Years in Constantinople*, p. 186. Cf. also, Pears, *Forty Years in Constantinople*, p. 136.

The attack on Bulgaria by Serbia, which had been threatening, came while the conference was holding its ineffectual meetings. It had an important bearing on events. There were reasons, apparently not very important, which Serbia gave for her aggression and other reasons which were the real ones. King Milan seems to have calculated that his position in Serbia would be much strengthened by the war. His position needed strengthening, and would be, he thought, if he could make territorial acquisitions through a successful war. With the Bulgarian army weakened by the recall of its Russian officers, and further handicapped by its station in Eastern Roumelia far from the Serbian border, he thought success would be easy. There was an element in Serbia which favored the war. Milan seems not to have been egged on by the Austrian government, as is quite commonly represented. As indicated above, Kalnoky had instructed Kevenhüller to say that Austria did not approve of an attack upon Bulgaria. King Milan was told that there would be no hope of the extension of his territory by an attack on Bulgaria. But he told Count Kevenhüller that even if Austria-Hungary was for the union, he was not. His honor was bound up with the restoration of the status quo or extension of territory for Serbia, and on account of his personal position, he could not back down, it would be equivalent to his abdication. "Austria-Hungary cannot support both of us. She has the choice between me and the Prince of Bulgaria."[37]

The war began November 14th and lasted two weeks. Serbia won some successes at first; nevertheless, when the Bulgarian troops came from Eastern Roumelia, the Serbian army was driven back into Serbia and the victorious Bulgarian army would have reached Belgrade if Khevenhüller, the Austrian representative, had not interfered in behalf of Serbia. Kalnoky, Austrian foreign minister at this time, gives as reasons for checking the Bulgarian advance that it would have aroused all the Slavs and would have overthrown the Obrenovich dynasty. Bismarck did not approve of Austrian interference. He was afraid the Drei Kaiserbund, whose importance to him was very great, would be broken. Besides he argued that a Greater

[37]Corti, *op. cit.*, p. 214.

Serbia would not be in the interest of Austria-Hungary and that King Milan, who was nothing but a hysterical old woman, could not be relied on. Giers, too, said that, if Austria-Hungary should attack Bulgaria, it would give the impression that the Drei Kaiserbund was broken. So Kalnoky renounced mobilization and claimed that Khevenhüller, who was much more pro-Serbian than Kalnoky, had exceeded his instructions.[38]

The result of Alexander's successful campaign was important in the history of Bulgaria, as it made impossible what the three Eastern Powers were trying to bring about, the *status quo ante.* The Prince became at once a national hero. Brophy, British Consul at Bourgas, wrote that he, who was an object of indifference to many Bulgarians a few weeks ago, was now a hero. They called him "the tsar who wears sandals of hide" because he wore what the common soldier wore and suffered the same hardships as he did.[39] Sir R. Morier wrote from St. Petersburg to Salisbury that: "After such deeds, His Highness had once for all identified himself with his subjects. The idea of separating his destinies from those of the people who had fought under his guidance seemed to me one that no diplomatic combination could again entertain."[40] The Russian press which was never allowed to depart far from the views of the autocracy was full of praise for the Prince and for the Bulgarian army which was, of course, a Russian creation. An Imperial Order praised "the bravery, the devotion, the constancy, and the obedience of discipline shown by Bulgarian and Eastern Roumelian troops.[41] The Conference of Ambassadors ceased to meet, and before long, Sir R. Morier wrote from St. Petersburg that "the Minister for Foreign Affairs for the first time to-day admitted in the course of conversation that a return to the *status quo ante* might not prove possible."[42] The Tsar however, was, as always, unrelenting toward Prince Alexander.

[38]Rachfall, *op. cit.*, pp. 569-70.

[39]*Times*, Dec. 18, 1885, p. 8. The Prince was probably better known in other parts of Bulgaria.

[40]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 372.

[41]*Ibid.*, p. 374.

[42]*Ibid.*, p. 423.

Already the administration of the Principality and Eastern Roumelia had been amalgamated.[43] The name South Bulgaria had been substituted in public documents for that of Eastern Roumelia.[44] It was to the credit of the Prince and his government that good order had been kept in the territory they were ruling. It helped his cause materially that few complaints were made of ill treatment or disorder in places where Mussulmans were numerous, and that no outbreak in Macedonia had led to a dangerous situation.[45] Karaveloff, who was chief minister at this critical period, took much credit to himself for the absence of undesirable events. He told a *Times* reporter that he was the most influential Bulgarian and "You don't know," he said, "what it has cost me to keep Macedonia in check."[46] Lascelles and other British agents were struck with the good order maintained.[47]

After the failure of the Conference of the Powers to bring about a settlement, a feeble attempt was made by Turkey to deal with the situation according to her views and those of the Eastern Powers. Early in December, the Porte sent two commissioners to Philippopolis to demand submission to the Sultan. Igelstrom, the Russian representative there advised those in control to yield to the demands, but they were not willing to do that, and the Turkish commissioners, finding no encouragement from any other quarter, soon left, one going back to Constantinople, and the other going on to Sofia.[48]

In order not to let the affair out of their control entirely, the Signatory Powers of the Treaty of Berlin thought it best to encourage the Sultan and the Prince to make an agreement which

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 183.

[44] *Ibid.*, p. 72.

[45] In the war against Serbia, the Turks fought with the Christians of Bulgaria. It was the custom in Bulgaria for military decorations to be distributed to the various companies, and by them conferred upon individual men considered deserving. In one company in which the majority were Christians, the soldiers voted to bestow the first decoration for distinguished service upon a Turk.

[46] *Times*, Oct. 27, 1885.

[47] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 1, 1886*, p. 132.

[48] *Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 2, 1886*, p. 21.

they might accept, perhaps with some changes. The Prince regarded it as disgraceful that he should have to be a vassal of the Turk, but, thinking that he might use the suzerainty relationship to keep Greece and Serbia from getting Macedonia, he consented to a treaty.[49] The first item in it was that:

"The Governor-Generalship of Eastern Roumelia shall be intrusted to Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin for so long as His Highness preserves a correct and faithful attitude towards the Court of His Suzerain, and devotes his efforts to maintaining order and security in the province and advancing the welfare of the Roumeliot population."

Another provision promised the support of the Bulgarian army if any of the Turkish provinces bordering on Bulgaria were attacked, and of the Turkish army, if Bulgaria were attacked. Certain districts in the Rhodope Mountain region inhabited by Mohammedans were to be handed over to Turkey, and Bulgaria agreed to pay the tribute due from Eastern Roumelia.[50]

Such was the treaty made by Turkey and the Prince, but as it was a modification of the Treaty of Berlin, the Signatory Powers claimed the right to interpose. Russia, especially, objected to it. Accordingly, changes were made and the revised draft presented to the delegates of the Powers at an eighth meeting of the Conference after a five month interval. The protocol was adopted on April 5, 1886. The military agreement between Turkey and Bulgaria was not to be permitted. Russia perhaps suspected that it was against her, but she argued that it might compel Bulgaria to attack Christian neighbors. A second change made at the instigation of Russia was with regard to the position of the Prince. The revised version of the treaty read: "The Governor-Generalship of Eastern Roumelia shall be intrusted to the Prince of Bulgaria in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty of Berlin."[51] In this provision thus stated, the mention of Alexander was avoided. It was another opportunity for the Tsar to show his unrelenting disapproval of his

[49]Rachfall, *op. cit.*, p. 575.
[50]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 2, 1886*, p. 123.
[51]*Ibid.*, p. 223.

cousin. The same animosity was shown later when the Prince again tried to effect a reconciliation. He had taken pains to praise the Russian training of his army and, on one occasion, gave orders to have the Russian national hymn played together with that of Bulgaria. He also sent by General Cantacuzene, a letter to the Tsar. The only reply of the Tsar was: "I will listen to nothing more from the Prince of Battenberg."[52]

The Prince objected strongly to the change in the terms made with Turkey. "I cannot and will not," he said, "lend a hand to the re-establishment of international sovereignty in Eastern Roumelia which was the principal cause of the Government without strength, without authority, not respected, and consequently even injurious to the interests of the people."[53] Some of the diplomats thought the Prince unwise not to accept in a docile spirit what the Great Powers thought best. However that may be, one cannot but admire his spirit and conjecture that he was right.

The union was supposed to be only a personal one. Alexander of Battenberg was Prince of Bulgaria and Governor General of Eastern Roumelia, distinct entities bearing different relations to the sovereign of both, the Sultan of Turkey. However, as we have seen, the administration of the two territories had been amalgamated, and in June, 1886, the deputies elected in Eastern Roumelia went to Sofia and sat with those from Bulgaria. At the opening of the National Assembly the Prince took the stand that the union had been accomplished. This in part is what he said:

> The heroic feats of the Bulgarian armies, and the enormous sacrifices endured by the nation have gained for Bulgaria the sympathy of the civilized world, caused obstacles and difficulties to disappear and thrown the weight of their influence into the scale in order that its wishes and legitimate aspirations may be satisfied. Thus it is that to-day we declare to you Deputies with great

[52]Another example of the Tsar's displeasure, a quite unnecessary action, was his dismissal of the Prince from the Russian army where he held an honorary commission. It was a public announcement of the Tsar's hostility, and so understood. This occurred on November 3rd, and the immediate occasion, the Prince believed, was a false or exaggerated report by Cojander of what the Prince had said, or was alleged to have said about Russian officers who had been in his service. *Times*, Dec. 22, 1885; *Spectator*, Nov. 7, 1885.

[53]*Parlia. Papers, Turkey, No. 2, 1886*, p. 13.

joy, that the union of the two Bulgarias so long looked for and so sincerely desired has already been accomplished; the proof of it is that to-day a General National Bulgarian Assembly will examine and decide respecting the affairs and questions which concern the interests of our united country.[54]

A few days later the Assembly put out its reply. It was not approved unanimously, for Tsankoff and about twenty of his followers who were pro-Russian at this time, left the hall and refused to vote, while two voted against it.[55] The great majority accepted the position taken by the Prince.[56]

The Sultan sent remonstrances to the Prince, and the Russian newspapers violently protested. Giers said to Sir Robert Morier that it was a wholly illegal union, and a wholly illegal common parliament. The newspapers of Russia could be more outspoken than the Foreign Minister. The *Novoe Vremya* in its issue of June 17, expressed itself as follows:

It required a good deal of self confidence for the Ruler of the Principality of Bulgaria and Governor General of Eastern Roumelia to address the Representatives of the Bulgarian people in the tone and with the expressions of the Constitutional Head of an independent country, and to assure them that the union of Bulgaria is now distinctly an accomplished fact. Of course, all who listened to the speech knew very well that this is not yet the case; that Prince Alexander is at the same time a vassal Prince and a Turkish official; that the Representatives of Eastern Roumelia appear in the Assembly without any legal right, and only by the toleration of the Porte; that there does not yet exist any general Bulgarian Constitution and that the events of last winter show anything you like except the right of Prince Alexander to talk of the neighboring States of the Balkan Peninsula.[57]

The Bulgarians of the two provinces went on as if they were really united and in the course of time, the situation was accepted by the European Powers.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 35-39.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 50.
[56] *Ibid.*
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

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